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Abstract 
A number of studies have reported that the returns from acquisitions made by private equity 
(PE) firms have exceeded those of the public markets, e.g. the S&P 500. The outperformance 
displayed in the buyouts made by private equity firms is perplexing, particularly given the 
underperformance and high failure rate typically reported in studies of traditional corporate 
mergers and acquisitions (M&A). This dissertation strives to shed a light on the dichotomy by 
examining the activities in a select sample of buyouts during the pre-buyout phase, holding period, 
and the exit transaction. 
The study makes a number of significant contributions. It contributes to the theoretical and 
conceptual understanding of private equity buyouts by materially extending previous models of 
value creation into a novel taxonomy and cohesive structure. It contributes empirically by filling an 
important research gap concerning the subset of buyouts that exhibited exceptional 
outperformance compared to peer firms in PE portfolios. The inductive multiple–case study 
approach in combination with access to proprietary interview data permitted an in-depth analysis 
of the factors conducive to buyout value creation. The analysis indicates the key factors resulting 
in the outperformance were timing the entry and exit transaction to the business and industry 
cycles, identifying and executing the apposite business strategy, utilizing alternative modes of debt 
financing, discerning the pre-buyout target firm characteristics, implementing a pervasive array of 
operational improvements, and lastly, achieving high-levels of employee motivation and 
commitment across the organization. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tiivistelmä 
Useat tutkimukset ovat osoittaneet, että keskimääräiset tuotot pääomayhtiöiden 
velkarahoitteisista yrityskaupoista ovat ylittäneet osakesijoitusten tuotot (esimerkiksi Standard & 
Poor 500). Kysymys, miksi velkarahoitteiset yrityskaupat onnistuvat on mielenkiintoinen, etenkin 
kun huomioidaan, että monet tutkimukset ovat osoittaneet useiden perinteisten yrityskauppojen 
epäonnistuvan ja tuhoavan osakearvoa. Tämä väitöskirja pyrkii selventämään kysymystä 
tarkastelemalla muutoksia valikoidussa otoksessa velkarahoitteisia salkkuyhtiöitä koko 
omistuskauden aikana. 
Väitöskirjan tuloksilla on merkittävä tieteellinen kontribuutio alalle. Tutkimus edistää 
teoreettista ja käsitteellistä ymmärtämystä pääomayhtiöiden velkarahoitteisista yrityskaupoista 
laajentamalla oleellisesti aikaisempaa käsitystä lisäarvon luomisesta yhdenmukaisempaan 
taksonomiaan ja rakenteeseen. Empiirisesti tutkimus täyttää merkittävää tieteellistä aukkoa 
tarkastelemalla velkarahoitteisia yritysostoja, jotka osoittavat poikkeuksellista kannattavuutta 
verrattuna verrokkiryhmään pääomayhtiöiden yrityssalkuissa. Induktiivinen monitapaustutkimus 
sekä luottamuksellisen tiedon saaminen pääomayhtiöistä sallivat perusteellisen analyysin 
tekijöistä, jotka mahdollistavat lisäarvon luominen yrityksissä. Analyysi osoittaa, että 
kannattavuuteen vaikuttavat päätekijät ovat osto- ja myyntihetken ajoittaminen 
suhdannevaihteluun sekä teollisuuden suhdannekiertoon, soveltuvan yritysstrategian 
tunnistaminen ja käyttöön ottaminen, vaihtoehtoisten velkarahoitusmuotojen käyttäminen, 
yrityksen ominaisuuksien todentaminen ennen ostotapahtumaa, laaja-alaisten operatiivisten 
muutosten läpivieminen sekä koko henkilöstön motivointi ja sitouttaminen. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sammanfattning 
Ett flertal studier har rapporterat att den genomsnittliga avkastningen från private equity 
bolagens buyout-förvärv sedan 1980-talet överstigit avkastningen från aktiemarknader (till 
exempel Standard & Poor 500). Den höga avkastningen från riskkapitalbolagens lånefinansierade 
företagsköp är paradoxal med tanke på forskning av traditionella företagsköp och fusioner påvisat 
att de senare ofta misslyckas och förstör aktieägarvärde. Syftet med avhandlingen har varit att 
åskådliggöra skillnaden genom att studera de förändringar som gjordes i ett urval av buyout-
förvärv innan köptransaktionen, under innehavsperioden, samt fram till dess företaget avyttrades. 
Avhandlingen bidrar till ämnesområdet på ett flertal punkter. Den bidrar teoretiskt och 
konceptuellt genom att väsentligen utvidga tidigare modeller av värdeskapande aktiviteter vid 
buyout-förvärv och integrera dessa aktiviteter i en ny sammanlänkad taxonomi och struktur. Den 
bidrar empiriskt genom att fylla en betydande lucka i forskningen angående den undergrupp av 
buyout-förvärv som påvisar exceptionellt hög avkastning i förhållande till jämförelsegruppen av 
portföljbolag. Kombinationen av en induktiv flerfallsstudie i förbindelse med tillgång på 
konfidentiell information från PE bolagen möjliggjorde att en ingående analys av faktorerna som 
påverkade värdeökningen. Resultatet utvisar att de centrala faktorerna för värdeökningen var 
timing av köp- och säljtransaktionen till den allmänna konjunkturen samt industricykeln, att 
relevant företagsstrategi identifierades och verkställdes, att alternativa källor för skuldfinansiering 
kunde säkras, att målföretagets särdrag identifierades innan köptransaktionen, att genomgripande 
operativa förändringar genomfördes, och slutligen, att hela personalen kunde motiveras och 
engageras i förändringsarbetet. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
1.1 Background 
The question of how to successfully pursue mergers and acquisitions (M&A) lies at the core of 
management and has long been of principal interest in management research. The result has been a 
cornucopia of multinational studies and, with the high failure rate, an abundance of explanations and 
justifications appear in research. Often the professed reason is found in the conflict of interests that emerges 
during integration or in insurmountable difficulties posed by divergent corporate cultures. At other times the 
impediment to M&A success is the haphazard execution of a shared strategic vision for the unified 
corporation. There is obviously truth to the notion that M&A poses a challenge for corporations, as the 
average failure rate is typically in the vicinity of 50%1. Yet despite the evident difficulty of M&A, a particular 
industry known as private equity has been remarkably successful in the repeated pursuit of acquisitions (Harris, 
Jenkinson, & Kaplan, 2014). The conundrum is perplexing. Why is it that private equity firms can successfully 
pursue unrelated acquisitions year after year, when the failure rate is so prevalent among traditional 
corporations that acquire adjacent businesses? 
Traditionally studies on private equity acquisitions, or buyouts2, have primarily been carried out by a 
particular strand of researchers within financial research, which means there is considerably less research 
devoted to the subject compared to M&A. However, taken on the whole, research is much less ambiguous 
with regards to the ensuing value generation in buyouts. For instance, there is recent evidence of market 
outperformance by mature PE firms that have existed for more than five years (Kaplan & Schoar, 2005; 
Acharya, Gottschalg, Hahn, & Kehoe, 2011). More surprisingly, Acharya et al. (2011, p.2) find “this performance 
is persistent, a characteristic that is generally associated with potential existence of ‘skill’ in a fund manager.” 
This finding is counterintuitive, especially when considering that the PE firms lack the opportunity to exact any 
benefit from the synergy potential that is found in related acquisitions, which by contrast corporate strategic 
buyers exploit to the fullest extent. It evokes questions: Why and how do private equity firms create value in 
the acquired portfolio firms? 
Moreover, there is an evident gap in research on the limited subset of leveraged buyouts (LBOs), resulting 
in momentous value creation that substantially exceeds the industry norm3. Does this particular unique 
subset of outperforming private equity portfolio firms differ from the average buyout and, if so, by what 
measure? What are the characterizing attributes of such portfolio firms and what changes were enacted 
during the holding period? 
                                                                                       
1 For reviews of research on M&A failure rates, see Jensen & Ruback, 1983; Agrawal, Jaffe, Mandelker, 1992; Gregory, 1997; 
Mitchell & Stafford, 2000; Ali-Yrkkö, 2002; Tichy, 2002; Cartwright & Schoenberg, 2006). Harvard’s Clayton Christensen 
summarizes the reported failure rates as often being in the realm of 70-90% (Christensen, Alton, Rising, & Waldeck, 2011). 
2 A buyout is the acquisition of a company mainly by debt and to a lesser extent equity and where the target company's 
assets typically act as collateral for the debt. Refer to the glossary in the appendix for further definitions. 
3 In private equity research, performance is a financial measure in basic terms defined as the delta between entry and exit 
transaction price, while adjusting for investment duration, e.g. internal rate of return (IRR) or the net present value (NPV). 
– 15 – 
There are a number of reasons for the evident research gap. First, private equity research has largely fallen 
below the radar of mainstream academic research, particularly when compared to M&A of public companies. 
A plausible answer to the puzzle is that data is hard to come by. The laws and regulations that govern private 
equity firms are much less constraining, especially with regards to the public information disclosure of 
portfolio firms. This means that the accessible information is at the opposite end of the spectrum relative to 
a public corporation listed on a stock exchange. Consequently, there are decidedly fewer avenues for 
conducting well–designed longitudinal studies, and research remains relatively scarce in regard to other 
organizational forms. 
Second, the principal data sources for research stem from a comparatively limited set of commercial or 
academic databases, such as the Thomson Venture Economics dataset. An inherent problem in using 
databases is the restriction on the type and extent of data. For instance, it may be unfeasible to study the 
effect the improved corporate climate had on profitability if the necessary “soft factors” were never gathered 
in the first place. This problem often results in the operationalization of proxies that are inadequate. A 
consequence of the prevailing quantitative research methodology is that there is a paucity of in–depth 
research of the value creation mechanisms within portfolio firms. By contrast, there is an abundance of studies 
on a more appropriate topic for quantitative research, such as attributing value creation to a few broad–
ranging categories, e.g. leverage, industry growth, and operational improvements. While relying on 
commercial databases is a convenient method for conducting research, the recurring studies on similar topics 
seldom reveal new and meaningful information and may even be construed as academic exercises. Moreover, 
categorizing the ensuing value creation under a few broad labels does little to elucidate our understanding of 
the specific mechanisms behind the value creation. 
Third, the prevailing quantitative approach in private equity research on financial outperformance has been 
to juxtapose the “top quartile” of buyout funds or portfolio firms with the “bottom quartile”. However, to 
contend that this is an exhaustive and sufficient method for explicating genuinely outperforming portfolio 
firms is misguided. We would hardly consider a research approach that relied on contrasting the average 
quartiles of tennis players to be appropriate for gaining insight to the characteristics of elite performers. The 
reason for the deficiency is probably that research on private equity is an offshoot of finance, which effectively 
implies relying on a quantitative approach. While the methods have been remarkably successful for solving 
numerous problems in finance and are crucial to modern science, it is also the case that quantitative analysis 
is ill–suited for examining pivotal extreme values and corner test cases (Flyvbjerg, 2006). Consequently there 
are to date no extant studies, as far as this researcher knows, on the “statistical outliers” of buyouts that 
substantially outperform their peers. 
The dissertation makes a number of significant contributions. First, it contributes to the conceptual 
understanding of private equity buyouts by materially extending previous models of value generation. The 
need for constructing an extended model was evident by the numerous uncovered inconsistencies and 
deficiencies in previous research, which became increasingly evident during literary review. The circumstances 
warranted the creation of a new taxonomy and nomenclature, along with a cohesive structure, for examining 
value generation in buyouts. 
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Second, the literature review of the dissertation brings together several streams of private equity research 
that cover various facets of value generation. Multiple articles and dissertations have been published 
previously regarding different research strands of private equity research, but none which explicitly 
concentrate on buyout value generation. 
Third, the multi–case study is comprised of buyouts within the Nordic countries. The Nordic region can be 
viewed as a fairly homologous region characterized by societal commonalities across several dimensions, e.g. 
economic, legal, and cultural. Albeit a limited sample, the analysis suggests that there may well exist 
commonalities among the Nordic buyouts that partially distinguish these from their Anglo–American 
counterparts. 
Fourth, and foremost, this study makes an empirical contribution by examining and reporting the findings 
from a distinct selection of buyouts: the value generation mechanisms in a small–N subset of exceptionally 
high–performing buyouts. Previous studies have examined, using quantitative methodologies, the top 
quartiles (25%) of ‘superior’ buyouts. However, the prior segmentation can be construed as performing on an 
order of magnitude below the exclusive small–N subset of this study. Finally, the study includes a sample of 
contrast cases where the buyouts substantially failed to increase the validity and reliability of the study. While 
the research is fundamentally an inductive multiple–case study, the study augments and strengthens the 
analysis by anchoring it to a previously derived cohesive structure. 
1.2 Purpose of Study 
The overall aims with the research project were to elucidate the preconditions and characteristics of 
buyout firms with exceptional performance and to discern potentially critical mechanisms for 
outperformance. The research approach was to gather a sample of buyout firms that substantially 
outperformed peers and to juxtapose the mechanisms of buyout value generation with previous research. In 
order to attain the objective, an extensive literary review of the subject was conducted. The result of this 
process was a panoramic overview of the value generation landscape and a unique perspective into focal 
portfolio firms throughout the buyout life cycle. 
The particular research questions examined in the study were: 
1. Do value generation mechanisms differ from the mechanisms currently recognized in extant research 
within the small–N sample of outperforming buyout firms? 
2. Provided discrepancies exist, how should the framework for value generation be augmented to 
provide a more accurate theoretical–conceptual view? 
3. Can novel value generation mechanisms be induced from the case material to generate propositions 
suitable for subsequent quantitative examination? 
An overall aspiration with the dissertation was to retain a pragmatic scientific perspective and approach, 
according to the research tradition of private equity and finance, whereas more recondite ontological 
constructs of management were de–emphasized. Of principal importance has been the applied research 
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tradition of finance and in particular the stream that concerns private equity buyouts. The pragmatic scientific 
approach also prompted the inclusion of research conducted by well–known consulting firms4, albeit the vast 
majority of the research consisted of academic research published in peer–reviewed articles. However, it 
should be noted that incorporating research conducted by consulting firms is common practice in research on 
private equity, typically because proprietary data is exclusively available to consulting firms. Furthermore, a 
number of studies are in fact collaborations between academic institutions and consultancies. 
In accordance with the overall aspiration, the aim has been to make a significant academic contribution to 
the research community, while at the same time conducting research that is of relevance to the wider 
community of managers and private equity practitioners. 
1.3 Scope and Limitations 
At the onset, a number of restrictions were decided upon in order to ensure the study’s feasibility. The 
scope of the research was delimited by requiring that each portfolio firm included in the study had to be among 
those at the pinnacle of existing buyouts in terms of standard measures for financial performance, i.e. the 
Internal Rate of Return (IRR) of the investment. All of the included PE firms are among the leading firms in 
the Nordic countries in terms of committed capital and had participated in the buyouts of several dozens of 
portfolio firms. 
Since the research methodology was a qualitative study, the quality of the data sources was crucial. For 
each case, two sources were deemed essential, i.e. the senior general partner (GP) of the PE firm involved in 
the case and the CEO of the portfolio firm during the holding period. Other personnel sources were desirable 
and were included when available. The decision to valorize these sources was made to ensure the validity and 
needed sufficiency in regard to granularity of the data. Having personnel tied to the case during the holding 
period improved the quality of the data and ensured that detailed information was captured, e.g. various 
operational changes during the holding period. Moreover, having at least two independent sources would 
mitigate problems of trustworthiness, i.e. what is usually referred to as reducing bias in quantitative research. 
The geographical scope of the study was delimitated by concentrating on private equity firms located and 
headquartered within the Nordic countries. The Nordic region can be viewed as a fairly homologous region 
characterized by societal commonalities across several dimensions, e.g. economic, legal, and cultural. 
Surprisingly, there were few private equity research projects with a Nordic scope, as the vast majority of prior 
studies covered a single country. A barrier for conducting research in multiple Nordic countries is the language 
barrier, which is a factor that is emphasized when conducting interviews. Even though English comprehension 
is on average of a high–level among study participants, it does not mean that the level of expression equates 
to that of fluency in the native language of the participant. The richness and depth of collected research data 
would be lost without fluency in the local language by the researcher. Since the researcher is a native Swedish 
speaker and has near fluent comprehension of Norwegian, and also speaks fluent Finnish, language was no 
                                                                                       
4 The primary sources were the publications by the consulting firms McKinsey, Bain, BSG, A.T. Kearney, Booz, Deloitte, PwC, 
Ernst & Young, and KPMG. 
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barrier and all interviews could be conducted in the native languages of the participants. 
With regards to the type of case study firms, the scope was limited to include portfolio firms acquired by 
leveraged buyouts. This means excluding germane–investment vehicles, such as venture capital funds and 
distressed securities funds. The delimitation served to increase comparability among the firms and 
homogeneity of the value creation source. Likewise, all case study firms were of a comparable size, which 
meant that all positive case firms were mid–sized and employed 500–1,000 people. 
As the research scope consisted of exploring the mechanisms for value creation, substantial segments of 
private equity research were peripheral, e.g. employment effects of the industry, the financial performance of 
private equity at the fund level, the historical development of the PE industry. Despite these limitations, value 
creation is an expansive concept, as it combines various strands of research that seek to improve corporate 
performance. Obviously it would have been unfeasible to include all prospective mechanisms for value 
creation in buyouts. As a consequence, the research scope was delimited to include the value creation 
mechanisms researched on private equity buyouts. 
The research approach can be viewed as an inductive multiple case study that extensively utilizes various 
streams of previous research on value creation in buyouts. By extension the research provides a panoramic 
overview of value creation in a buyout from pre–buyout target criteria to the mode of exit. While the vast 
majority of the included research is limited to academic studies on private equity buyouts, in a few instances 
research by other management disciplines has been included, e.g. strategic management. 
1.4 Organization 
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows. First, I outline the previous theoretical research on 
buyouts and prior theoretical–conceptual models of value generation. I conclude the section by proposing a 
more complete model of buyout value generation that brings together various strands of research. Second, I 
conduct an extensive literary review of value generation in previous research, which is categorized according 
to the proposed structure. Third, I introduce relevant aspects of the qualitative research methodology and 
recount how this multiple case study research project was conducted. Fourth, I present the buyout case study 
firms in a narrative form, where each presented case firm narrative is the amalgamation of multiple 
interviews. Fifth, I conduct a comprehensive and transparent data analysis and synthesize the findings of the 
study. In the final chapter, I discuss the findings and derived propositions, and propose prospective directions 
for future research. 
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Chapter 2. Fundamental Research on Value 
Generation 
The objective of this chapter is to present the principal theoretical views on value generation in private 
equity buyouts. The various effects of the theories will resurface, starting at the beginning of the 
dissertation with the review of the specific value generation mechanisms in Chapter 3: An Empirically 
Derived Taxonomy of Value Generation. 
2.1 The Agency Theoretical View on Buyouts 
2.1.1 The Agency Theory 
The agency theory has long been the cornerstone of research on buyouts (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Fama, 
1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983a, 1983b). However, the inherent conflict in corporations caused by interest 
divergence has a long history in economics. Adam Smith (1776) already commented on the consequence of 
ownership separation in a joint stock company in his magnum opus5. Another milestone was a seminal book 
by Berle and Means (1932), in which the authors expressed the central problem inherent to the modern 
corporation6. Subsequently, a number of researchers have provided evidence that the incentives for 
management to maximize firm value in public corporations are weak (Baumol, 1959; Marris, 1964; Williamson, 
1964). Moreover, it has been surmised that management is often indirectly incentivized to retain profits and 
increase the size of the firm, which increases remuneration and power (Berle & Means, 1932; Baumol, 1959; 
Marris, 1964). 
At a time prior to the first boom of buyouts, Jensen and Meckling (1976) developed the theory further in a 
seminal paper where the agency problem was construed as a contractual obligation between two parties 
consisting of the principal (“shareholder”) and the agent (“management”). The principal in this context is the 
owner of the corporation, which entrusts the residual control to the agent. The agent is the professional 
manager that acts on behalf of the principal. The problem arises when the agent has access to more and better 
information, and the respective interests between the parties are not perfectly symmetrical. Provided both 
parties maximize their utility, their respective interests will gradually diverge, which leads to a situation where 
the agent is not necessarily acting in the best interest of the principal by maximizing the utility of the 
corporation. Moreover, the principal has no means of knowing when it will occur. 
As envisioned by Jensen and Meckling (1976), the principal has at his disposal two means for limiting the 
interest divergence. Firstly, the principal may structure the agent’s contract with incentives consistent with 
the principal’s interests (i.e. bonding costs). Secondly, the principal may expend resources to monitor the 
                                                                                       
5 “The directors of such companies”, as Bank of England, “being the managers rather of other people’s money than of their 
own, it cannot well be expected that they should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a 
private copartnery frequently watch over their own.” (Smith, 1776, p.606). 
6 “If we are to assume that the desire for personal profit is the prime force motivating control, we must conclude that the 
interests of control are different from and often radically opposed to those of ownership; that the owners most emphatically 
will not be served by a profit–seeking controlling group.” (Berle & Means, 1932, p.114). 
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behavior of the agent. However, constructing a contract so as to perfectly align the interests becomes 
infeasible at a certain point, when the marginal utility equals the marginal costs. The reduction in the 
principal’s welfare that remains after the optimization, i.e. residual loss, is an additional cost of an agency 
relationship. Consequently, the agency costs, as construed by Jensen and Meckling (1976, p.6), are the 
aggregate sum of (i) the monitoring expenditures by the principal, (ii) the bonding expenditures by the agent, 
and, (iii) the residual loss. 
The various penalty costs that emerge as a consequence of the corporate ownership separation increase 
when management is in possession of a surplus cash flow but lacks positive net present value (NPV) 
investment opportunities (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986b). Jensen (1986b, p.15) describes this surplus 
as the “cash flow in excess of that required to fund all projects that have positive net present values when 
discounted at the relevant cost of capital”. The agency costs of free cash flow tend to be particularly destructive 
in mature public companies that generate steady revenues, but with few remaining profitable investment 
opportunities, such as the steel, chemical, tobacco, paper, and textile industries (Eun & Resnick, 2011, p.86). 
Ultimately, the unproductive use of free cash flow will lead to value destruction. The downward spiral of 
value destruction is self–perpetuating, as management has minimal incentives to dispose of the free cash flow 
to shareholders, while much to gain by retaining control (Jensen, 1986b, 1989a). Without the discipline of being 
compelled to return excess capital to shareholders, management can use the accumulated capital to fund 
unprofitable investments and pursue value–destroying mergers. Jensen (1986b) even suggests that managers 
being left unchecked and unmonitored by investors was the primary cause for the massive inefficiencies that 
plagued corporate America in the late 1960s and 1970s. 
Agency costs have been at the center of much research (Jensen, 1986b, 1989b; Kaplan, 1989b; Mian & 
Rosenfeld, 1993; Holthausen & Larcker, 1996) and already early on researchers found that buyouts tended to 
attenuate agency costs (Lehn & Poulsen, 1989). The agency costs are endogenous to the firm and depend on 
multiple factors, e.g. governance structure and management incentives (Smith, 1990a). In this context, the 
leveraged buyout emerges as a particularly well–suited mechanism to “suppress the temptation that free cash 
flow creates” (Haarmeyer, 2008). The costs tend to be smaller in the post–buyout firm, as the reorganization 
that follows typically involves measures that reduce the agency costs in a number of ways (Kaplan, 1989b). A 
principal explanatory factor for the cost reduction comes from the change in governance structure elicited by 
a buyout. Since buyouts are typically financed with substantial amounts of debt, it can function as a dividend 
substitute to dispose of the excess free cash flow (Jensen, 1989a). 
From this perspective, the buyout can be viewed as a market mechanism surrogate to suppress the costs 
of free cash flows. Instead of disposing of free cash flows as dividends, the buyout permits the owners to use 
the free cash flow to serve interest payments and amortize debt payments. However, here it must be noted 
that the import of this aspect as an inducement for buyouts has diminished since the mid–1990s. Subsequent 
research reveals that the free cash flow has become insignificant as a motive for Public–to–Private 
transactions (Renneboog, Simons, & Wright, 2005; Weir, Laing, & Wright, 2005; Bharath & Dittmar, 2010). 
This is a period in time that coincides with an increased emphasis by private equity firms on operational 
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restructuring. 
In practice, debt imposes a regimen of internal control that compels managers to service interest payments 
and reduce the amount of free cash flow (Kaplan, 1989b; Smith, 1990b). As a consequence, high levels of debt 
reduce the amount of corporate expenditures at managerial discretion and limit non–value maximizing 
behavior (Grossman & Hart, 1983; Jensen, 1986b, 1989a, 1989b; Lehn & Poulsen, 1989; Smith, 1990a; Stulz, 
1990; Newbould, Chatfield, & Anderson, 1992). Moreover, the debt burden forces managers to run the 
company efficiently in order to avoid default (Lowenstein, 1985; Jensen, 1986b; Thompson & Wright, 1991; 
Cotter & Peck, 2001). In fact, Opler and Titman (1993, p.1988) state that debt induces “management to act in 
the interest of investors in ways that cannot be duplicated with optimally designed compensation packages”. 
Central to the buyout is the change of ownership and assertion of control through the board of directors. 
Here the board has at its disposal a number of methods to cope with the agency problem, e.g. providing equity 
ownership stakes that realign the incentives of management by instigating a regime of closer monitoring and 
control that reduces the manager’s discretionary decision space (Fama, 1980; Demsetz, 1983; Jensen, 1988; 
Baker & Wruck, 1989; Lichtenberg & Siegel, 1990). In addition, the principal control function of the board is to 
allow the owner to exert power in determining the composition of the management team (Baker & 
Montgomery, 1994). The methods for reducing agency conflict can be collected under the umbrella of 
governance. Not surprisingly, several researchers find that adjustments to corporate governance are central 
to buyout value creation (Rogers, Holland, & Haas, 2002b; Heel & Kehoe, 2005; Zong, 2005; Wright, 
Renneboog, Simons, & Scholes, 2006). 
Arnold (2005) suggests that the agency conflict should be perceived as originating from the asymmetric 
information between the finance providers and the corporate managers. Assuming that the shareholders or 
financiers have access to perfect information, there would be no leeway for managers to invest excess free 
cash flows and these would thus be disposed of as dividends to the financiers. Since finance providers rarely 
have direct access to internal information of the firm, they thereby incur additional risk. For instance, 
incumbent management may invest resources on projects with significantly higher risk than deemed 
acceptable by the investor. In this case, the agent does not sufficiently share the potential downside of a 
decision, but does share in the profits in the event that the outcome is a success. Even when a project can lead 
to significant value destruction, the manager stands to lose little, but stands to gain a great deal if the risky 
project succeeds. This scenario is referred to as a moral hazard and can more broadly be expressed as a bet, 
where the downside risk has been transferred to the financial provider, while the upside remains with the 
bettor. 
The agency theory has received critique by some academics. Eisenhardt (1989a) suggests that with the 
theory there are tacit human assumptions made, e.g. as guided by self–interest, bounded rationality7, and risk 
aversion. At least a part of the critique has been misdirected by mixing these attributes with those of the 
efficient market, in which the assumption is that the market consists of unbounded rational and narrowly 
                                                                                       
7 Initially the Nobel prize–winning economist Herbert A. Simon denoted with “bounded rationality” that decisions are limited 
by the available information, the cognitive constraints of the individual, and the disposable time. 
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self–interested actors. A more substantive critique can be found in a much–cited paper by Ghoshal (2005), in 
which he summarizes the deficiencies and refers to two large reviews of firm performance effects on 
independent board directors and the separation of dual chairman–CEO roles. However, the empirical evidence 
he refers to regarding board compositions and the separation of dual roles in order to invalidate the agency 
theory is at best incomplete. A more valid critique would be that individuals are motivated not merely by self–
interest, but by a multitude of reasons. However, it is difficult to evade the fact that “people respond to 
incentives,” which lies at the core of the agency theory. A theoretical problem, not mentioned in the literature 
as far as I am aware of, is that the main cost penalty of incentive divergence may not be in the deficient division 
of the finite resources of the firm, but in the relative resource dissipation from a lack of profitable expansion. 
What seems clear is that the agency conflict affects public corporations in a number of ways, and that the 
buyout can be viewed as a corrective market mechanism to attenuate the agency costs and dispose of excess 
cash flows. The specific mechanisms will be revisited and explored further in the chapters on direct and 
indirect drivers of value creation. 
2.1.2 The Effect of Information Asymmetries 
One of the most researched information asymmetries has been the potential exploitation of private 
information by management during management buyouts. This is the case where there exist information 
asymmetries between a buyer and seller in a transaction8. Initially the effect on the market was examined by 
the Nobel prize–winning economist George Akerlof (1970) in a seminal paper, where he illustrated the 
information asymmetry by using the market of used car dealers, which are known for selling “lemons”. 
Information asymmetries subsequently received much academic interest during the buyout boom of the 
1980s as a potential source for value capture at the expense of pre–buyout shareholders and stakeholders 
(DeAngelo, DeAngelo, & Rice, 1984), particularly as a means by which management might depress the 
valuation of the firm by manipulating future earnings forecasts (Lowenstein, 1985; DeAngelo, 1986). 
There are a number of reasons to believe that this hazard has diminished over time, e.g., the increased 
professionalism in the market and the proliferation of auctions (Indahl & Zinterhofer, 1998; Wright, Hoskisson, 
& Busenitz, 2001a). For instance, the auction process involves extensive disclosure requirements, which 
diminish the potential for managers to systematically conceal information about a business (Lee, 1992). 
Finally, it is specifically within the context of management buyouts, as opposed to the much more prolific 
leveraged buyout, where private information can be exploited by the buyer9 (Long & Ravenscraft, 1993b). 
However, there exists another veiled possibility for exploiting private information, which occurs during the 
exit of the buyout (Berg & Gottschalg, 2003). The advantage effectively mirrors entry transaction. In this case 
                                                                                       
8 While research on information asymmetries is a modern concept, the exploitation of it is ancient. The 16th century maxim 
‘caveat emptor’ i.e. “let the buyer beware” expresses the notion and reflects a principle known in ancient Roman law. 
9 It is not inconceivable that an external bidder in cooperation with incumbent management could exploit information 
asymmetries in an LBO, albeit it would be a more complex operation. To my knowledge this information asymmetry has not 
yet been studied. 
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the private equity firm doing the selling could take advantage of the fact that it has more and better 
information than the buyer10. Berg and Gottschalg (2003) assert that this potential for misuse has received 
little attention by researchers. Arguably, the tactic would backfire on any private equity firm that repeatedly 
and blatantly resorted to exploiting the information asymmetry. 
2.1.3 The Parenting Advantage 
Finally, the parenting advantage is occasionally considered in conjunction with the agency theory and can 
by itself be viewed as implicitly affecting several indirect levers of value creation in buyouts. Goold (1991) 
proposed it in a paper exploring the efficiency of corporations with multiple unrelated businesses. The 
argument by the researchers is that multi–business entities can excel when the corporate center can provide 
a parenting advantage to the subsidiaries that outweighs the costs incurred by the added organizational 
complexities (Campbell, Goold, & Alexander, 1995; Goold & Campbell, 1998). Campbell et al. (1995) argued 
that when the multi-business corporation created more value for the unrelated unit than rivals could, the unit 
benefited from a parenting advantage. In contrast, the unit ought to be divested when the incurred costs by 
the increased organizational complexities outweigh the advantages. 
The incurred costs due to the added organizational complexities are construed as an inherent element of 
value destruction present in all corporate hierarchies (Goold, Campbell, & Alexander, 1998). The costs can 
manifest as additional corporate overhead, managerial information filters because of the organizational 
hierarchy, and due to ill-conceived decisions by corporate management. First, corporate overhead and 
administration tend to grow at an additional rate, since there is less oversight and controls to curb expansion. 
Corporate headquarters are commonly insular and shielded from the recurrent critical examination of cost 
effectiveness subjected to business units (Goold, Campbell, & Alexander, 1998). The authors suggest the 
deficiency is because processes are rarely in place to access the net corporate value of corporate overhead. 
Second, information filters come into play due to the disincentives of unit managers to provide unfavorable 
information. The internal competition ensures divisional and corporate management systematically receives 
biased information, which bode for ill-conceived decisions (Goold, Campbell, & Alexander, 1998). 
Fundamentally there are two paths compensate and add value that supersede the costs. There are the 
vertical synergies that stems from the transferable skills or resources provided by the corporate parent. A 
number of viable components exist, e.g. strategic guidance that leads to improved decision-making (Bowman 
& Helfat, 2001). The strategic expertise can incorporate methodical competences that concern the strategic 
planning process, the scenario planning techniques, or the capital expenditure reviews (Chandler, 1991). 
Moreover, the strategic expertise may include the contribution of industry-specific expertise concerning 
market trends and key success factors (Kruehler, Pidun, Rubner, 2012). It may be of a business-oriented 
character and concern the internationalization of a business or the introduction of a new product innovation 
(Kruehler, Pidun, Rubner, 2012). Another avenue for extracting vertical synergies are by establishing central 
resources and services, e.g. management capabilities (Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991), financing expertise 
                                                                                       
10 Potentially the management of a portfolio firm could similarly under certain circumstances suppress information from the 
GPs at the private equity firms. As far as known, there are no studies on this potential for abuse to date. 
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(Magowan, 1989; Kaufman & Englander, 1993; Cotter & Peck, 2001), centralized purchasing (Yip, 1989; Ellram 
& Siferd, 1998), and corporate tax advantages (Gilson, Scholes & Wolfson, 1987; Shih, 1994). 
The second path to add value is by pursuing cross-business or lateral synergies, which initially were 
advocated by the strategic management pioneer Igor Ansoff (1965). There are a number of prospective ways 
in which cross-business unit collaboration could be advantageous. Knoll (2008) distinguishes between four 
different categories of cross-business synergies: (i) operative synergies where advantages stems from 
leveraging resources across related units; (ii) market power synergies where advantages stems from leveraging 
market power resources across units; (iii) financial synergies where advantages stems from leveraging 
financial resources across units; and (iv) corporate management synergies where advantages stems from 
leveraging management resources across units. Granted the categories proposed by Knoll (2008) can equally 
be construed as vertical synergies, since the corporate parent can function as a mediator. While the notion of 
synergy is intuitively appealing, Goold, Campbell, & Alexander (1998) submit their research have shown that 
management more often pursue mirages than real synergy opportunities. Moreover, when synergies do exist, 
the same advantages will be available to independent businesses as a corporate parent is not necessary for 
businesses to trade, form alliances, joint ventures, license technology, share benchmarks and best practices, 
pool negotiating power, share services, or coordinate strategies (Goold, Campbell, & Alexander, 1998). 
A function that has been extensively examined by academics is the comparative performance effect of 
relatedness in diversification strategies. The relatedness of businesses can be measured across a number of 
dimensions, e.g. technologies, markets and customers. Studies have generally found that related and 
horizontal acquisitions are more profitable than unrelated businesses (Chattered, 1986; Lubatkin, 1987; 
Lubatkin & O'Neill, 1987; Singh & Montgomery, 1987; Seth, 1990; Healy, Palepu et al., 1992). Yet, there are 
multiple successful corporations with unrelated acquisitions that outperform their peers, for instance in the 
1980s KKR and in the 1990s Virgin and GE (Goold, Campbell, & Alexander, 1998). Thus, the researchers 
advocate that corporate parents focus on building: “portfolios around businesses with similarities in terms of 
parenting needs and opportunities.” 
Arguably the success of leveraged buyouts suggests that private equity firms provide parenting advantages 
to portfolio firms that exceed the incurred costs. Particularly this is the case with regards to supervision, 
monitoring, mentoring, and learning. Private equity firms often excel in implementing common service 
platforms, which creates distinctive organizational capabilities. The supervision and guidance by the private 
equity parent firm can be observed from the intensified collaboration and increased frequency of 
communication (Bull, 1989; Hite & Vetsuypens, 1989; Anders, 1992). 
2.2 Concepts of Value Generation in Leveraged Buyouts 
2.2.1 Fundamental Drivers of Value Creation and Value Capture 
The fundamental drivers of buyout value creation emerged in conjunction with the first U.S. buyouts in 
the mid–1970s. The early drivers were to utilize high–levels of debt, to take advantage of the tax reductions 
provided by increased interest payments for the debt, and to reduce the agency conflict prevalent in mature 
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industries11. In particular, the utilization of high levels of debt created a demand for various financing 
techniques, which in the 1980s became collectively known as financial engineering. Another early driver 
emerged through the discipline of corporate governance or governance engineering. This in turn was fuelled by 
the intention to mitigate agency conflict by using high–powered incentives, incentive realignment, and 
disposal of free cash flows (see Jensen 1989b; Kaplan 1989a, 1989b). Although the changes brought about in 
corporate governance seldom directly affected profit drivers, they often had widespread internal effects, which 
in turn resulted in performance improvements. 
The second wave of buyouts in the mid–1990s brought about operational engineering, which emerged as 
a collective term for the enacted changes with the intention of increasing operational efficiency and 
productivity (Jensen, Kaplan, Ferenbach, & Feldberg, 2006; Matthews, Bye, & Howland, 2009; Arundale, 2010). 
Finally, fundamental changes to the future directions of buyout firms could be discerned that are increasingly 
collected under the term strategic redirection, where the objective is often to refocus on core business activities 
or to consolidate fragmented markets (Rogers, Holland, & Haas, 2002a; Lieber, 2004; Zong, 2005). 
Multiple arbitrage or financial arbitrage emerged already within the first wave of buyouts, but is 
fundamentally different from the previous drivers, as value is to a lesser extent created than captured. The 
gain originates primarily from an overall market or industry appreciation, or alternatively from the timing of 
business cycles, which tend to raise the buyout firm value without affecting the fundamental business of the 
firm. A particular form of arbitrage crucial in the early 1980s was to take advantage of the conglomerate 
discount. With the term was denoted the discount by which a public multi–business corporation was valued 
at a lower multiple than the combined value of its assets. By divesting assets and business units, investors 
could remove the discount and benefit from the value appreciation (DeAngelo et al., 1984; Lowenstein, 1985; 
Wright & Coyne, 1985; DeAngelo, 1986; Jensen, 1989b; Lehn & Poulsen, 1989; Opler, 1992). 
We can categorize the various drivers into levers, where the financial, operational, and strategic drivers are 
viewed as direct value creation, the governance driver as indirect value creation, and multiple arbitrage as value 
capture. When we can combine these separate drivers of value creation and value capture, we can derive a 
basic formula for buyout value generation: 
      Value Generation = Value Creation * (Direct + Indirect) + Value Capture12  (1) 
The monetary value generated by the buyout can be further expressed as the financial delta between the 
entry transaction and the exit transaction (if we presume the duration is negligible): 
         Value Generation = Equity Value exit – Equity Value entry      (2) 
                                                                                       
11 Several earlier research papers (e.g. Jensen (1993)) have described the history and development of the private equity 
industry and the market for corporate control. 
12 Berg and Gottschalg (2003) use the term ‘value capturing’ interchangeably in a conceptual paper. However, in this study 
the more established term value capture is used, see, e.g. Bowman and Ambrosini (2000). 
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This means we can quantify the value generation in buyouts and arrive at a more precise definition13. Equity 
value (E) is commonly defined as the combined value of all outstanding shares, assets, short and long–term 
investments, while deducting all short and long–term debt and minority interests. 
We can further decompose formula (2) of value generation and view the equity value as a function of 
changes to the accounting fundamentals: 
      Equity Value = Market Multiple * Margin * Revenues – Net Debt14   (3) 
We find that the equity value can be expressed as a function of four variables, where the changes to the 
values determine the buyout value generation. Changes to the market multiple (e.g. EBITDA/EV) constitute 
the gains from multiple arbitrage, which in turn equate to the value capture. Both direct and indirect value 
creation are functions of the appreciation to margins and revenues and the depreciation of debt. The formula 
provides guidance in how to decompose the mechanisms and assess changes. Nevertheless, in the case of 
indirect value creation the causal relationship is often complex and relies on a chain of intermediary factors, 
which ultimately improve margins and increase revenues by several means. 
If we combine the predominant value drivers we can construct a basic graphical representation of value 
generation as seen in Figure 1. 
 
 
In order to analyze specifically ‘how’ and ‘where’ the value generation occurs within the firm we have to 
distinguish the factors further at the level of the mechanisms. 
                                                                                       
13 Various definitions of value creation exist within different streams of management. A problem with several of the definitions 
is that they are unspecific and unquantifiable. 
14 The simplified formula (along with the first formula) of equity value is used by Berg and Gottschalg (2003) for decomposing 
the variables into the constituting value generation levers. 
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Figure 1. The fundamental drivers of value generation model in buyouts 
– 27 – 
2.2.2 Conceptual Models of Value Generation 
There is a fundamental gap in research on conceptualizing theoretical frameworks that would encapsulate 
the various value generation mechanisms derived from empirical research. The reasons for this deficiency may 
be manifold. Typically, quantitative studies focus on validating a fairly limited set of variables and the overall 
picture is of tangential consideration. When quantitative studies do cover the complete spectrum of value 
generation, they tend to congregate disparate mechanisms into a few high–level categories. Furthermore, it 
is plausible that theoretical–conceptual research papers on buyouts have diminished since the mid–1990s. 
An exception to this is in a joint paper based on two doctoral dissertations by Berg and Gottschalg (2003). 
In the first section of the paper they propose a three–dimensional model that categorizes buyout value 
generation according to phases, causes, and sources. However, the second portion of the paper, in which they 
expand and extend the “five driver” framework of value generation, has garnered particular interest. By 
extending the model, Berg and Gottschalg (2003) are able to incorporate much of the extant research into 
the framework and classify value drivers into a multilevel taxonomy that decomposes value generation into 
the constituting components15. Figure 2 is a graphical representation of the constructed model. 
 
                                                                                       
15 Berg and Gottschalg (2003) use the terms Primary– and Secondary lever of value creation (cf. Porter, 1985, p.39; Stabell & 
Fjaeldstad, 1998, p.419). However, in this thesis the more descriptive terms Direct– and Indirect lever of value creation are 
used (cf. with Walter, Ritter and Gemünden, 2001). 
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Another similar model of value generation drivers by Wilms (2007) distinguishes between twenty value 
drivers of four main categories: multiple expansion, deleverage, earnings improvements, and qualitative 
factors. In the model, the drivers are further categorized into active and passive value drivers. The passive value 
drivers are defined as pre–closure value generation and can thus be equated with value capture. 
2.2.3 Limitations and Deficiencies to Previous Models 
While the taxonomy by Berg and Gottschalg (2003) contributes conceptually by extending the prevalent 
model, it is problematic, particularly with regards to structural consistency and the incorporation of extant 
research. The structure mixes different entities, i.e. drivers derived from organizational functions (e.g. financial 
engineering) with drivers derived from theories (e.g. reducing agency costs, parenting effect). Arguably the 
model would be more consistent if organizational functions had been used exclusively, such as corporate 
governance or governance engineering for the secondary drivers. Furthermore, the inclusion of these concepts 
and exclusion of others appears rather arbitrary, as the suggested drivers do not encompass all mechanisms 
of indirect value creation. 
Another problem with defining theoretical concepts as drivers is that subordinated mechanisms become 
scattered among multiple drivers. For instance, the secondary driver reducing agency costs first and foremost 
induces managers to reduce costs. However, reducing costs should for consistency’s sake be a component of 
cost cutting and margin improvements, which in the model is subordinated to the primary driver increasing 
operational effectiveness. Furthermore, value generation mechanisms that have received substantial support 
in extant research have been overlooked or summarily dismissed (e.g. market mispricing, underpricing). 
Finally, there are problems in the organization of drivers and mechanisms. For instance, the reduction of 
corporate tax is considered as value creation, while it arguably constitutes a wealth transfer and as such 
should be considered as a mechanism of value capturing. 
The study by Wilms (2007) concentrates on value drivers within the “100–day programs,” which may limit 
the applicability. The central problem is that some drivers in the model overlap (e.g. ‘optimization of corporate 
scope’ versus ‘concentration of the firm on core activities’). Another drawback is that much of the research on 
value generation is either omitted – this includes research on temporary drivers (holding period, vintage years), 
cultural drivers (entrepreneurship, performance management), and commercial drivers (timing of market 
cycles) – or dealt with in a perfunctory manner (e.g. buy and build strategies, board contribution). 
2.2.4 Constructing a Holistic Conceptual Model 
During the literary review of previous research, it became increasingly clear that existing models of buyout 
value generation were inadequate. The legacy constraints made it difficult to integrate known mechanisms 
and dynamically extend the model with new drivers. The intention with the construction of a new integrative 
framework was to provide a cohesive structure that holistically incorporated the known mechanisms from 
empirical research.  
The first step in the construction of the new model was to synthesize the previous research literature into 
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a more cohesive model that extended prior conceptual frameworks (Berg & Gottschalg, 2003; Loos, 2006; 
Wilms, 2007; Talmor & Vasvari, 2011, p.552–567). Attention was paid to the taxonomy of the structure, i.e. the 
organization, structure, interconnection, and subordination of factors. To some extent, this entailed 
augmenting extant nomenclature, particularly at the level of drivers and mechanisms. 
Subsequently, in the analysis of the case study firms, the findings induced from the analysis of the case 
firms were incorporated into the novel model (“empirically derived taxonomy”). 
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Chapter 3. An Empirically Derived Taxonomy of 
Value Generation 
“It is better to have an approximate answer to the right question than an absolute answer to the 
wrong question” 
– John Tukey, American mathematician (1915–2000) 
 
There is an extensive range of value generation levers and drivers that affect the success of a buyout. In 
this thesis, these factors have been structured into a cohesive and consistent model with a higher granularity 
and less overlap than previously proposed structures. The Empirically Derived Taxonomy is a four–layered 
hierarchy composed of Levers, Drivers, Mechanisms, and Methods, arranged in order of abstraction from the 
generic to the specific. All in all, in the literary review the author has distinguished between three levers, eight 
drivers, and 35 mechanisms, which are all depicted in Table 1. The methods (and considerations) are discussed 
in detail in the respective chapters. 
The top–level levers comprise the direct and indirect levers of value creation and value capture. The primary 
distinction between the value creation levers is that the direct levers have a directly measurable effect on the 
profitability of the portfolio firm, while indirect levels tend to affect multiple mechanisms that concurrently 
improve profitability. Value capture refers to the appreciation of firm value due to exogenous factors such as 
industry growth or wealth transfer occurring during the entry and exit transaction. Consequently, it refers to 
the excess value in the post–exit phase that was not created by changes within the portfolio firm. 
The direct levers of value creation encapsulate the financial, operational, and strategic drivers. The financial 
driver is largely extrinsic, i.e. the value creation originates from the necessary expertise possessed by the GPs 
of the private equity firm. By contrast the operational and strategic drivers are largely intrinsic to the portfolio 
firm, which means value is primarily created by changes made within the firm by management and personnel. 
The time horizon of both the financial and operational drivers tends to be short to medium term, which means 
they affect the bottom line fairly rapidly. Strategic changes take a longer time, meaning the strategic drivers 
typically are medium term to long term. 
The indirect levers of value creation encapsulate the governmental, cultural, and temporal drivers. These 
drivers are largely extrinsic, meaning the expertise originates from within the expertise possessed by the GPs, 
the directors of the board, or the reinforced management team. Predominantly indirect levers tend to affect 
profitability over the medium term. Value capture refers to commercial and organizational drivers. While the 
source of value capture is exogenous, the drivers are largely extrinsic, meaning that the necessary expertise 
and know–how for capitalizing on the effects of the drivers originate with the GPs. The drivers of value capture 
tend to be long term and do not materialize until the exit of the portfolio firm. However, the distinct events 
that determine the resulting value capture are relatively brief in duration: the entry and exit transaction. We 
can summarize the introduction with a visual overview outlining all discerned layers of value generation (Table 
1). (For a simplified overview without the fourth layer, refer to Figure 4, p.70.) 
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Table 1. The complete empirically derived taxonomy of buyout value generation16 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                       
16 For a comparison with the drivers and mechanisms proposed Berg and Gottschalg (2003), see appendix C. 
LEVERS DRIVERS MECHANISMS METHODS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I. DIRECT 
VALUE 
CREATION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A. Financial 
Driver 
1. Financial Expertise and 
Contact Networks 
Competency of capital markets 
Extensive contact networks 
Rewards to repeat customers 
2. Debt Market Cycles: 
Mispricing and Overheating 
Capitalizing on market mispricing of debt 
and equity markets 
Evading the hazard of overheated debt 
markets 
3. Alleviating Capital Market 
Constraints 
Investing in markets, industries, and firms 
in need of expansion capital 
4. The Effects of High–Leverage: 
Inflating Gains and Inducing 
Efforts 
Inflating gains through increased risk 
exposure 
Inducing managerial effort 
5. Capital Structure Optimization 
in Buyouts 
Determining the optimal capital structure 
Gaining from the non–linear risk for 
financial distress 
Avoiding management risk aversion from 
debt overhang 
Continual optimization of the capital 
structure  
6. Creative Finance Applying innovative financial instruments 
7. Asset Conversion and 
Securitization 
Raising firm liquidity by asset conversion 
and securitization 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I. DIRECT 
VALUE 
CREATION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B. Operational 
Driver 
1. Functional Experience and 
Operational Expertise 
Strengthening the operational expertise 
and industry experience 
2. Cost Structure Improvements Cost reductions and increased productivity 
Controlling and moderating capital 
expenditures 
Pruning administrative overhead and 
fostering a flat organization 
Reassessing and qualifying R&D 
investments 
3. Capital Management and 
Asset Utilization 
Increasing asset utilization 
Lowering inventory levels and accelerating 
turnover rates 
Revising the stream of account 
receivables and payables 
Rationalizing the logistics flow 
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I. DIRECT 
VALUE 
CREATION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C. Strategic 
Driver 
1. Focusing on the Core: 
Complexity Reduction 
Complexity reduction and decreased 
diversification 
Divestments and asset sell–off 
2. Focusing on Consolidation: Buy 
and Build Strategies 
Buy and build strategies and add–on 
acquisitions 
Facilitating acquisitions by asset 
conversion and stock swaps 
3. Focusing on Growth: Market 
Expansion 
Focus on market expansion to improve the 
exit value 
Redefining the business profit drivers 
Recruiting dynamic executives with 
acquisition experience 
Growth strategies advocated by leading 
consulting firms 
Analyzing the profit variance allocation 
across the value chain 
LEVERS DRIVERS MECHANISMS METHODS 
 
 
 
 
 
II. 
INDIRECT 
VALUE 
CREATION 
 
 
 
 
 
D. Governance 
Driver 
1. The GP Effect: Experience and 
Expertise Matters 
Effects of GP expertise in governance, 
incentivation, operations, industries 
2. PE Firm Constraints: Industry 
Focus and Fund Size 
Developing sector expertise by industry 
focus 
Restricting the fund size 
3. Reducing Agency Costs: 
Incentivation and Interest 
Realignment 
The upside of a downside: the carrot–
and–stick mechanism 
Pay–to–performance sensitivity 
Illiquidity of remuneration 
4. Restructuring the Board of 
Directors 
Reshaping the board structure, size, 
composition, and duties 
5. Reinforcing the Top 
Management Team 
Rapid removal of underperforming 
management 
 
 
 
 
 
II. 
INDIRECT 
VALUE 
CREATION 
 
 
 
 
 
E. Cultural 
Driver 
1. The Parenting Advantage: 
Monitoring and Mentoring 
Applying an active, hands–on approach 
Improved monitoring and control 
Advising and mentoring 
2. The Value of Corporate 
Culture: A Revived 
Entrepreneurial Spirit 
Direct and frequent communication 
Minimizing bureaucracy 
Reviving the Entrepreneurial Spirit 
Improving human resource practices 
3. Performance Management: 
Stretch Budgets and 
Ambitious Goals 
Raising performance standards 
4. Revising the Firm KPIs: Novel 
Yardsticks 
Using a core set of cash–flow based 
financial metrics 
Using a core set of industry–specific 
operational indicators 
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II. 
INDIRECT 
VALUE 
CREATION 
 
 
F. Temporal 
Driver 
1. High–Tempo and Inchoate 
Change 
Constructing the “100–day plan” 
Enacting immediate changes to maximize 
the IRR 
2. The Holding Period Time 
Horizon 
Focusing on the early holding period 
Curtailing the holding period 
LEVERS DRIVERS MECHANISMS METHODS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
III. VALUE 
CAPTURE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
G. Commercial 
Driver 
1. Proprietary Deal Flow Proactive proprietary deal sourcing 
2. Deal Making Expertise Avoiding the winners curse 
Re–negotiating the price for uncovered 
defects 
Being prepared to capitalize on emergent 
opportunities 
3. Target Firm Identification and 
Investment Criteria 
Predefined investment criteria 
4. Uncovering the Business 
Potential 
The inefficient market: identifying 
underperforming firms 
5. Detecting Nascent Market 
Trends: Multiple Expansion 
Optimizing the market share, geographic 
scope, and firm size for multiple expansion 
Capitalizing on GDP growth, industry 
growth, and business cycles 
6. Timing the Business Cycles Timing the entry and exit transactions 
Attentive consideration to vintage years 
and business cycles 
7. The Entry Transaction: Firm 
Valuation 
The mixed blessing of auctions 
Utilizing scenario analysis–based 
contingency plans in base cases 
8. Divesting the Firm: The Mode 
of Exit 
Potential optimal firm size for maximizing 
the exit multiple 
The IPO exit route: only top performing 
firms during high GDP growth 
The effect of geography on trade sale and 
secondary buyout 
 
 
III. VALUE 
CAPTURE 
 
 
H. 
Organizational 
Driver 
1. Mitigated Legislative and 
Regulatory Constraints 
Out of the spotlight: a mitigation of 
business constraints 
2. The Corporate Tax Shield: 
Debt and Taxes 
The corporate tax shield 
3. Carried Interest and Capital 
Income 
Carried interest and capital income 
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3.1 The Direct Lever of Value Creation 
3.1.1 Financial Drivers 
The financial innovations of the early 1980s were crucial to the growth of LBOs and MBOs, which 
functioned as market catalysts for corporate restructuring (Renneboog et al., 2005). With the emergence of 
new sources of finance, private equity firms could acquire companies using massive amounts of debt. This 
debt in turn could be used to optimize the capital structure of the portfolio company in order to take full 
advantage of the resulting tax shield. The application of the financial innovations and associated tools and 
methods become known as financial engineering (Lieber, 2004).  
By the capital structure of the firm, we often refer to the combination of debt and equity by which the 
operational firm is financed. The sources of debt can be further decomposed, e.g. the most common forms in 
the buyout context are subordinate and senior debt, vendor notes, bridge loans, and mezzanine debt. Equity 
is often decomposed into two classes, i.e. the common and preferred shares of the firm. However, hybrid 
forms of finance as an intermediary between debt and equity are quite common, e.g. convertible bonds. The 
purpose with the optimization of the capital structure is to find a mix that balances the pros and cons for the 
firm. A core objective is often to minimize the after–tax cost of capital by taking advantage of the fact that 
debt interest payments typically are tax deductible. 
The financial driver is predominantly exogenous, as added value tends to come from outside the firm and 
often from within the private equity firm. The importance of this driver has gradually diminished, partly due 
to inflation from having become widely known, and partly due to the increased importance of supplemental 
drivers. 
In the context of value generation taxonomy in this thesis, tax advantages are not primarily considered 
mechanisms for value creation, but mechanisms for value capture. The reason for this is that tax advantage 
primarily constitutes wealth transfer from a societal perspective, despite the fact that it can function as a 
long–term enabler for further investments. 
3.1.1.1 Financial Expertise and Contact Networks 
At the core of the leveraged buyout is the sophisticated use of debt to finance the acquisition. Private equity 
firms usually have the expertise regarding capital markets needed to assist the portfolio company with 
negotiations for bank loans, bond underwritings, initial public offerings, and stock sales during the buyout exit 
(Anders, 1992). Moreover, he maintains that when the private equity specialists commence a negotiation they 
are prone to possess intimate knowledge of capital markets and have a willingness to apply this knowledge. 
With an extensive contact network among financial institutions and investment banks, private equity firms 
can often secure debt finance at terms that are favorable, as compared to industrial buyers (Magowan, 1989; 
Kaufman & Englander, 1993). This can be contrasted with the experience of a CEO or CFO of a company, who 
may only participate in a single buyout throughout his or her career and thus have an inadequate number of 
contacts within financial institutions (Cotter & Peck, 2001). The advantage of having more financial experience 
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is not limited to just industrial buyers. A recent study by Zarutskie (2010) finds evidence that private equity 
buyout fund teams with more experience in finance outperform funds teams that lack this competency. 
PE firms tend also to be repeat customers with financial institutions, which may lead to their being able to 
access lenient long–term financing. Cotter and Peck (2001) find that LBOs are financed less frequently with 
short–term debt and senior debt when buyout specialists control the majority of the post–buyout firm. The 
primary reason for receiving financing at lenient terms may be due to a perception of them as trustworthy 
borrowers (Frankfurter & Gunay, 1992; Baker & Smith, 1998; Cotter & Peck, 2001). Cotter and Peck (2001) 
report that the reason for this increased trustworthiness is because portfolio firms are less likely to experience 
financial distress. In addition, private equity firms have disincentives to expropriate wealth from debt holders, 
which increases trustworthiness (DeAngelo et al., 1984; Opler & Titman, 1993; Cotter & Peck, 2001). As a 
consequence, PE firms with a high reputation specifically receive narrower bank loan spreads and access to 
more debt, and at a lower cost from institutional loan markets (Demiroglu & James, 2007). 
A marginally different causal explanation is that by being repeat customers for financial institutions, 
information asymmetry between the parties is reduced and consequently trust increased, which permits 
institutions to lower interest rates and fees (Ivashina & Kovner, 2010). Reduced information asymmetries 
provide lending institutions with higher visibility into the prospect and thereby reduce the risk. Moreover, 
investment banks can have an incentive to offer more lenient covenant terms because they want to sell 
additional fee–based services to the PE firms. The study by Ivashina and Kovner (2010) offers evidence for the 
two mechanisms being additive. A single standard deviation increase in both banks’ relationship strength’s 
cross–selling potential is associated with a 5% decrease in the spread and a 7% increase in the maximum debt 
to EBITDA covenant. Taken together, these advantages translate into a 4% increase in equity return for the 
buyout firm. It is obvious that this confers an important advantage on PE firms in comparison to strategic 
buyers. 
3.1.1.2 Debt Market Cycles: Mispricing vs. Overheating 
The association between increased investments by private firms and the availability of liquidity in the debt 
market has long been known. A study by Kaplan and Stein (1993) showed that the liquidity of debt markets 
provided through “junk bonds” was instrumental to the buyout boom in the 1980s. Other researchers find 
that firms attempt to take advantage of market mispricing (between debt markets and equity markets) by 
financing with public equity issues during periods of low market returns and debt issues during periods of high 
returns (Baker & Wurgler, 2000; Baker, Greenwood, & Wurgler, 2003). 
However, instead of benefiting from the market mispricing between debt and equity markets, investors 
can be penalized for investing in overheated debt markets. This was found to be the case in the study by Kaplan 
and Stein (1993), which showed that the private equity markets gradually became overheated in the second 
half of the 1980s. Typically these periods are characterized in the debt markets by ‘covenant lite’ agreements, 
by substantially higher than average levels of debt in buyouts, by low interest rates, and, simultaneously, 
escalating price multiples. Gompers and Lerner (2000) report that venture deal valuations are propelled, not 
by industry returns, but by fund inflows into the industry, which cause a ’money chasing deals’ phenomenon. 
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Diller and Kaserer (2007) find that fund inflows do explain a substantial portion of overall variation in private 
equity returns, although they affect buyout funds less than venture funds. 
More recent research has established that buyout funds accelerate their investment flows and the quantity 
of leverage when credit conditions are loosened in the debt markets, which increases competition, raises price 
levels and causes average returns to deteriorate (Ljungqvist, Richardson, & Wolfenzon, 2007; Axelson, 
Jenkinson, Strömberg, & Weisbach, 2008; Cornelius, Juttmann, & de Veer, 2009). A recent study of 1,157 
worldwide private equity deals over an extended time period from 1980 to 2008 affirms the association 
between highly leveraged deals and buyout timing (Axelson, Jenkinson, Strömberg, & Weisbach, 2013). In this 
study, highly leveraged deals were consistently associated with lower fund level returns for investors. The 
result is puzzling when considering the variable of leverage at the exclusion of the environment, but consistent 
if one takes into account the variability of leverage being due to debt markets. 
The evidence suggests that PE firms would gain from taking advantage of market mispricing by investing 
when the cost of debt is low in relation to equity, while refraining from overheated debt markets. The two 
concepts are naturally linked to market cyclicality and market timing, which are discussed in a later chapter. 
3.1.1.3 Alleviating Capital Market Constraints 
A mechanism for value creation that has received surprisingly little attention by academics is that private 
equity firms can function as a market substitute for weak capital markets by enabling capital allocation for 
companies with growth potential. Boucly, Sraer, and Thesmar (2008) present evidence that private equity in 
France has alleviated capital market constraints, in an analysis of 830 buyouts. Moreover, the researchers 
observe that the strongest post–buyout growth occurs in industries reliant on external finance for growth. 
The study has since been replicated in the U.K. in a study that reached the same conclusion (Chung, 2010). The 
result for the U.K. is even more confounding, since it has a well–functioning capital market that could be 
expected to obviate the need for private equity expansion capital. This implicitly suggests that promising 
buyout opportunities could exist for PE firms, particularly in countries with capital–constrained markets. 
3.1.1.4 The Effects of High Leverage: Inflating Gains and Inducing Efforts 
The principal function of increased leverage is to permit the private equity firm to acquire a larger buyout 
target firm, and thereby inflate the return on the equity. Typically the buyout firm equity is used as collateral, 
which enables highly leveraged deals. Leverage, or gearing, thus function as a lever for increasing prospective 
gains and losses. The increased leverage comes at a price, however, which is seen in an increase in the inherent 
risk of the investment. Any loss accrued by the firm will be multiplied by exactly the same principle in which 
gains are inflated. This is the reason private equity firms place a high value on the ability of the buyout firm to 
generate an adequate and stable cash flow. Given that an investment generates sufficient levels of stable cash 
flows, there is support for the notion that increased leverage can be a source of value generation (Lowenstein, 
1985; Bull, 1989). A more recent study that attempts to attribute buyout value generation to the source finds 
that the change in leverage in buyouts resulted in quarter of the total return of 48% IRR (Meerkatt et al., 
2008). Correspondingly, another study of buyouts in the U.K. finds that leverage significantly inflates equity 
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returns (Valkama, Maula, Nikoskelainen, & Wright, 2010). 
Nevertheless, a secondary but indirect effect of using high levels of debt can be discerned. Several 
researchers have found that this can induce management to behave in ways that benefit investors and that is 
inimitable with other forms of remuneration (Grossman & Hart, 1983; Jensen, 1986a, 1989b). In particular, a 
high level of debt permits the mitigation of agency costs, which results in increased operational efficiency and 
reduced expenditures (Jensen, 1986b, 1989b; Rappaport, 1990). The reasoning is that high levels of debt expose 
management to the personal costs of bankruptcy, which encourages them to dispose of prior privileges and 
increase their work efforts (Grossman & Hart, 1983). While the personal costs of bankruptcy are invoked 
merely for high debt, the effect is accentuated when management has placed a significant portion of their 
private wealth in the buyout firm. A related argument is that debt allows for the construction of dual 
incentives, which combine an upside and a downside that promote concentrated management efforts (Butler, 
2001). Finally, the high debt ratios ensure that management perceives capital as a scarce resource that should 
be allocated efficiently. 
The use of high levels of debt for improving management efforts is connected to management 
incentivization and interest realignment, both of which will be discussed in a subsequent chapter. 
3.1.1.5 Capital Structure Optimization in Buyouts 
Capital structure typically refers to the mix of debt and equity that finances the operative firm in the short 
and long term. The optimal capital structure is, in simple terms, one that strikes a balance between the debt–
to–equity ratio, while minimizing the cost of capital. While debt tends to minimize the cost of capital because 
of tax deductibility, it increases the risk of the firm at the same time. What constitutes an accepted risk level 
is a parameter that must be determined by the stakeholders, e.g. private equity firm partners and the portfolio 
firm board of directors who are often in cooperation with the firm’s management. Other common factors 
affecting the optimal structure are, for example, the degree of financing necessary to meet the business 
forecasts in the next few years and the possibility of reacting with flexibility to changed market conditions. 
Damodaran (2001) contends that an optimal capital structure is firm specific, since it is determined by the 
particular circumstances of the firm. 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, there are key benefits to using debt in buyouts, such as inflating 
gains in profitable buyouts and inducing management to improve firm performance. The main disadvantage 
with increased levels of debt is the increased exposure to financial distress due to external market shocks and 
sudden shortfalls in demand (Palepu, 1990; Rappaport, 1990; Singh, 1990; Smith, 1990b; Singh, 1993; Gifford, 
2001). Another drawback is potential erosion in long–term competitiveness due to high debt (Palepu, 1990; 
Gifford, 2001). In addition, interest rates do not generally remain stable with increasing levels of debt because 
of the greater default risk and downgraded credit rating, which means the cost of borrowing can escalate 
(Damodaran, 2001). 
However, while the risk for insolvency increases with debt in buyouts, several studies show that the effect 
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is non–linear and decreases proportionally at high levels of debt (Kaplan, 1989b; Kaplan & Stein, 1993)17. 
Various explanations for this non–linearity have been proposed. Jensen (1989a) submits that a flexible 
institutional workout process overrides the usual bankruptcy procedures, since the insolvency is seldom in the 
interest of the creditors. Empirical evidence lends credence to this interpretation, as parties tend to accomplish 
a reorganization of claims more efficiently outside the courtroom (Jensen, 1989a; Hotchkiss, Smith, & 
Strömberg, 2014). Another explanation is that higher levels of debt cause risk–averse managers to alter 
behavior so as to reduce the likelihood for a default (Holthausen & Larcker, 1996). Furthermore, the high levels 
of debt eliminate taxes, which allows management to use cash flows to service debt payments and thus 
reduce the risk of default (Opler & Titman, 1993). Palepu (1990) suggests that the substantially lowered ex 
post default risk may be due to positive organizational changes, and hence, while the financial risks increase, 
the business risks coincidentally diminish. 
A veiled disadvantage with high debt is that risk–averse managers are discouraged from pursuing 
investments perceived as risky, despite the prospects for long–term profitability (Myers, 1984; Holthausen & 
Larcker, 1996). Perhaps more important is that excessive levels of debt – or debt overhang – prevent growth 
by circumscribing the operational, strategic, and governmental flexibility of management (Berck & DeMarzo, 
2007). Thus, debt overhang manifests as underinvestment, when management becomes disinclined to invest 
in NPV positive projects with a short–term negative cash flow, even when the expected long–term profits are 
substantial (Stulz, 1990). The result of underinvestment is that firms relinquish market share to rivals, which 
leads to the relative dissipation of shareholder wealth (Grant, 2011). Aside from restricting the management’s 
latitude to act, restrictions are often imposed by external stakeholders due to excessive levels of debt. 
Creditors may impose restrictive covenants that curb management behavior and limit the firm from adding 
or altering the type of debt (Damodaran, 2001). 
Consequently, the potential for value gains exists only if embarking on more debts moves the firm towards 
an optimal debt ratio (Damodaran, 2001; Eun & Resnick, 2011). Jensen et al. (2006) suggest that the difficulty 
herein lies in striking a balance between the countervailing factors by assessing whether the portfolio firm has 
unused debt capacity or excess capital. Common countervailing factors would be to assess the projected 
development of cash flows, the increased risk for default, the liquidity of the firm’s assets, the flexibility in the 
amortization of the financing mix, the increase in interest rates with higher levels of debt, the covenant 
restrictions posed by senior securities, the corporate tax shield, and the fluctuations of the liquidity on 
corporate debt markets (see e.g. Pinegar and Wilbricht (1989)18. 
An obvious, yet sometimes overlooked factor in the context of buyouts, is that the optimization of the 
capital structure is a continual process. Buyouts are typically financed by using a mix of tranches with different 
maturity and interest rates, such as a revolving credit facility (‘revolver’), bank debt, mezzanine debt, and 
                                                                                       
17 More recently Strömberg (2007) reports that the LBO firms eventually file for bankruptcy or undergo a financial restructuring 
at 6%, while another study reports bankruptcy rates of 5% for Scandinavia vs. 12% for U.S. (Lopez–de–Silanes, Phalippou, & 
Gottschalg, 2011). A third study reports a failure rate of 4.8% for U.K. (Wilson, Wright, & Altanlar, 2009). 
18A more detailed discussion on the optimal capital structure, e.g. the static trade–off models and the pecking order 
hypothesis, falls outside of the realm of this thesis. 
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subordinated debt or high–yield notes (Olsen, 2002). The optimal capital structure is obviously affected by 
changes to both internal and external conditions (e.g. fluctuations in cash flows or liquidity of debt markets), 
and thus need to be reassessed periodically. 
What is clear is that the realized capital structure in buyouts differs substantially from the counterpart 
public companies. For instance, a study of 153 large public buyouts in the U.S. and E.U. averaging at $1 billion 
in enterprise value provides evidence that equity accounts for only 25% of the purchase price and the 
remaining portion is debt (Axelson et al., 2008). Even when taking into account that the debt on average will 
be lower, since loans are commonly amortized during the holding period, the debt levels are considerable. This 
may be contrasted with a study of public equity–financed companies in a range of countries, which showed 
that debt comprised an average of 20–30% of total capital (Rajan & Zingales, 1995). 
3.1.1.6 Creative Finance 
Finnerty (1988) considers the design of innovative financial instruments and the formulation of creative 
solutions as the heart of financial engineering. A prime example of creative finance were the “high–yield, non–
investment grade bonds,” which helped to fuel the first boom of buyouts. These bonds were pioneered by the 
investment banking firm Drexel Burnham Lambert, and became best known by the colloquial term “junk 
bonds”. In the 1990s the subordinated debt emerged as a means to finance buyouts, such as second lien debt 
and mezzanine debt (Ryan, 2006, p.140). 
A more recent invention from the 2000s are the syndicated loans, which now account for a majority of the 
buyouts of large public firm in the U.S. and Europe (Axelson et al., 2008). In syndicated loans, several 
commercial or investment banks pool together their resources to facilitate the deal financing. Another 
financial innovation, and especially in the U.S., is the development towards all–bullet loan structures (Axelson, 
Jenkinson, Strömberg, & Weisbach, 2007; Axelson et al., 2008). A bullet loan is an instrument whereby the 
entire principal of the loan, including the interest, is due at the end of the loan term. Different hybrids of these 
exist, such as loans with a grace period without principal payments, interest–only loans, and variants whereby 
at the end of the loan a percentage of the principal is due. Another increasingly used financial instrument is 
strip financing, whereby the returns to finance providers are derived from multiple tranches of the capital 
structure, i.e. subordinated debt, preferred stock, and common stock (Chapman & Klein, 2009). The expressed 
intent of strip financing is to foster greater goal congruence among investors and lenders, and thus minimize 
the agency costs (Jensen, 1989a; Chapman & Klein, 2009). 
A recent comprehensive study by Axelson et al. (2013) covering a sample of 1,157 private equity deals 
worldwide between 1980 and 2008, interestingly finds that the average for LBO debt financing is primarily by 
senior bank debt, and resides at 72.5%, while the remainder is mainly subordinated debt and bonds19. The 
remainder, alternative funding, comprises merely 2.4%. The category is composed of vendor loans, loans by 
the LBO sponsor (the PE fund itself), off–balance–sheet financing, and assumed debt (existing loans that are 
                                                                                       
19Specifically (i) Senior Bank Debt (bullet debt 46.2%, amortizing bank debt 23.4%, bridge loans 2.9%); (ii) Subordinated Debt 
(mezzanine, 9.9%, 2nd lien, 2.5%); (iii) Bonds (junior, 9.3%; senior, 2.3%); and (iv) Alternative Funding (2.5%). 
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retained rather than refinanced) (Axelson et al., 2013). Axelson et al. (2008) suggest that the wide variety of 
debt instruments signifies the importance of client choice in capital structure, aside from the quantity of debt. 
3.1.1.7 Asset Conversion and Securitization 
An additional method for obtaining more efficient capital structures and lowering the cost of finance is 
the conversion of traditional firm assets into new sources of financing, which is particularly pertinent when a 
substantial amount of capital is tied up in fixed assets and non–cash, current assets (Rogers et al., 2002b). A 
standard measure for raising additional capital is the securitization of assets into asset–backed securities (ABS) 
and collateralized loan obligations (CLO). In the case of the ABS, the raised capital is secured by the cash flows 
obtained from a specified pool of underlying assets comprised of the company’s receivables, e.g. credit card 
receivables, car loans, and asset leases, or royalty payments. Since asset–backed securities are generally set at 
a lower interest rate compared to traditional bank loans, firms can benefit from the asset conversion (Mishkin 
& Eakins, 2011). 
Sale and leasebacks are another typical form of asset conversion to free up substantial amounts of capital, 
which traditionally is considered distinct from asset–backed securities. For instance, when firm equity includes 
expensive machinery or corporate real estate, it may be sold to a financial institution and leased back by the 
firm. An advantage of using leasebacks as a vehicle for financing upcoming investments is that they require 
less effort to arrange compared to asset–backed securities. 
3.1.2 Operational Drivers 
While applied financial engineering was critical to the nascent private equity industry in the 1980s, 
subsequent research indicates that it has become insufficient for achieving success20 (Lieber, 2004; Wright et 
al., 2006). By the late 1980s the evidence was mounting that buyouts are associated with significant operating 
and productivity improvements (Baker & Wruck, 1989; Bull, 1989; Bernstein, Lerner, Sørensen, & Strömberg, 
2010; Chung, 2010). Cumming, Siegel, and Wright (2007) summarize much of the evidence in a review: 
“The end result is there is a general consensus that across different methodologies, measures, and time 
periods, regarding a key stylized fact: LBOs and especially, MBOs enhance performance and have a 
salient effect on work practices.” 
Early evidence by Kaplan (1989b) showed sharp improvements in operating performance after adjustments 
for industry–wide changes. Jensen (1989a) found that the primary source of value creation from buyouts was 
organizational change that leads to improvements in firms’ operating and investment decisions. These 
findings were corroborated in a large number of later studies (see Appendix A). Surprisingly, two studies of 
U.K. and U.S. public–to–private transactions report the opposite effect of modest increases in operating 
performance and cash flow margins (Weir, Jones, & Wright, 2008; Guo, Hotchkiss, & Song, 2011). A problem 
                                                                                       
20 Some researchers maintain that financial engineering may still be a key source in buyout value generation. A study by 
Meerkatt and Liechtenstein (2010) suggests that while some funds generate more than 75% of the internal rate of return (IRR) 
due to operational improvements, in others more than 66% comes from financial levers. Although the indication may be 
accurate, it is based on a confidential study conducted at the consulting firm BCG and is limited to eight buyout funds. 
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is that these studies primarily concern large PTP buyouts, which typically display the poorest performance. 
Additional criticism has been that performance improvements in buyouts come at the expense of future cash 
flows, particularly when taking into account the increased cash flows in post–buyout firms with the 
concurrent decline in capital expenditures. However, the hypothesis has not found support in empirical studies 
(Cao & Lerner, 2007; Lerner, Sørensen, & Strömberg, 2009).  
3.1.2.1 Functional Experience and Operational Expertise 
A number of researchers have studied how various aspects of the private equity firm industry experience 
and managerial expertise constitute a knowledge transfer to the portfolio firm (Jensen, 1989a; Baker & Smith, 
1998). Empirical research has since validated that the experience and management skills of the individual GP 
significantly affect portfolio fund performance, as seen in Schmidt, Nowak, and Knigge (2004). More recently, 
Acharya et al. (2011) report that GPs with backgrounds in finance or accounting generated superior 
performance when the firm strategy was based on external growth (M&A), while GPs with an operational or 
consulting background achieved abnormal returns when the firm followed an organic growth strategy. A 
related mechanism is that it is the cross–utilization of managerial talent in the portfolio firms, which can 
represent a valuable resource at buyout firms (Hite & Vetsuypens, 1989). Consequently, due to the increased 
importance of operational improvements, PE firms have since begun hiring executives with operational 
backgrounds and industry experience, which can be observed in the more diverse backgrounds of personnel at 
the leading private firms (Kaplan & Strömberg, 2009; Matthews et al., 2009). 
3.1.2.2 Cost Structure Improvements 
Early on multiple researchers found evidence of profitability gains being directly associated with cost 
savings (Kaplan, 1989b; Muscarella & Vetsuypens, 1990; Baker, 1992). In manufacturing firms there was ample 
evidence for a reduction in production cost and an increase in plant productivity (Lichtenberg and Siegel, 1990). 
Several studies provided evidence of swift tightening of corporate spending (Grossman & Hart, 1983) and the 
reduction of capital expenditures and divestment of under–utilized assets (Magowan, 1989). Asset divestiture 
could also lead to the redeployment of capital and new investments in plant and equipment (Wright, 
Thompson, & Robbie, 1992), the core idea being that the effect is value enhancing when negative net present 
value projects are curbed (Jensen, 1989b). 
It is noteworthy that the cost savings from reduced employment levels are typically peripheral. An 
explanation may well be that buyouts typically occur in firms with a positive stable cash flow, but not in 
distressed firms facing a reconstruction. Kaplan (1989b) reports that when one controls for the reduced 
employment that results from divestitures, the median employment level increases by 0.9%. Modest 
employment reductions over the long–term have been found by some researchers in the U.K. and U.S. (Wright, 
Jensen, Cumming, & Siegel, 2007; Davis, Haltiwanger, Jarmin, Lerner, & Miranda, 2008). A predominant notion 
is that employment levels tend to trace the J–curve trajectory of PE investments. While employment initially 
falls under private equity ownership, an increase in employment levels takes place over the long–term (Amess, 
Girma, & Wright, 2008; Shapiro & Pham, 2008). What is clear is that buyout firms manage with less 
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bureaucratic structures, which is achieved by pruning corporate overhead, e.g. white–collar employment and 
wages (Easterwood, Seth, & Singer, 1989; Lichtenberg & Siegel, 1990; Butler, 2001). The overall target with 
these measures is to foster a flat organization by reduction of managerial layers. 
The evidence regarding cost cuts in R&D in buyouts is ambiguous, as some studies report reductions in 
R&D (Hall, 1990; Lichtenberg & Siegel, 1990; Smith, 1990b), while others report the preservation of R&D or 
even an increased effort in new product development (Lichtenberg & Siegel, 1990; Zahra & Fescina, 1991). For 
instance, a study by Zahra and Fescina (1991) reports substantial increases in product development, 
technological alliances, R&D workforce, capabilities, and business activities in the buyout firms. Moreover, 
buyouts tend to occur in mature industries, which are not R&D intensive. 
A problem with both reduced and deferred capital expenditures is that these may come at the expense of 
the long–term performance, particularly when used to boost short–term cash flows in order to maximize the 
exit valuation. However, the fact that the improvement comes at the expense of R&D, compensation levels, 
or capital expenditures has not been corroborated (Lichtenberg & Siegel, 1990; Smith, 1990a). More recent 
evidence by Kaplan and Strömberg (2009) does not find empirical support for ‘short–termism’, i.e. the 
reduction of CAPEX at the expense of long–term performance. 
3.1.2.3 Capital Management and Asset Utilization 
A cornerstone for improvements to productivity and efficiency is to increase asset utilization. Bull (1989) 
finds that the more effective use of corporate assets in buyouts is a means to increase cash flows. 
Furthermore, more efficient use of corporate assets frees up resources and is the primary cause for the 
reduction of capital requirements in buyouts (Lowenstein, 1985; Bull, 1989; Baker & Smith, 1998). Several 
researchers find that buyouts achieve cost reductions by rationalizing both the fixed or current assets and 
improve the management of working capital (Baker & Wruck, 1989; Smith, 1990a; Kester & Luehrman, 1995; 
Butler, 2001). Working capital is foremost tied up in inventory and here studies have found that inventory 
control is streamlined and inventory levels are dramatically reduced in the post–buyout firm (Easterwood et 
al., 1989; Magowan, 1989; Singh, 1990; Wright et al., 1992). It may also be observed in firms that have 
undergone a buyout, which have lower levels of inventory and working capital compared to industry peers 
(Holthausen & Larcker, 1996). 
A common method for improving cash management is to accelerate the collection accounts receivables, 
i.e. the outstanding customer debt (Singh, 1990; Long & Ravenscraft, 1993a; Holthausen & Larcker, 1996). 
Damodaran (2001) advocates minimizing both account receivables and inventory while increasing the pace of 
collecting account payables, since these changes directly affect the firm’s cash flow and the valuation. In 
practice, it can be achieved by enforcing payment terms, expediting distribution of invoices, shortening the 
payment period, prolonging the terms for supplier payment, and renegotiating prices (Long & Ravenscraft, 
1993b; Kester & Luehrman, 1995; Butler, 2001; Niemeyer & Simpson, 2008). 
Logistics and supply chain management form a special case in the buyout context: while efforts to 
rationalize the logistics chain are pervasive, PE research pertaining to the subject is effectively non–existent. 
– 43 – 
3.1.3 Strategic Drivers 
Rogers et al. (2002b) suggest that private equity specialists have a competitive advantage compared to 
executives in public firms, who are often guided by vaguely defined long–term strategic missions and a lack of 
focus on maximizing IRR. Instead the attention of executives is divided between the immediate quarterly 
targets and a variety of bureaucratic distractions and disparate objectives among contending stakeholders 
(Rogers et al., 2002b). By contrast, successful private equity firms strive to engage actively and participate in 
redirection of the portfolio company (Rogers et al., 2002b; Heel & Kehoe, 2005; Zong, 2005). The logic behind 
the active participation in the strategic redirection and refocusing process is that this activity can be a 
substantial source of value generation (Muscarella & Vetsuypens, 1990; Singh, 1990; Seth & Easterwood, 1993; 
Phan & Hill, 1995). The activities can encompass the selection of the geographic target markets, market niche, 
product mix, customer segments, pricing strategy, distribution channels, the level of after–sales services, and 
the future direction of the firm (Muscarella & Vetsuypens, 1990). 
In the context of private equity buyouts, two distinct strategic alternatives dominate the discussion: 
focusing on the core and market consolidation. Frequently these alternatives are combined into hybrid forms 
together with an explicit objective on market expansion. A common problem before the buyout is that many 
firms suffer from resource dispersion by simultaneously pursuing multiple goals. Zong (2005) suggests that 
dispersion can be mediated by developing a “laser–sharp focus” on maximally 2–3 strategic issues. 
3.1.3.1 Focusing on the Core: Complexity Reduction 
The reason for focusing on the core business is that several empirical studies have shown that firms consisting 
of unrelated, diversified business units underperform (Rumelt, 1974; Palepu, 1985; Lubatkin & Rogers, 1989; 
Lubatkin & Chatterjee, 1991). Moreover, there is evidence that shows that a reduction of the diversification is 
positively associated with increases in operating performance and firm value (John & Ofek, 1995; Gadad & 
Thomas, 2004). Unsurprisingly, there is research reporting a reduction of business complexity in the post–
buyout firms (Seth & Easterwood, 1993; Phan & Hill, 1995). A consequence of the focus on the core and 
divestment of unrelated businesses is post–buyout firm value increasing (Montgomery, Thomas, & Kamath, 
1984; Kaplan & Weisbach, 1992). As expected, there is ample evidence for asset sales and divestment of non–
core operations following a buyout (Kaplan, 1988; Baker & Wruck, 1989; Aslan & Kumar, 2009). An explanation 
for the profitability increase is that divestment curbs costs associated with over–investment in mature and 
declining industries that have limited growth prospects (Jensen, 1989b). Aside from over–investment, 
operating several product lines causes inefficient product line cross–subsidies (Liebeskind, Wiersema, & 
Hansen, 1992). 
What need to be considered in this context are the drastic reductions of the workforce and large–scale 
divestments in the early 1980s, primarily in the U.S., which became known as asset stripping and bust–ups. 
This Schumpeterian creative destruction that would color the public perception of the private equity industry 
and leveraged buyouts, was to some extent guilt by association, as the drastic cuts were more typical of hostile 
takeovers by corporate raiders and activists (Carey & Morris, 2012, p.6). At the time, a number of moderately 
profitable public conglomerates were taken private, dismantled, and sold–off piecemeal; often while the core 
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company was left to succumb burdened by debts. Specifically the activity relied on taking advantage of the 
conglomerate discount, so called because public conglomerates would attain stock market valuations that 
were lower than the combined value of the separate entities. In practice, the discount could be removed by 
divesting the peripheral assets, i.e. asset stripping, and the investor would then benefit from the appreciation 
in value21. By the 1990s, the public conglomerates had largely disappeared, and today dramatic asset stripping 
and bust–ups are rare22. 
It should also be recognized that there is research that legitimizes the organizational structure of 
conglomerates, especially during recessions. A recent study by Kuppuswamy and Villalonga (2010) that looked 
at the global financial crisis in 2008, found that conglomerates fared comparatively much better than single–
segment firms. The study revealed that comparative value is created through two different channels. First, 
there was the “more money” consequence that arose from the debt coinsurance effect, and second, the 
“smarter money” consequence that emerged from more efficient capital allocation internally within the 
conglomerate (Kuppuswamy & Villalonga, 2010). The debt coinsurance effect is the long–standing hypothesis 
by Wilbur G. Lewellen (1971), which states that in the event of market shocks, conglomerates have a higher 
absorptive capacity for reverberations. 
3.1.3.2 Focusing on Consolidation: Buy and Build Strategies 
The archetypal strategic option favored by private equity is the Buy and Build Strategy. This strategy became 
increasingly popular in the mid–1990s as it outperformed competing corporate strategies both in terms of 
growth profits and value (Ernst & Young, 2008). A limited study by Hoffmann (2008) of 21 platform 
companies in Germany indicated that buy and build strategies were highly successful in generating value. In 
the study, 75% of the buy and build transactions generated an excess of 25% IRR. 
The process of implementing a buy and build strategy begins with the acquisition of a nucleus firm in a 
fragmented industry, after which a series of successive roll–up acquisitions take place to create a market 
leader. The core business logic lies in market consolidation and thus the amassing of the advantages of scale 
economies, which concurrently leads to multiple expansion (Baker, Gibbons, & Murphy, 1994; Allen, 1999; 
Wright et al., 2001a). By contrast, the traditional justification for M&A – business synergies – is often viewed 
with skepticism by PE investors due to frequent overestimation of synergies. O'Donnell (2001) makes an 
attempt to distinguish further between buy and build strategies based on the impending business opportunity: 
1. Consolidation: In rationalizing mature or cyclical industries by horizontal mergers. 
2. Build–up: In making multiple consecutive acquisitions in a fragmented industry. 
3. Missing link: In making a complementary acquisition to complete a geographic area or 
business line. 
4. Roll–up: By imposing a business model on add–on acquisitions. 
                                                                                       
21 A prospective possibility is that by removing the discount, the coinsurance effect is concurrently removed and that the end 
result is an increase in Beta and a vulnerability to market cycle fluctuations. 
22 While the likelihood of a private equity firm being able to exploit the conglomerate discount today is small, it bears some 
resemblance to value appreciation seen in buyout firms that divest peripheral assets and focus on the core business. As far 
as is known, this form of ‘conglomerate discount lite’ has not been proposed in extant research. 
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From a practical standpoint, a common measure in portfolio firms is to facilitate add–on acquisitions by 
using the capital that was freed up during prior divestments, while another is to free up capital by asset 
conversion (both of these have been discussed in an earlier chapter). When the generated cash flow from the 
ongoing operations exceeds the interest payments and amortizations, it may provide an additional source of 
capital to carry out the strategy. Furthermore, a factor that alleviates the level of capital is that the sequential 
add–on acquisitions are to be valued at substantially lower multiples than the consolidated firm during the 
exit. 
An occasionally overlooked factor in research is that buyout firms often can rely on share swaps as a 
method of payment for the add–on acquisitions (Brau, Francis, & Kohers, 2003; Brau & Fawcett, 2006). Even 
in instances when the add–on acquisition cannot be obtained solely through a stock swap, substantial 
amounts of the payment can consist of shares. The advantage of using share swaps is that the risk of 
acquisition is clearly reduced, there is an incentive alignment between the management of the acquired firm 
and buyout firm, and finally, that payment does not materialize until the exit. 
3.1.3.3 Focusing on Growth: Market Expansion 
Growth is significant in and of itself, as firm growth is a parameter that affects firm value23. While a track 
record of solid growth is a determining factor in firm valuations, it becomes even more crucial if the exit route 
is to float the business at a public listing (Butler, 2001). A consequence of the growth impact on enterprise 
value is that buyout firms work diligently on increasing firm growth. Singh (1990) reports that buyout firm 
revenues grew at a substantially faster pace than industry peers in the three years prior to an IPO. 
The main benefit of market expansion and growth is that it can be an important component of value 
creation, particularly when margins are not deteriorating24. A study of value creation in 32 buyouts in Europe 
revealed that almost half of the total internal rate of return (IRR), or 22% of the total 48%, was attributable 
to sales growth, while an additional 5% was due to margin improvements (Meerkatt et al., 2008). Acharya et 
al. (2011) find that buyout firms both achieve higher sales growth and margin improvements (EBITDA to sales 
ratio) relative to peers. A secondary effect is that a track record of growth tends to raise the valuation multiple. 
In the study by Meerkatt et al. (2008), another 10% of the IRR was attributed to an increase in valuation 
multiples, which although primarily the result of systematic increases in multiples across the markets, was in 
part caused by improved performance prospects at the time of exit. 
The core question is then: How do firms achieve growth levels that exceed industry peers? Various 
approaches have been developed in different strands of academic research and by leading consulting firms. 
An extensive research project and assessment on the different strategic approaches to organizational growth 
by McGrath and MacMillan (2005) found a number of key components, such as to reconceive and redefine 
the business profit drivers by examining and enhancing key business metrics. Specifically the researchers 
                                                                                       
23 Growth has long been known to constitute a key component of firm value, e.g. Branch and Gale (1983) reported the value 
of public firms is determined by four variables: firm growth, profitability, risk, and market outlook. 
24 Overall we can discern two common paths to market expansion: a sales increase by selling more to an existing market 
(increased sales of supplementary products or higher market penetration) or by selling existing products to new markets. 
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proposed using the metrics of cash–flow velocity, asset utilization, customer performance, customer 
productivity, customer cash flow, and customer asset intensity. 
Hitt and Ireland (1985) examined the growth strategies of large industrial corporations and found that 
firms must develop corporate distinctive competencies appropriate for their industry. In particular, the 
researchers found two distinctive competence areas, finance and R&D, which were directly related to the 
performance of the internal growth strategy. Firstly, competency in finance was positively correlated with 
growth since this affected the firm’s ability to raise capital to undertake the necessary investments. This means 
that management needs to pay attention in order to improve the firm’s bond ratings and build a sound capital 
structure (Hitt & Ireland, 1985). Secondly, the core competencies of R&D and engineering were negatively 
correlated with the growth strategy, which implies that management would need to re–examine the 
corporate R&D expenditures, the prime reason being that resources are readily dispersed due to an inadequate 
definition of how the firm can attain return on investment from the R&D investments. 
In the private equity research strand, we find an interesting connection between buyout firm growth and 
human capital. Researchers have found that in order to achieve growth from the inception it is crucial to 
recruit dynamic executives who can seek out and exploit growth opportunities, as opposed to recruiting 
executives with organizational skills to monitor the firm (Lockett, Murray, & Wright, 2002; Meuleman, Amess, 
Wright, & Scholes, 2009). Moreover, Meuleman et al. (2009) find evidence for firm growth being positively 
associated with management acquisition experience. 
A number of popular approaches to achieving firm growth originate from management consulting firms. 
An extensive empirical study on factors conducive to firm growth by McKinsey indicated that management 
should methodically: identify high–growth micro–segments of customers, regions, and products; invest 
resources in promising micro–segments while jettisoning low–growth areas; and finally, restructure the 
organization to pursue each selected micro–segment (Baghai, Smit, & Viguerie, 2009). In a similar vein, 
consultants at A.T. Kearney suggest that in order to achieve growth a firm should move its sales efforts to the 
markets with the highest potential (Rothenbuecher, Handschuh, & Kickenweiz, 2007). They espouse the view 
that this can best be accomplished by making inroads to additional regional markets, expanding firm 
partnerships, halting price erosions; exploiting opportunities within product portfolios, boosting cross–sales, 
and aligning processes to better meet customer needs. A third path to growth is advocated by Bain, which is 
that of the single pursuit of improving the net–promoter score of the firm, where the net–promoter score is 
defined as the ratio of promoting–to–detracting customers when these customers talk to colleagues 
(Reichheld, 2003). Purportedly the simple survey question serves as a better predictor of future growth than 
more elaborate and sophisticated customer satisfaction indices. However, an independent study on the net 
promoter score did not find support for the claim of the NP score being the best predictor of growth 
(Keiningham, Cooil, Andreassen, & Aksoy, 2007). 
Finally, if we examine profit distribution across the value chains of industries, we often find that these vary 
significantly. Consequently, a standard method for improving profitability and achieving growth is that of 
upstream or downstream horizontal integration. In particular, the profit distribution in after–sales service is 
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often substantial and offers an opportunity for expansion in that additional services become available to 
existing customers. 
3.2 The Indirect Lever of Value Creation 
The indirect lever of value creation has proved to be remarkably relevant in the context of private equity 
buyouts, since the resulting drivers do not directly affect performance. Loos (2006) suggests that the drivers 
tend to amplify the positive performance effects attributed to the direct drivers. This is partially correct, albeit 
an insufficient explication. The main causal effect appears to be that the indirect drivers set in motion a chain 
of events, which then tend to affect several direct value creation drivers at once. For instance, in improving 
incentivization we thus affect management effort, which in turn results in multiple operational 
improvements. 
Multiple indirect drivers of firm government and organization are associated with the agency theory and 
the parenting advantage (Loos, 2006). However, the agency theory and the parenting effect incorporate an 
array of causal mechanisms and dissect the hypotheses into more distinct causal mechanisms. Furthermore, 
the agency theory and the parenting advantage do not circumscribe all indirect levers, e.g. the import of the 
holding period or impact on the private equity firm focus. Consequently, the indirect levers have in this 
dissertation been expanded to encompass all the indirect drivers we find in extant research.  
3.2.1 Governance Drivers 
The governance driver concerns the altered organizational structure and administrative discipline exerted 
by the new owners. One of the first studies to bring attention to the governance driver was the qualitative 
case study of the O.M. Scott & Sons Company, in which the improvements in operating performance were 
attributed to changes in the incentive structure, the monitoring system, and the governance structure of the 
firm (Baker & Wruck, 1989). Another early seminal study identified two factors that contribute to the 
productivity increase: the increased utilization of all employees due to the increased sensitivity to financial 
performance rewards and penalties, and the reduction of misallocation to inefficient activities due to 
curtailment of free cash flow (Lichtenberg & Siegel, 1990). In essence, both of these studies pointed to the 
significance of changes to the corporate governance structure to improve operating performance25. 
3.2.1.1 The GP Effect: Experience and Expertise Matters 
A major benefit from private equity ownership is the cross–utilization of industry expertise and 
management talent within the portfolio firms (Hite & Vetsuypens, 1989). Particularly pertinent is the 
accumulated experience of private equity professionals, which constitute a knowledge transfer from the GPs 
to the portfolio firms (Baker & Smith, 1998). Several researchers find that the industry expertise is garnered 
not merely from participating in buyouts, but from the extensive contact networks (Anders, 1992; Kaufman & 
Englander, 1993; Baker & Smith, 1998; Bruining & Wright, 2002). On the whole, the accumulated GP expertise 
                                                                                       
25 For a current review of the various strands of corporate governance research see e.g. Bebchuk and Weisbach (2010). 
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is diverse and incorporates factors from governance to incentivation. 
A number of studies have since confirmed the effect of GP experience and expertise on fund performance, 
which in essence is an aggregate measure of the portfolio firms that constitute the fund. Kaplan and Schoar 
(2005) find that the fund performance increases with experience and that this performance is persistent, i.e. 
GPs of the funds that outperform the industry in one fund are likely to outperform in the next fund26. The 
results suggest an underlying heterogeneity in general partners’ skill and quality, e.g. the guidance provided 
by the GPs to firm management or a proprietary deal flow (Kaplan & Schoar, 2005). Schmidt et al. (2004) 
report homologous results that fund performance is significantly related to the experience of the individual 
fund manager, where the suggested explanation is a proprietary deal flow and management rests in the hands 
of the portfolio firm. Diller and Kaserer (2007) report similar findings, i.e. that the GPs skills significantly affect 
fund performance. In a recent study of VC firms, Ewens and Rhodes–Kropf (2015) find that the skillset of the 
partner explains a large fraction of the investment outcomes, while the accumulated skills at firm level were 
less important. 
The result begs the question of how individual GPs actually achieve superior fund performance. A 
dissertation that combines both qualitative and quantitative data provides an indicative answer and finds that 
fund outperformance is associated with the heterogeneous skills of the GP and the type of buyout deal (Hahn, 
2009; Acharya et al., 2011)27. GPs with a managerial background from the industry or in consulting generated 
significantly higher outperformance in organic strategies due to three measures: frequent management 
change, active participation in the development of the business plan, and by substantial time commitments 
(Hahn, 2009)28. In contrast, GPs with investment banking or accounting generated higher outperformance in 
consolidation strategies, specifically due to two measures: by providing first and second line management 
with substantial amounts of equity, and by frequently devising new KPIs (Hahn, 2009). In an attempt to 
synthesize empirical research and interview data, as well as the consulting firm perspective and academic 
research, Meerkatt and Liechtenstein (2010) suggest that there are three ways in which experience affects 
performance: ownership experience, industry expertise, and regional experience. Finally, Achleitner, Braun, 
and Engel (2011) report that more experienced GPs successfully negotiate the acquisition prices down. 
What complicates the GP–performance relationship is that the causality might be bidirectional. A study 
by a leading consulting firm found that in 83% of the top tercile buyouts the GPs sought out the expertise of 
the board, the management team, and trusted external sources, whereas this was the case in less than 50% 
in the bottom tercile (Heel & Kehoe, 2005). 
3.2.1.2 PE Firm Constraints: Industry Focus and Fund Size 
Overall, private equity and venture capital firms have a tendency to focus on a limited number of industry 
sectors. Muscarella, Peavy III, Vetsuypens, and Barry (1990) find evidence for the limitation of VC scope 
                                                                                       
26 Newer studies have confirmed the earlier findings of performance persistence in buyouts made before 2000, but 
surprisingly not for investments after 2000 (Braun, Jenkinson, & Stoff, 2013b; Harris, Jenkinson, Kaplan, & Stucke, 2014). 
27 Much of the research in the dissertation has since been summarized in an article by Acharya et al. (2011). 
28 The managerial skills associated with functional experience and operational expertise were discussed in chapter 3.1.2.1. 
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regarding industry sectors in an early study of 433 IPOs from 1978 to 1987, and that this limitation occurs 
precisely because it takes time to develop the necessary industry expertise. A more recent study of VC firms 
confirms this rationale by showing that specialist firms outperform generalist firms, but beyond that firms 
with more experience outperform the inexperienced (Gompers, Kovner, Lerner, & Scharfstein, 2006). 
Zarutskie (2010) finds support for VC experience being a significant variable, but further reports that longevity 
in the VC industry is of import. However, we also find support for the importance of specialization and a focus 
on later–stage buyout funds. Cressy, Munari, and Malipiero (2007) report that private equity industry 
specialization adds 8.5% to the profitability over the first three post–buyout years. The outcome is congruent 
with the results reported by Loos (2006) in his dissertation, i.e. in that the number of previous deals 
undertaken by a buyout firm has a positive influence on IRR. 
Furthermore, there is evidence that the experience in private equity scales better than in venture capital, 
due to the scaling of investments as experience accumulates, which leads to substantially higher revenues per 
partner in subsequent buyout funds (Metrick & Yasuda, 2010). A caveat here is that there are penalties for 
exceeding an investment threshold. Firstly, when the number of concurrently managed portfolio firms 
increase, this can cause considerable diseconomies of scale (Lopez–de–Silanes, Phalippou, & Gottschalg, 
2008). In a large study covering 4,848 investments by 151 private equity firms between 1973 and 2002, the 
researchers found that the quartile of private equity firms having the least amount of simultaneous projects 
earned an average annual IRR of 41%, while the quartile having the most projects earned a meager average 
IRR of 15%. However, the penalty was attenuated in PE firms with flatter hierarchies, managers that shared 
similar backgrounds, and more experienced managers. 
The same penalty recurs when increasing the fund investment size per investment professional, which 
adversely affected the performance (Cumming & Walz, 2010). It is in line with what Kaplan and Schoar (2005) 
document, i.e. that private equity funds display a concave relationship between fund size and performance. 
Perhaps surprisingly, the accumulative learning effect manifests in yet another way. Several researchers 
provide evidence that syndication enhances returns significantly, i.e. the co–investment of multiple private 
equity firms in a buyout (Brander, Amit, & Antweile, 2002; Gompers & Lerner, 2006; Cumming & Walz, 2010). 
Brander et al. (2002) suggest the reason for the improved performance may be the complementary 
management skills of different PE firms. 
3.2.1.3 Reducing Agency Costs: Incentivization and Interest Realignment 
An extensive amount of research has been directed at the Carrot and Stick mechanism and particularly 
how this ameliorates agency costs during buyouts (Lowenstein, 1985). Initially, the hypothesis was proposed 
by Lowenstein (1985) in a paper on MBOs, as a bifurcate mechanism for resolving the principal–agent conflict. 
The “carrot” in this context is the interest realignment between managers and owners, which develops by 
providing management with ownership stakes in the firm29. Incentive realignment has, since its inception, 
been at the forefront of buyouts, and one study reports it as being the strongest determinant of buyout 
                                                                                       
29 The substantially increased leverage plays a key role in improving the incentivization of buyouts, which is further examined 
in this dissertation in chapter 3.1.1.4 The Effects of High–Leverage. 
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performance (Kreuter, Gottschalg, & Zollo, 2005). In a similar vein, Renneboog et al. (2005) in another study 
find that neither the tax shield nor free cash flow has any impact on buyout performance, while incentive 
realignment is a significant determinant. 
Moreover, the size of the incentive is typically substantial. Heel and Kehoe (2005) suggest that it is not 
uncommon for these to equal 15–20% of the firm equity, while Leslie and Oyer (2009) report that levels of 
remuneration to CEOs at 2.3% in equity, or in effect double the equity of the average CEO of comparable 
public corporations. The result of the high–powered incentives are improved operating and investment 
decisions (Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1988; Easterwood et al., 1989; McConnell & Servaes, 1990; Phan & Hill, 
1995; Weir & Laing, 1998). For instance, Palepu (1990) submits that it is the incentives in the post–buyout firm 
that provide a decisive impetus for management to improve cash flows and operating performance. 
The “stick” half of the equation forms the negative incentive, i.e. “pain equity”, which is created by requiring 
that management make a substantial equity investment. This produces high personal costs for inefficiencies 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976; DeAngelo et al., 1984; Muscarella & Vetsuypens, 1990; Smith, 1990b, 1990a; Weir & 
Laing, 1998). The sizeable investment made by management relative to their personal net worth means there 
is a financial risk to the buyout (Kitching, 1989; Thompson, Wright, & Robbie, 1992; Beaver, 2001; Butler, 2001). 
The rationale is that managers share the burden of loss which results from poor performance. This 
combination of considerable positive and negative incentives in a buyout is the foremost difference compared 
to traditional organizational forms. 
We also find a distinction with traditional firms in that there is an increased pay–to–performance 
sensitivity for a wide range of personnel (Jensen, 1986b; Anders, 1992; Fox & Marcus, 1992). Leslie and Oyer 
(2009) find from case interviews that equity shares are typically provided to 20–80 employees, but that twice 
the amount is not uncommon. Employee share ownership plans (ESOP) are another example of participation 
schemes (Thompson et al., 1992). Pay–to–performance sensitivity may also be achieved by adapting the 
employee contracts (Baker & Wruck, 1989; Easterwood et al., 1989; Muscarella & Vetsuypens, 1990). 
Other typical forms of compensation in private equity are performance ratchets or equity ratchets. When 
pre–specified, ambitious performance targets are reached, management can be awarded increased equity 
ownership by the PE firm30. The purpose of a ratchet is to induce management to improve performance for 
the duration of the holding period. Another crucial difference from traditional firms is that the equity is illiquid 
during the holding period until the exit. Stock options cannot be exercised, nor can shares be sold, which 
means a substantial portion of the equity investment is undiversifiable (Jensen et al., 2006). The effect of 
illiquidity is that management is committed to the buyout to a completely different degree than in public 
firms. 
A caveat here is that if the portion of tied–up equity becomes too high, it can result in decreased firm 
performance, due to management risk aversion and under–diversification (Demsetz, 1983; Fama & Jensen, 
1985; Morck et al., 1988; Lei & Hitt, 1995; Holthausen & Larcker, 1996). One solution is obviously to ensure that 
                                                                                       
30 Ratchets are also common to the private equity firms themselves. Typically, a predefined performance target for a fund 
has to be met before the firm partners receive any share of the fund return. 
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management does not make excessive investments. 
3.2.1.4 Restructuring the Board of Directors 
Several studies have emphasized the contribution of boards, particularly in terms of their supervisory 
function (Jensen, 1993; Gabrielsson & Huse, 2002; Gompers & Lerner, 2006; Bottazzi, Da Rin, & Hellmann, 
2008), and strategic guidance (Rosenstein, Bruno, Bygrave, & Taylor, 1993; Sapienza, Manigart, & Vermeir, 
1996; Kaplan & Strömberg, 2004). 
With regards to the performance effect of board size, a fair amount of research has come to the conclusion 
that board size should be limited to 5–7 board members. For instance, a meta–review does find support for 
the limitation in smaller corporations, defined as having revenues of less than $300m (Dalton, Daily, Johnson, 
& Ellstrand, 1999). Yermack (1996) finds that the relationship between board size and firm value is the inverse 
in a sample consisting of 452 large U.S. corporations. Likewise, a study of small– to mid–sized Finnish firms 
finds a significant negative correlation between increased board size and profitability (Eisenberg, Sundgren, & 
Wells, 1998). A more recent study from the U.K. finds that an increase in board size has a strong negative 
impact on profitability, Tobin's q, and share returns (Guest, 2009). It is congruent with the change observed in 
buyouts, where soon after the buyout a new board that has been significantly reduced in size is appointed 
(Jensen, 1993; Jensen et al., 2006; Acharya, Kehoe, & Reyner, 2008; Cornelli, Kominek, & Ljungqvist, 2012). 
With regards to the composition of the board, private equity firms typically appoint one to two general 
partners to represent the firm. Moreover, there is often a senior GP appointed to the role of chairman (Rogers 
et al., 2002b; Jensen et al., 2006). Aside from the CEO and private equity firm representatives, the new board 
tends to be composed of more outside directors (Millson & Ward, 2005; Jensen et al., 2006; Cornelli & Karakas, 
2008). With regards to involvement, private equity firms have a preference for active and participating boards 
that assemble frequently (Lowenstein, 1985; Jensen, 1989a, 1989b; Smith, 1990a). 
Many researchers have found that board members of buyout firms tend to meet more frequently than 
traditional boards, which can mean meeting formally on a monthly basis and informally several times a week 
(Gertner & Kaplan, 1996; Vafeas, 1999; Jensen et al., 2006; Acharya et al., 2008; Cornelli & Karakas, 2008; 
Acharya et al., 2011; Guo et al., 2011)31. A related characteristic of the boards of buyout firms is the accelerated 
decision making that takes place compared to the traditional competitors. 
As discussed in the section on agency theory, a hallmark of the boards in buyouts is the reduction of agency 
costs. This includes providing equity ownership stakes that realign management incentives and instigating a 
regime of closer monitoring that reduces the discretionary decision space of management (Fama, 1980; 
Demsetz, 1983; Jensen, 1988; Baker & Wruck, 1989; Lichtenberg & Siegel, 1990). Moreover, the principal control 
function of the board is to allow the owner to exert power in determining the composition of the management 
team (Baker & Montgomery, 1994). Besides often replacing the managing director at the inception, buyout 
boards tend to replace underperforming management more swiftly than traditional firms (Jensen, 1989a). 
                                                                                       
31 This cultural change following the buyout, e.g., frequent meetings and direct communication channels, is discussed further 
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– 52 – 
Finally, Acharya et al. (2008) argue that private equity boards work intensely to establish a critical set of 
industry–applicable metrics, which are then continuously monitored and used to direct operations. Thus, 
while the private equity boards actively pursue value creation, by contrast the boards of public corporations 
tend to focus on ensuring short–term performance objectives, on avoiding unpleasant surprises, and in 
complying with governance regulations. 
3.2.1.5 Reinforcing the Management Team 
Already in the mid–1960s, Manne (1965) proposed in his “market for corporate control” that equity markets 
could be the principal mechanism for facilitating corporate takeovers. In an efficient market, a firm would 
become more attractive as a takeover object, the lower its stock price became compared to the value potential 
with more efficient management. This corrective market mechanism of disposing of underperforming 
management is still a common method for buyout value creation. Moreover, the impact on corporate 
performance by CEOs has generally been reported to be substantial32. 
A cause for firm underperformance prior to a buyout is often the incumbent top management team, which 
is a cause remedied when the private equity firm replaces the inefficient team (Jensen & Ruback, 1983). 
Buyouts can thus function as vehicles to improve market efficiency by rapid and decisive action to remove 
poorly performing managers (Gilson, 1989). Perhaps most importantly, Bertrand and Schoar (2003) report 
evidence confirming that CEOs affect firm performance significantly. Interestingly, the disruption caused by 
forced CEO replacement is associated with higher post–succession firm performance (Khurana & Nohria, 
2000; Helfat & Bailey, 2005; Cornelli et al., 2012)33. 
Immediately after the buyout, private equity firms typically replace substantial portions of the 
management team (Heel & Kehoe, 2005; Jensen et al., 2006). In a study by Acharya et al. (2011) a third of CEOs 
were replaced within 100 days of the buyout and a total of two–thirds within a four–year holding period. As a 
result, private equity firms tend to get involved in the recruiting of CEOs and management (Rogers et al., 
2002b; Zong, 2005) and spend a considerable time in selecting and regularly re–evaluating the management 
(Palepu, 1990; Anders, 1992; Cotter & Peck, 2001). A recent international study finds that as a consequence of 
the relentless focus on management, private equity–owned companies are liable to have better management 
practices than other organizational forms, particularly when compared to governmental organizations and 
family firms (Bloom, Sadun, & Van Reenen, 2009). 
If we examine the particular human capital and personal skills that predict success in buyouts, we must 
consider a study, which reported that execution skills trump interpersonal skills (Kaplan, Klebanov, Mark, & 
Sørensen, 2008). While execution skills may trump many personal attributes, it may be premature to conclude 
that this single attribute overrides all other characteristics without more extensive behavioral research being 
done on the subject. 
                                                                                       
32 For studies on the corporate performance variation that is due to the CEOs, see e.g. Smith, Carson, and Alexander (1984), 
Thomas (1988), and MacKey (2008). However, research on the topic in the context of buyouts is scarce. 
33 A theoretical explanation that incorporates agency into a strategic–factor–market model shows that a prerequisite for 
extraordinary performance is the combination of skilled governance with managerial competence (Makadok, 2003). 
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3.2.2 Cultural Drivers 
3.2.2.1 The Parenting Advantage: Monitoring and Mentoring 
A framework frequently employed in conjunction with the private equity industry is the parenting 
advantage, albeit that it was originally proposed as an explanation for the success of diversified corporations 
(Campbell et al., 1995; Goold & Campbell, 1998; Goold, Campbell, & Alexander, 1998). Campbell et al. (1995) 
argued that when the multi–business corporation created more value for the unrelated unit than rivals could, 
the unit benefited from a parenting advantage. In contrast, the unit ought to be divested when the incurred 
costs by the increased organizational complexities outweigh the advantages. From the parenting advantage 
framework, it appears that PE firms often excel in implementing common services in monitoring, mentoring, 
and learning, which creates distinctive organizational capabilities. 
Central to this approach is the adoption of an active ownership model, where constructive interaction is 
facilitated by direct communication channels and decreased levels of bureaucracy (Kester & Luehrman, 1995). 
The cultural change that follows the buyout is germane to this approach taken by the new board of directors. 
Often the deal partners of the private equity firm discuss things directly with management on a daily or weekly 
basis, which is vastly different from the traditional context of a corporate board or conglomerate headquarters 
(Bull, 1989; Hite & Vetsuypens, 1989; Anders, 1992). A study reported that in the top tercile of buyouts private 
equity deal partners devote more than half of their time to this type of discussion in the first 100 days of a 
deal, and meet almost daily with management, whereas in the bottom tercile deal partners spent less than 
20% of the time on the buyout firm (Heel & Kehoe, 2005). 
There is a clear “business logic” to the intensive communication in the post–buyout phase. A number of 
pivotal steps are taken in the early months following the buyout, e.g., determining the strategic priorities, 
detailing personal responsibilities, and building working relationships (Heel & Kehoe, 2005). Furthermore, 
advancing the J–curve by achieving profitability early in the holding period (e.g. first year as opposed to third 
year) has a decisive impact on the holding period IRR, which necessitates making the necessary investments 
immediately after the buyout. 
Several researchers have found that ownership concentration facilitated by the buyout encourages closer 
monitoring and control (Lowenstein, 1985; Singh, 1990; Thompson & Wright, 1991; Admati, Pleiderer, & 
Zechner, 1994; Maug, 1998; Bottazzi et al., 2008). A key advantage of the ownership concentration is that it 
facilitates accelerated decision making compared to traditional competitors. A number of other advantages 
have already been discussed, such as the amelioration of the agency conflict (Hite & Vetsuypens, 1989; Singh, 
1990), the continuous evaluation of firm management (Palepu, 1990; Anders, 1992; Cotter & Peck, 2001), and 
the protection against manager wealth expropriation (Sahlman, 1990; Kaplan & Strömberg, 2003). In practice 
this closer monitoring often means monthly management accounts, weekly sales reviews, and frequent 
manager meetings (Millson & Ward, 2005). 
This may be contrasted with public corporations, where the dispersed shareholder structure result in an 
underinvestment of monitoring. These tend to suffer from the free–rider problem proposed by Grossman and 
Hart (1980), as individual shareholders with minor equity stakes have little to gain by expending effort on 
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monitoring, particularly as the gains befall all shareholders equally. 
3.2.2.2 The Value of Corporate Culture: A Revived Entrepreneurial Spirit 
Several researchers have reported on the changed corporate culture following a buyout, including the open 
and direct communication, the alleviated corporate bureaucracy, and the less–constrained atmosphere 
(Lowenstein, 1985; Jensen, 1989a; Hoskisson & Turk, 1990; Anders, 1992; Taylor, 1992). The changed modus 
operandi under the private equity ownership unfetters management from the grip of corporate bureaucracy 
and allows it to act without interference (Jensen, 1989a; Butler, 2001; Wright et al., 2001a). 
Buyouts are often viewed as a creative vehicle to reintroduce an entrepreneurial spirit in public companies 
(Singh, 1990). Freed from the constraints of corporate headquarters, the buyout firms can be transformed 
into entrepreneurial organizations (Kester & Luehrman, 1995; Weir, 1996; Bruining & Wright, 2002). The 
change in sentiment that follows in the wake of the buyout can re–energize firms and spur management to 
make any effort that is necessary (Houlden, 1990; Beaver, 2001; Butler, 2001). The revival can be detected as 
an intensification of product development in the post–buyout firm (Wright & Coyne, 1985; Bull, 1989; Malone, 
1989; Thompson et al., 1992). Zahra and Fescina (1991) not only find support for the intensified product 
development, but also by related proxies, e.g. an increase in R&D staff, business development, and 
technological alliances. Unsurprisingly, the increase in entrepreneurship is positively associated with 
performance improvements (Wright, Wilson, Robbie, & Ennew, 1996). 
There are several reasons for the lethargy that ails pre–buyout firms. In the non–core divisions of 
corporations, management is often provided with limited discretion (Weir, 1996; Beaver, 2001). Even when the 
division provides profitable and innovative investment opportunities these things may be given low attention 
by the corporate management (Wright et al., 2001a). Moreover, divisions of large corporations tend to be 
afflicted by significant agency problems, as the structures for incentive mechanisms and control functions are 
lacking (Fama & Jensen, 1983b; Hill, 1988; Thompson & Wright, 1995). 
Pre–buyout family–owned firms in turn often suffer from not being able to make necessary investments, 
either from being financially constrained or due to a risk–averse management (Meuleman et al., 2009). Bloom 
and Reenen (2007) report on a management competency gap in family–owned firms compared to private 
equity–owned buyout firms. Moreover, family firms may face succession problems when no family member 
willing or able to succeed in management (Howorth, Westhead, & Wright, 2004). On the other hand, the 
agency problem seen in divisions is typically mitigated by no prior separation of ownership and control, which 
means there is less scope for improving the control mechanisms (Chrisman, Chua, & Litz, 2004). In family 
firms where the ownership has been dispersed among family members some agency problems may exist 
(Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, & Buchholtz, 2001; Howorth et al., 2004). 
Finally, an aspect of the cultural revitalization in buyouts that has not received much attention is the 
positive effect on HR practices, e.g. increased training, employee involvement, number of employees, and pay 
levels (Bruining, Boselie, Wright, & Bacon, 2004). In a comparison between the U.K. and the Netherlands, the 
positive effects were bolstered significantly in the HR practices in the less institutionalized environment of the 
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U.K. (Bruining et al., 2004). The more institutionalized environment is defined as having higher participation 
in trade unions, recognizing collective bargaining, and having neutral attitudes towards union membership at 
the inception. 
3.2.2.3 Performance Management: Stretch Budgets and Ambitious Goals 
A common measure in the private equity industry is to produce ambitious business plans that raise 
performance standards and expectations for management (Jensen, 1989a; Baker & Montgomery, 1994; Butler, 
2001). Management is frequently challenged by stretch budgets, where the objective can be to double the 
EBITDA during the holding period (Anders, 1992; Baker & Montgomery, 1994). The idea behind stretch budgets 
and challenging goals is to incite management to excel. 
Moreover, management is also forced to reach aggressive targets to serve interest payments in order to 
cope with the higher gearing and elevated risk for financial distress (Easterwood et al., 1989; Smith, 1990b). 
Lastly, managers are forced to intensify their efforts or face the prospect of being replaced (Baker & Wruck, 
1989; Magowan, 1989). Consequently managers are willing to make unpopular decisions, such as reducing 
employment levels and disposing of business units (Singh, 1990; Butler, 2001). 
3.2.2.4 Revising the Firm KPIs: Novel Yardsticks 
Private equity firms typically devise a new system of key performance indicators to track portfolio firms 
based on a limited set of crucial objectives, e.g. cash flow ratios, EBITDA, and ROIC (Butler, 2001; Rogers et al., 
2002b; Zong, 2005). Acharya et al. (2008) find that private equity firm boards stress the importance of cash 
flow metrics, instead of delivery and swiftness of earnings. To these core financial indicators, private equity 
firms often add 2–3 industry–specific operational indicators. Complicated measurements are shunned since 
they tend to impede rather than speed up actions (Rogers et al., 2002b). An indication of the effect comes 
from the study by Heel and Kehoe (2005), which reported that performance–tracking systems had been 
implemented in 92% of the top performing buyouts, but in less than 50% in the bottom tercile. 
The revision and implementation of key performance indicators (KPIs) is widespread in buyouts and there 
are a number of reasons for it. First, there is the notion that people tend to improve on that which is being 
measured. By carefully selecting the appropriate yardstick, management can ensure that personnel focus on 
the right goals. Furthermore, the prior metrics at the company or industry have been sub–optimal for directing 
the efforts and must be reassessed. Finally, using too many measurements causes management to lose focus. 
3.2.3 Temporal Drivers 
3.2.3.1 High Tempo and Inchoate Change 
Bergström, Grubb, and Jonsson (2007) emphasize the import of high tempo and momentum in the 
immediate post–buyout period in order to ensure post–buyout success. The consultants Heel and Kehoe 
(2005) report from a proprietary study that GPs involved in the top tercile of buyouts devoted more than half 
of their time to the portfolio firm during the first three months by often meeting daily with executives. In the 
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lowest performing tercile, GPs spent only 20% of their time with the portfolio firm during this period. PE firms 
routinely create a “100–day plan” that prescribes the necessary changes during the period. There are a few 
principal reasons for this practice. Firstly, new owners are frequently under pressure to improve cash flows to 
serve the debt obligation, which means there is a limited window of time in which to enact operational 
improvements (Matthews et al., 2009). Secondly, immediate improvements in profitability will accumulate 
downstream during the holding period and in turn directly affect the exit valuation. 
Matthews et al. (2009) assert that the difficulty lies not in identifying potential improvement opportunities 
for the plan, but rather in sorting and prioritizing the opportunities to be acted upon. The created plans will 
typically have explicit objectives regarding cost reductions, target market share, and growth rate, as well as on 
financial parameters, including EBITDA targets, return on capital, and the schedule for servicing the debt 
(Matthews et al., 2009). They can incorporate a wider set of measures that involve core strategic objectives, 
necessary top management changes, and new incentive structures. The researchers advocate including in the 
plan a limited number of ‘low value, low difficulty projects’ where the principal objective is to deliver the benefit 
of relatively easy gains that can serve to energize employees and management. The key idea is that early 
success produces a template that bestows subsequent success. 
3.2.3.2 The Holding Period Time Horizon 
The holding periods of the buyouts tend to vary to some extent based on market conditions and locations. 
Kaplan (1991) reports in an early study of large LBOs from 1979 to 1986 that the median–time was 6.70 years. 
A study conducted by McKinsey consultants found that more than 66% of the buyouts were exited within five 
years in the 1980s, even if this fell to two years in the late 1990s (Butler, 2001). The median holding period was 
approximately four years in a study covering 7,500 buyouts from 1971 to 2005 (Lopez–de–Silanes et al., 2011). 
The most comprehensive data is from a study of 21,000 LBO transactions during the years 1970–2007 from 
a global dataset (Strömberg, 2007). This study showed that the median holding time firm in the 1980’s was 
6–7 years while during the period of 1995 to 1999 it was nine years. Smaller buyouts in the study tended to 
have longer holding periods than large ones, but when controlling for size, ongoing private transactions had 
a longer holding period compared to buyouts of private companies and corporate divisions. Depending on the 
study, the average holding period will then be between 6–9 years34. On the other hand, it would be a mistake 
to presume “quick flips” constitute a major portion of all exits. Only 2.9% of the buyouts in the study were 
exited within 12 months and 12% within 24 months (Strömberg, 2007). The study by Lopez–de–Silanes et al. 
(2011) reports a corresponding result, with 12% of the PE investments being held for less than two years. 
However, when instead examining the holding period of the buyouts that produce the highest returns the 
answer is different. Phalippou and Zollo (2005b) report that it is the short–lived investments that deliver the 
highest returns. This is in line with Lopez–de–Silanes et al. (2011), who find a strong negative association 
                                                                                       
34 However, we need to distinguish between the median holding period and that of the full population. Strömberg (2007) 
finds that 6% of all investments constitute failed buyouts, defined as having undergone financial restructuring or defaulted. 
The buyouts become “zombies”, which fund managers fail to liquidate and/or extend the median holding period. 
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between performance and duration. In the latter study quick flips (defined as those being held for less than 
two years) accounted for only 12% of the investments but had an astonishing median IRR of 85%. In turn, 
investments held for more than six years and that accounted for nearly 18% of the investments had a median 
IRR of only 8%35. 
Private–equity buyout firms possess a further advantage when compared with public companies in the 
singular strategic focus for the duration of the holding period. This can be contrasted with the dispersion of 
resources in public companies, where management often are disrupted by quarterly earnings of the firm and 
public scrutiny in the media. Several studies have found that the strategic focus in buyout firms is on the long–
term (Rogers et al., 2002b; Jensen et al., 2006; Mills, 2006). Often the private equity firms develop an 
investment strategy during the 100–day plan for reshaping the business model, which determines the buyout 
firm direction for the holding period (Rogers et al., 2002b). 
3.3 The Lever of Value Capture 
The value appropriation or transfer of wealth from prior shareholders and non–equity stakeholders is 
known as multiple arbitrage. The lever is often multifaceted as value can originate from several sources. In the 
context of this thesis, these are classified under the more expansive term value capture. Value capture is 
intrinsically and fundamentally different from the levers of value creation, as new value is not created, but 
merely won or lost in what fundamentally constitutes a zero–sum game. Another difference from value 
creation is that the generated value is determined by two distinct moments: the entry and the exit transaction 
(although these are in turn affected by the preceding history). 
The stakeholders of a transaction here are defined broadly, since it can involve expending the resources of 
society due to decreasing taxes and a reduction of the workforce remuneration. Consequently it is the most 
controversial lever for generating value in private equity buyouts and often at the center of criticism in the 
media. It should be noted that a substantial amount of research has been devoted to examining the 
stakeholder expropriation hypothesis – sometimes called the wealth transfer hypothesis – and whether or not 
wealth is expropriated from pre–transaction stockholders, bondholders, or employees. However, even if there 
are evident cases where expropriation has occurred, the majority of the empirical evidence does not support 
the hypothesis when accounting for the full population of buyouts (Renneboog & Simons, 2005). 
Another common notion is that a party that possesses superior information compared to a counterpart 
can use it to gain from the losses sustained by the other party. Of particular interest to academics has been 
whether or not the information asymmetry referred to as private information is being abused during a 
management buyout (MBO)36. For instance, management may have an incentive to suppress profits prior to 
a buyout in order to drive down the price. This exploitation of private information, labeled as the 
                                                                                       
35 However, another study does not find that “quick flips” leads to significantly higher returns (Siming, 2010, p.119). 
36 Moreover, information asymmetries may affect the entry- and the exit transaction in correspondence with Akerlof’s (1970) 
work. If so, measures that decreased the information asymmetry could permit the buyer to increase the price, since having 
better information enabled a more accurate valuation and reduced the risk. 
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undervaluation hypothesis (or the signaling hypothesis) was studied particularly in the first wave of buyouts in 
the early 1980s. The first to suggest that management could take advantage of information asymmetries by 
artificially depressing the company value through accounting measures before a management buyout was 
Lowenstein (1985). Initially some researchers found support for the hypothesis, e.g. the premiums paid for 
buyout target firms were the result of an undervaluation, which implied subsequent performance 
improvements due to the exploitation of private information during management buyouts (Baker & Wruck, 
1989). Other researchers found that abnormal buying patterns preceded management buyouts, but not during 
externally induced buyouts (Harlow & Howe, 1993; Kaestner & Liu, 1996).  
At the same time, other researchers reported potential gains from exploiting private information being 
inconsequential as an explanation for the subsequent performance improvement (Kaplan, 1989a, 1989b; 
Kaplan & Stein, 1993). It is also true that most buyouts are not of the management buyout type, which means 
that taking advantage of any private information would be considerably more difficult. 
Moreover, there will be information asymmetries in any transaction, which does not necessary indicate 
improprieties. Extensive business advantages may stem from transaction experience, negotiation skills, 
extensive contact networks, firm valuation skills, market information, business intelligence, and industry 
expertise – all of which demonstrate various information asymmetries between the transaction parties 
(Anders, 1992; Fox & Marcus, 1992). 
3.3.1 Commercial Drivers 
3.3.1.1 Proprietary Deal Flow 
Practitioners often proclaim the advantage of a proprietary deal flow, but support from longitudinal 
studies is scant, perhaps due to limited availability in data sets. Kaplan and Schoar (2005) propose that having 
better access to investments could be an explanation for the persistent performance variations observed 
among GPs. Schmidt et al. (2004) report that buyout fund performance is significantly related to the 
experience of the individual fund and further speculate that the reason might be access to a superior deal flow 
and in preferential management of buyout portfolios. Apart from being suggested by various researchers 
(Kaufman & Englander, 1993; Wright et al., 1996), more substantial support for proprietary deal flow is found 
in a dissertation by Loos (2006, p.344), who reports that proactive proprietary deal sourcing from the buyout 
firm leads to substantial returns, but that deal sourcing was less effective when coming from intermediaries 
(e.g. investment banks) or the GP’s contact network. 
3.3.1.2 Deal Making Expertise 
An auction is the preferred method for optimizing the value received by sellers, which conversely means it 
is the least favorable method for acquiring firms. The more restricted a transaction is from buyer competition, 
the lower the resulting transaction price (Wright et al., 1996; Baker & Smith, 1998). In particular, ”hot auctions,” 
where fervent competition drives up prices, may lead to a situation known as the winners curse. One tactic at 
auctions is to secure sole bidder status by making a high bid and then re–negotiating the bid with uncovered 
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flaws during the due diligence process (Butler, 2001). When used as a stratagem for the sole purpose of 
reducing and renegotiating the price, the tactic can backfire and carry repercussions37. However, judicious 
renegotiations based on deficiencies identified during the due diligence process is common among savvy 
negotiators. Discovered flaws may include, e.g. outdated equipment and environmental liabilities (Butler, 
2001). Another tactic is to tie the bid to performance targets during a transfer period, which means if 
profitability suddenly deteriorates, the purchase price goes down. 
An additional method for gaining the upper hand is to be ready immediately as opportunities emerge, as 
seen in Fox and Marcus (1992). Correspondingly, Wright et al. (1996) suggest that private equity investors 
should proactively approach attractive buyout targets before the competition is alerted. 
3.3.1.3 Target Firm Identification and Investment Criteria 
The buyout firm has traditionally been a firm with the ability to generate large cash flows, but with few 
net present value (NPV) positive investment opportunities (Baker & Wruck, 1989; Kaplan, 1989b; Lichtenberg 
& Siegel, 1990; Smith, 1990b; Opler & Titman, 1993). Opler and Titman (1993) reported that buyout target 
firms are more diversified than peers. Conversely, firms with expected high costs for financial distress are 
unlikely targets, e.g. high CAPEX industries (heavy machinery and process technology) and R&D intensive 
sectors. However, in a recent study Puche, Braun, and Achleitner (2014) found that value creation differed 
substantially among industries and that it has been highest in industrials and consumer services and lowest 
in technology companies. 
Delving deeper into the attributes reveals that management buyouts have had higher cash flows as a 
percentage of sales than peers prior to the buyout, alongside lower levels of receivables to sales, and have 
been the object of more incidences of buyout speculation (Singh, 1990). With regards to target firms for 
public–to–private transactions, Masulis and Thomas (2009) report that these are likely to have a diffused 
ownership base, low levels of management shareholdings, performance insensitive compensation plans, to 
suffer from deficient board oversight and control, and finally to exhibit underperformance. Finally, as seen 
implicitly in studies on capital constrained markets by Boucly et al. (2008) and (Chung, 2010), we might infer 
that this could be a potential investment criterion. 
Various criteria of PE firms are summarized in table 2 (Olsen, 2002; Malak, 2005; Arundale, 2010)38. 
                                                                                       
37 The method became infamous during the 1980s and 1990s, as e.g. Cohan (2012) reports. This study suggests that a large 
PE firm “took the art of negotiation over price into the scientific realm. Once the competitive dynamics had shifted in its 
favor, the firm’s genuine views about what it was willing to pay – often far lower than first indicated – would be revealed”. 
38 Certain acquisition criteria typically recur, e.g. stable cash flow, while others will be industry specific. 
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Business Criteria Financial Criteria 
1. Business opportunity; buy & build, focus 1. Steady and predictable cash flow 
2. Market leadership/defensible position 2. Non–cyclical industry 
3. Strong or replaceable management team 3. Flexible, low–cost financing 
4. Experienced board of directors 4. Strong margins and profitability 
5. Stable competitive environment 5. Divestible assets and units 
6. Diversified customer base 6. Clean balance sheet with minimal debt 
7. Highly skilled workforce 7. Cost reduction potential 
8. Viable exit strategy 8. Heavy asset base for loan collateral 
9. High brand recognition 9. Well–invested/minimal future CAPEX 
10. Broad prospective supplier base 10. Non–fixed price contracts 
11. Large portfolio of patents and licenses 11. Limited working capital requirements 
  Table 2. Business and financial criteria to identify suitable buyout targets 
Self–evidently the significance and weight of any individual criteria will be contingent upon a particular 
investment opportunity. A competent top management team is crucial, but deficiencies can be alleviated by 
external recruitment. Correspondingly, attaining a board with industry expertise is vital, but rarely a barrier for 
the completion of a buyout. 
3.3.1.4 Uncovering the Business Potential 
Several of the original tenets and investment criteria have been remodeled due to the increased 
competition within the industry. In fact, Strömberg (2007) suggests that the caricature of private equity firms 
investing merely in mature and declining industries was never entirely accurate, as the investment targets 
have always been diverse. To some extent it is likely that the paucity of ideal targets has forced private equity 
firms to make trade–offs and reassess previous target criteria. Mitigating factors can alleviate apparent 
shortcomings and turn the non–traditional target into a highly successful buyout. For instance, a buyout case 
in an atypical industry for private equity will usually mean less competition towards the target firm and 
consequently may result in a more attractive valuation. A business case within a highly cyclical industry can 
in reality be an outstanding case if the cycle is in a trough. Correspondingly, a business case in an industry 
characterized by high capital expenditures, i.e. an unconventional buyout target, can be opportune if it is well 
invested. At the core of this expertise is the willingness to discard simple decision heuristics in order to be able 
to identify the innate business potential of the prospect39. 
In particular, the due diligence process can be an excellent opportunity for reevaluating the initial 
assessment and discovering hidden factors that can either mitigate the downsides or aggravate the 
deficiencies. Having the due diligence process performed before the buyout is a methodical review that 
                                                                                       
39 The reasoning is somewhat parallel to the identifying an evident drawback that at closer inspection reveal to be an 
advantage, and vice versa, which the author Malcolm Gladwell (2013) eloquently explores in this recent bestseller. 
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typically comprises a commercial, financial, legal, and occasionally an environmental section. The due 
diligence can minimize the information gap that causes agency problems for the firm (Jensen et al., 2006). 
Aside from reviewing the state of the firm, another important goal is to uncover the downsides and dormant 
potential, i.e. the “hidden gems”. 
Holthausen and Larcker (1996) introduced a new category of buyout targets in the mid–1990s with the 
underperformance hypothesis. This hypothesis suggested a market anomaly that could not be entirely 
explained with either the free cash flow hypothesis or the private information hypotheses (Nikoskelainen, 
2006). The hypothesis states that the buyer can increase the PTP premium when the pre–transaction firm is 
underperforming (Renneboog & Simons, 2005). Nikoskelainen (2006) suggests that the reasons for this 
underlying underperformance are manifold and range from incompetent management to organizational and 
strategic mistakes to an inflexible reporting and decision–making process. In a study of 71 European buyouts, 
he finds support for the underperformance hypothesis in target firms as compared to industry peers. The study 
finds that buyout targets had, compared to industry peers, lower levels of gearing, lower EBITDA margins, and 
a more volatile cash flow but, somewhat surprisingly, relatively high operating profits and a faster turnover 
on assets. Furthermore, these characteristics indicate a lower capacity for leverage based on the cash flow, 
but more potential for operating efficiency improvements and business growth (Nikoskelainen, 2006). 
Correspondingly, a study by Renneboog and Simons (2005) of 177 Public–to–Private (PTP) transactions in 
the U.K. from 1997 to 2003 confirms the undervaluation hypothesis, as lower share price performance leads 
to higher premiums and cumulative abnormal returns (CAAR)40. This relationship was especially significant in 
the case of management buyouts and institutional buyouts, while weaker in management buy–ins (i.e. 
leveraged buyouts). While the study finds the strongest correlation to the undervaluation hypotheses, other 
primary sources of gains were the increase in the interest tax shield and the incentive realignment. 
Wright, Gilligan, and Amess (2009) state that buyouts tend to be heterogeneous in terms of the location 
of performance improvements, which are in consonance with the findings of this literary review. For example, 
the potential for improvement can originate from the relative underperformance of a buyout target. Bloom 
and Reenen (2007) find that management practices were often inferior in privately held family–managed 
firms compared to industry peers, and particularly private equity–owned firms. This suggests that there would 
be an opportunity for private equity firms to exploit the management differential. Bloom et al. (2009) find 
evidence for the phenomenon, i.e. that PE firms disproportionately target family companies with managerial 
underperformance. 
With regards to the necessary competency to identify the concealed business potential, it can be 
hypothesized that the ability is multi–dimensional. First, it necessitates an analytical cognitive approach and 
a willingness to reassess preconceptions. Second, it requires intellectual flexibility and perceptiveness. Third, 
it requires functional experience and industry expertise in order to assess the particulars of the firm. While 
intellectual flexibility and functional experience are easy to comprehend, the first dimension is more complex. 
We can draw parallels to the concepts of cognitive style and cognitive complexity extensively studied by the 
                                                                                       
40 CAAR as measured over an 11 –day event window centered around the announcement day. 
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social scientist Philip Tetlock of Wharton, which suggests that a more analytical approach is necessary in order 
to overcome preconceived notions (e.g. Tetlock, 2000). Likewise, a similar concept relates to the two modes 
of thought championed by Kahneman and Tversky, of which System 1 refers to thought processes that are 
instinctive, emotional and fast, whereas System 2 refers to the slower, more deliberate and logical thought 
processes (Kahneman, 2011). In the case of the ability to identify a concealed business potential, the ability to 
overcome the initial perception and analyze the case detail would be a necessity. 
3.3.1.5 Detecting Nascent Market Trends: Multiple Expansion 
Practitioners often refer to an overall appreciation in value of business sectors and industries as “multiple 
riding.” Specifically this refers to the multiple expansion or increase of the valuation multiple, where the 
multiple denotes the EBITDA/Enterprise Value or EBIT/Enterprise Value. However, an expanding market will 
not only increase the valuation multiple, but simultaneously increase top–line sales and EBITDA. 
There are a number of common ways by which private equity firms can gain from multiple arbitrage. For 
instance, multiples typically vary for comparable firms among different countries. Mature industries tend to 
be valued at lower multiples than growth firms, despite having equal levels of profitability. Public and private 
firms are valued and traded at different multiples with a higher multiple conferred to listed firms. Larger firms 
tend to receive valuations at higher multiples than smaller firms within the same industry. Furthermore, 
multiples tend to fluctuate in accordance with the business cycle. Finally, industry growth or improved future 
prospects both tend to increase the firm multiples. 
While all of these factors influence multiples, two factors in particular rely on having superior market 
expertise: industry growth and business cycles. While the latter will be discussed in the next chapter, the 
former means having superior expertise in predicting long–term industry trends. This in turn will determine in 
which industries the PE firm invests and, ultimately, the return on investment. The old maxim “a rising tide 
lifts all boats” is the guiding principle here. A recent study illustrates this by finding that both industry growth 
and GDP growth affect buyout returns and the probability of achieving positive abnormal market returns 
(Valkama et al., 2010). Previously a number of studies have found similar results. A study of buyouts in Sweden 
found that private equity investors able to pick firms in industries experiencing high growth were successful 
(but does not establish the result as being due to market timing abilities) (Bergström et al., 2007). An earlier 
study found that buyout fund performance increases substantially when the investments are made in times 
of high GDP growth and with high return on the public stock market (Phalippou & Zollo, 2005a). Likewise, 
Achleitner et al. (2011) report that EBITDA multiple expansion (aside from leverage and operational 
improvements) was fundamental to explaining equity returns and was the result of a GP skill. 
While value generation is exogenous in cause, the expertise that permits the private equity firm to 
capitalize on industry trends is endogenous to the buyout specialist. What is clear is that when a buyout 
specialist has a better understanding of the market and can more accurately predict the development than 
the seller, the specialist can gain from the information gap. 
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3.3.1.6 Timing the Business Cycles 
A number of studies have examined whether investors can time market entry and exit so as to achieve 
gains from business cycles. This phenomenon is multifaceted and can be viewed from diverse research 
perspectives, e.g. return variations of fund vintage years, variations in the capital influx to the PE market, the 
cyclicality of PE firm returns, and variations in industry sensitivity to business cycles. 
A considerable effect on industry performance is found by analyzing industry cycle sensitivity. Certain 
industries such as chemicals, energy, and telecom display substantial variations in the gross IRR across fund 
vintage years (Cornelius et al., 2009). Timing in cyclical industries can form a crucial difference between 
generating significantly above or below average returns. The study reports that funds outperformed their 
peers and produced top–quartile returns when they selected industries in the right cycle and combined this 
with operational and financial engineering skills (Cornelius et al., 2009). The finding is unsurprising, as superior 
returns can be achieved with less effort when pursuing an industry that is experiencing a business cycle 
expansion. 
The vintage year return of private equity funds is associated with the business cycle of the private equity 
industry (Kaplan & Schoar, 2005). Explicitly, the vintage year performance variation appears to correspond to 
the availability of inexpensive debt financing, which drives up the valuation multiples for buyout firms to 
unsustainable levels. Consequently, the vintage year returns are likely to be low for funds raised in boom years 
(Kaplan & Schoar, 2005). Steve Kaplan expresses this as: “(my) regression models have shown that there is a 
very strong negative relationship between the vintage year return and the capital committed to private equity 
funds” (Chew, 2009, p.10). Kaplan finds that the effect is particularly strong when measured as a fraction of 
committed capital to PE funds and the overall allocation in the stock market, as the vintage years of the early 
1980s showed average returns close to 25% in the U.S., which fell to below 10% in the late 1990s. The historical 
pattern suggests the returns from the vintage years from 2005 to 2008 will be disappointing since PE funds 
raised record amounts of capital during the peak years (Chew, 2009; Kaplan & Strömberg, 2009). From a 
practical standpoint this suggests that a useful indicator for investment timing would be to track the fraction 
of the capital allocation and scale back on peak years by not investing funds or not raising capital (Chew, 
2009). 
While the timing of business cycles does have a considerable effect on private equity investments, the 
research is more ambiguous with regards to the timing ability of GPs. An early study of 433 IPOs during the 
years 1978 to 1987 found that investors of VC funds can time the period for going public (Muscarella et al., 
1990). Similarly a study by Lerner (1994) of 350 biotechnology firms from 1978 to 1992, showed that seasoned 
venture capitalists appeared particularly proficient at taking companies public near market peaks. In an 
analysis of 70 PE and VC funds from 1971 and 1998, Schmidt et al. (2004) finds timing ability being an important 
factor of overall fund performance, but only for VC funds and entry investment. On the other hand, the 
analysis indicates that timing ability is less consequential in PE funds that invest in mature companies with 
more stable market valuations (Schmidt et al., 2004). Relative to VC investments this may be accurate since 
the VC entry valuations are largely determined by assessing expectations. However, the finding that PE fund 
performance is determined by other factors than timing ability appears puzzling. 
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One study examining the macroeconomic conditions at the time of the PE investments reported that fund 
performance improves significantly both from higher GDP growth rates and public stock market returns 
(Phalippou & Zollo, 2005b). Conversely, when either credit spreads or corporate bond yields are low at the 
time of the investment, fund performance is higher (Phalippou & Zollo, 2005b). In addition, there is evidence 
that the market cycles are counter–cyclical between M&A activity and MBOs. Another study found evidence 
of increased M&A activity in bull markets at peak valuations, while LBOs and MBOs are relatively more likely 
in bear markets with low valuations41 (Thomsen & Vinten, 2007). 
Extant research on business cycles and vintage years suggest that private equity firms should to a higher 
degree consider the market conditions when making investments. The market timing could arguably be 
improved by using the market indicators determined in extant research. 
 
 
3.3.1.7 The Entry Transaction: Firm Valuation 
A critical aspect of firm valuation expertise consists in having models that accurately reflect the intrinsic 
value of a firm and its future business. The most common financial methods for valuating a firm include the 
discounted cash flow (DCF), the adjusted present value (APV), weighted average cost of capital (WACC), and 
firm value multiples (e.g. Damodaran (2006)). At the same time, Hoffmann (2008) suggests that the most 
common valuation method is to make multiple comparisons within a particular industry and examine the 
price level of a recent transaction, which occasionally is combined with a simplified DCF–model. 
When comparing the price levels for buyouts to those acquired through an M&A, the evidence seems to 
support the view that PE firms pay less than competing acquirers. Two separate studies report that in Public–
to–Private (P2P) transactions, existing shareholders receive a price premium of 40% when acquired by PE firms 
                                                                                       
41 We can speculate that managers of public firms take advantage of the relative overvaluations at peaks to instigate M&A 
with moderately valued firms, while buyout funds take advantage to enter when valuations are low. This suggests that 
business cycles of M&A and private equity buyouts are off phase, since M&A activity is at a peak when the stock prices are at 
a maximum and private equity buyouts are at a minimum. 
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Figure 3. An illustration of market timing in the context of buyouts  
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(Kaplan, 1989b; Wright et al., 2006). A more recent study for the period 1990 to 2005 reports that the average 
premium to shareholders during a private equity buyout is 20.5% (Bargeron, Schlingemann, Stulz, & Zutter, 
2008). Correspondingly, the premium when a public firm makes the acquisition is 32.7%, which constitutes a 
43% gain compared to having a private firm make the acquisition, and a 55% gain if the acquirer is a private 
equity firm (Bargeron et al., 2008). These results suggest private equity firms do pay a premium to 
shareholders, but one that is substantially less compared to the premium paid by public firms. 
Likewise, research by a consulting firm suggests that private equity buyers consistently paid less than 
industrial buyers during the 1990s (Butler, 2001), and suggests that the reason is the dispassionate approach 
taken by PE firms, which includes screening dozens of deals for each execution. The contrast is stark for 
strategic buyers, who tend to be limited to targets within the same industry and often overestimate the 
synergies alongside getting carried away in auctions (Butler, 2001). Kaplan and Strömberg (2009) suggest that 
the price difference is consistent with PE firms either being proficient in identifying ex–post undervalued 
companies and industries or else having more skilled negotiators. 
If we examine the mode of entry, we find that competitive auctions tend to maximize the acquisition price, 
which should affect buyout deal performance negatively. However, this is not necessarily the case. The average 
gross IRR for deals entered through competitive auctions soar to 153% in realized deals, compared to 75% for 
a negotiated–sale and 75% for buy–side intermediary (Loos, 2006). A proposed explanation for the high 
returns is that the most attractive buyout targets are exchanged in competitive auctions and the value 
generation potential remains superior despite the higher price. At the same time, Loos finds evidence of return 
corrosion for current, unrealized deals. The average gross IRR is 55% among European auctions, while it is –
3% among U.S. auctions, which suggests private equity firms should refrain from U.S. auctions (Loos, 2006). 
Finally, a note on contingency planning and the necessity of incorporating rare case scenarios into the 
valuation. The core idea is to integrate positive and negative scenarios into the decision–making process that 
could fundamentally alter the current business, such as business cycle changes, market environment 
movements, cost structure adjustments, and fluctuations to market prices (Lieber, 2004). While essentially 
all firms have established processes for assessing and approving investments, these do not necessarily 
incorporate improbable Black Swan events. Carey and Morris (2012, p.189) describe how the procedures for 
preparing buyout base cases were altered by including projections of “fluke events”42. A germane technique 
for improving future outcomes is to conduct a pre–mortem analysis (Klein, 2007; Kahneman, 2011, p.256). 
3.3.1.8 Divesting the Firm: The Mode of Exit 
The most common approach among practitioners for maximizing the exit value is to perhaps begin 
promoting the portfolio firm soon after the transaction is reported in the business press by media events, 
interviews and press releases. Less widespread, but nevertheless known, especially from IPOs, is the practice 
                                                                                       
42“Like their counterparts…Blackstone’s partners were accustomed to producing voluminous projections”, forecasting 
“every item of every division, down to how many Coca-Colas they’re buying in their conference rooms...” With the new CEO 
Hamilton James, the practice was changed to instead consider the effect of ‘fluke’ events, which were improbable when 
considered separately, but accumulated when taken together, and which might occur during the period. 
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of ‘window–dressing,’ i.e. applying specious accounting tricks to bolster the financial statement artificially. A 
rather common method is to defer capital expenditures and necessary reinvestments in order to boost short–
term profitability. Recent research on the exit routes of buyouts suggests that secondary buyouts have 
become at least as prevalent as the trade sale, while IPOs have decreased. 
Perhaps the most common method for increasing the exit multiple and consequently the exit value is through 
market consolidation. A domestic market leadership position frequently garners a higher multiple than a 
regional market position. Similarly a more substantial geographic entity, for instance, all the Nordic countries 
versus one of the countries, tends to receive more interest from outside buyers. A plausible explanation for 
the higher valuation could be that a more sizeable geographical area permits further opportunities for the 
extraction of value through economies of scale and the concentration of purchasing power in the supply chain. 
However, there may exist a maximum above which market consolidation is unwarranted. A study by 
Gustavsson and Stjernswärd (2009) shows that firm size affects exit multiples concavely and consequently 
affects firm valuation as well43. Firms with revenues of $20–50 million that pursued a buy and build strategy 
achieved higher exit multiples, while the relationship turned negative for revenues between $300–600 million. 
It is common knowledge that when comparing exit routes and all is kept equal, an IPO will typically garner the 
highest price. Unsurprisingly it is the preferred route of exit for the most successful firms (Schwienbacher, 
2002; Schmidt, Steffen, & Szabo, 2009). The empirical evidence showed that firms exited through an IPO got 
the highest multiples at 11.7, while other exit routes garnered significantly lower multiples: trade sale 7.6, 
secondary buyout 7.1, and recap 7.7 (Chapman & Klein, 2009). Overall the price premium for publicly traded 
firms tends to be close to 20% compared to private firms. Finally, there is evidence that IPOs are particularly 
auspicious in periods with high GDP growth (Schmidt et al., 2009). Simultaneously, there are several 
drawbacks with an IPO, e.g. these tend to be a viable alternative merely for the top performing buyouts, the 
process of listing is comparatively long and costly, all shares can rarely be offloaded and, finally, the firm may 
be below a threshold with regards to capitalization. 
The alternative that typically garners the next highest price is the exit to a financial buyer, i.e. a secondary 
buyout has become increasingly common44 (Achleitner, Bauer, Figge, & Lutz, 2012). The study provides 
evidence that secondary buyouts can produce returns comparable to those achieved by an IPO. Furthermore 
the study shows that the likelihood for a financial exit increases with the liquidity of debt markets and the 
debt capacity of the portfolio firm. In a follow up study, Achleitner and Figge (2014) find that secondary 
buyouts do not generate lower returns or less operational value creation, but obtain 28–30% higher leverage 
after controlling for debt market conditions. Moreover, the former are acquired at a price level that is 6–9% 
more expensive. 
                                                                                       
43 Interestingly a recent study reported that smaller deals exhibited greater value creation than mid–cap buyouts, which in 
0turn exhibited greater value creation than large–cap deals (Puche et al., 2014). 
44 Strömberg (2007) cites slightly earlier data in which the most common exit route for buyouts is trade sale (38%), secondary 
buyout (24%), and IPO (13%), of which the latter have gradually decreased in importance. 
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3.3.2 Organizational Drivers 
3.3.2.1 Mitigated Legislative and Regulatory Constraints 
Practitioners often claim that the principal advantage of buyout firms compared to traditional companies 
is the exemption from the restrictive legislation of public corporations. The CEO of a portfolio firm is subject 
to a substantially decreased media scrutiny compared to a public company, e.g. public criticism for the large 
amounts of equity–based compensation (Masulis & Thomas, 2009). Moreover, the disclosure requirements 
have rather increased in later years with new legislations for public companies, such as for the Sarbanes–Oxley 
Act of 2002 in the U.S.45. This is in stark contrast to portfolio firms, which rarely issue any public financial 
statements, whereas in most countries these are by law publicly available for any limited or incorporated 
private company, not to mention the disclosure requirements of public firms. Appelbaum and Batt (2012) 
suggest that the mitigated regulatory environment, especially the financial regulatory regime, is an 
explanation for the dramatic growth of private equity in the U.S. At the same time this is a factor that provides 
an equal advantage within a legislature for private equity and thus rarely is the focus of PE research. 
3.3.2.2 The Corporate Tax Shield: Debt and Taxes 
The combination of financing acquisitions with debt against a firm’s assets, while making tax deductions 
of debt interest payments, has been used since the mid–1970s. Typically the tax shield has been viewed as a 
key component of financial engineering and a lever of value creation. However, it can be argued that the 
advantage derived from a tax reduction primarily constitutes a wealth transfer from a societal perspective and 
consequently more appropriately should be considered a lever of value capture46. To some extent this is a 
simplification, since the reduction of taxes from interest rates enable buyout investments that eventually may 
benefit the society. Likewise, the tax deductions resurface as taxable income for the issuers of the debt and 
capital gains tax for the pre–buyout shareholders through the price premium (Gilson, Scholes, and Wolfson, 
1987; Kaplan, 1989b). Obviously there are the capital gains taxes from the carried interest that form the lion’s 
share of the GP remuneration, which however is capped and at a significantly lower rate than income tax in 
most jurisdictions. 
In the late 1980s multiple studies found evidence for debt being a significant source of value in buyouts, 
particularly in the U.S. (Lowenstein, 1985; Kaplan, 1989a). The central mechanism by which debt adds value in 
a buyout is via the tax deduction of debt interest rates, which provide a tax shield that affects cash flow 
generation (Kaplan, 1989a; Singh, 1990). Jensen and Murphy (1990) find that the overall impact on taxes by 
buyouts is likely to be positive since there is an increase in tax receipts for capital gains, for increased operating 
income, and for the income on debt interest. Thompson and Wright (1995) assert that aside from some 
transfers from taxpayers with respect to debt interest relief, the net effect is likely value creation rather than 
a transfer of value. 
                                                                                       
45 For a more detailed overview of the financial regulatory regimes in Europe, refer to European Commission (2006), EVCA 
(2009), and Braun, Hornsby, and Coekelbergs (2013a), while for U.S. see Appelbaum and Batt (2012). 
46 The notion that tax–related benefits in buyouts should be considered as a wealth transfer was proposed by Lowenstein 
(1985), who argued these constitute a public subsidy to firms in mature capital–intensive industries. 
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Despite the advantages of tax deductions, this is not identical to proposing that the benefits accrue to 
private equity investors. An article often quoted in the research is a study of 76 management buyouts of public 
companies in the U.S. during the years 1980 to 1986 by Kaplan (1989a), which finds that the tax benefits 
measured from the premium paid to pre–buyout shareholders varied between 21% and 143%. This 
considerable variation was due to the varying assumptions of marginal tax rates and the amortization 
schedule of the debt. What is noteworthy is that a substantial amount of the tax advantage was transferred 
to the pre–buyout shareholders by the price premium. 
More recently, a study of the 100 largest P2P takeovers during the years 2003 to 2008 in the U.S., Jenkinson 
and Stucke (2011) find a strong relationship between tax savings and the extent of price premium. In their 
analysis, the buyout premium paid to the former shareholders was twice the size of tax savings from increased 
financial leverage. The researchers conclude that the benefits typically accrue to the former shareholders and 
consequently the tax savings are likely negligible. The caveat is that the studies by Kaplan (1989a) and 
Jenkinson and Stucke (2011) concern public–to–private buyouts, which are not representative of the population 
of buyouts at large. Public–to–private buyouts account for a minority in the U.S. and the U.K., while being even 
rarer in continental Europe (Harris, Siegel, & Wright, 2003). 
However, in the aforementioned study Kaplan (1989a) reports that, depending on the presumptions, the 
reduced taxes from higher interest deductions explain between 4% and 40% of the firm’s value. Kaplan and 
Strömberg (2009) suggest that an estimate of the value of lower taxes from the higher levels of debt in the 
1980s would thus constitute 10% to 20% of the firm value. The figures seem minor in comparison with a more 
recent study of a sample consisting of 192 large buyouts in the U.S. during the years 1990 to 2006 (Guo et al., 
2011). In this study it was found that out of the total returns, the tax benefits from the increased leverage 
accounted for 33.8% while 22.9% can be attributed to the changes in operating performance and 17.7% to 
changes in industry valuation multiples, and finally only 5.1% to changes in market valuation multiples. While 
the contribution to value generation is substantial in the study by Guo et al. (2011), a limitation to the study is 
that the sample only contains U.S. public–to–private transactions. At the same time, it is clear that differences 
in national tax regulations makes it difficult to estimate and compare the tax benefit between countries. 
It is reasonable to conclude that the tax advantage private equity firms maintain relative to both public– 
and private corporations can be construed as a competitive advantage for the PE industry, even if the playing 
field gradually has become more equal between different organizational forms, e.g. for U.S. see Newbould et 
al. (1992). 
3.3.2.3 Carried Interest and Capital Income 
The second key tax advantage the private equity industry holds compared to traditional enterprises is the 
carried interest. Carried interest has undoubtedly been controversial in the media over the years and it remains 
unclear as to if and how these will change in different countries. Firstly, there is the broader question of tax 
rates on capital income, which in most Western European countries and North America is currently taxed at 
flat rates ranging from 15% to 28.5%. Secondly, and the core of the debate, is whether GPs should enjoy capital 
income tax rates for the carried interest. The carried interest is essentially a form of remuneration that is 
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rewarded to deal partners when they exceed fund performance limits. 
At the baseline, this means to repay all the invested capital of the fund to the investors, but often 
covenants stipulate that a certain hurdle rate must be achieved before any carried interest is rewarded. A 
typical level of the carried interest is 20% of the fund gross return and regularly constitutes a considerable 
share of the remuneration to the GP. Consequently, carried interest can effectively function as an industry 
advantage in relation to traditional enterprises, e.g. during the recruitment process. However, there is 
substantial variation in the fee structures between regions and even among firms. Morris and Phalippou (2011) 
note that there is a difference between the carried interest in Europe and the U.S., where PE firms of the latter 
tend to be intricate and expensive, in addition to being comprised of additional indirect fixed fee layers. The 
European firms by contrast, and particularly the Scandinavian, have contracts with low or non–existent 
portfolio firm fees. 
Despite the observed variation between countries and firms, carried interest creates a competitive 
advantage for private equity compared to traditional public and private enterprises. One way to interpret the 
relative competitive advantage that PE firms possess is that a certain portion of the value generation can be 
attributed to the carried interest. However, it is difficult to estimate the overall effect of the fee structure on 
buyout value generation because of the variance between regions. 
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Figure 4. Summary of the empirically derived sources of value generation in buyouts 
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Chapter 4. Research Methodology 
The aim of this chapter is to set out the methodological approach undertaken to explore the prevailing 
value generation mechanisms in outperforming buyouts. This chapter presents the research method 
and justifications behind the chosen methodology, the selection process of the sample, the method 
used to collect the empirical data, and the data analysis process. Finally, limitations and ethical issues 
pertaining to the study are discussed. 
4.1 Data 
4.1.1 Sample Criteria 
In qualitative research, the sample selection is not restricted by the rules of statistical inference that govern 
quantitative research. Samples can instead be determined by the purpose of the study and the researcher’s 
research question. Smith, Flowers, and Larkin (2009) suggest that sample selection should be purposive and 
homogeneous. Homogeneity may be problematic to achieve in instances where the phenomena under study 
are rare, but this is less of an issue with purposive sampling. Purposive sampling means that participants are 
selected due to certain characteristics or experiences in an attempt to establish good correspondence between 
the research questions and the sampling (Bryman, 2004; Smith et al., 2009). According to Patton (1990), small 
sample sizes are superior to probability sampling for an in–depth study, while Smith et al. (2009) recommend 
three to six participants in order to secure a fine–grained account of the studied phenomena. 
The inclusion criterion at the onset was buyout portfolio firms where substantial value generation had 
materialized as measured as the relative difference between the entry transaction price and the exit price. The 
performance limit was not fixed, but dependent upon availability in the participating private equity firms. In 
practice, significant value generation meant, e.g. the money–back multiple was at 1.9x, 1.7x (est.), and 6,0x, 
for investments with holding periods of 2 – 3.5 years. The multiple was used as a proxy to qualify case firms 
for the study, while the core research question had to do with examining various value generation 
mechanisms. (The broad range of valuation methods was outside the realm of this thesis.) By definition, a 
materialized exit price implied the divestment had been made for all included case firms. 
The second criterion was the availability of at least two independent sources with intimate knowledge of 
the portfolio firm. In practice, this meant the senior partner most involved with the portfolio firm and the 
managing director or CEO at the portfolio firm during the holding period. The quality of the data source was 
emphasized, as opposed to increasing the quantity of interviews. Having access to a broader selection of 
personnel at the portfolio firm could have added value and validity, but this was deemed unpractical with the 
limited resources for the dissertation project. However, the second criterion proved to be a cornerstone in the 
study, which led to the exclusion of several buyout cases. 
The third criterion was defining the target group to consist of Nordic buyouts, meaning expanding beyond 
national borders, but keeping the sample selection fairly homogeneous. 
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4.1.2 Case Selection 
In order to find appropriate case study objects, the Nordic private equity market was screened. For 
Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden this information was collected by using publically available 
information from the national venture capital trade organizations DVCA, FVCA, NVCA, and, SVCA. For each 
country firm investment profiles were sorted to include firms investing in later–stage buyouts. The remaining 
firms were contacted by email with an inquiry to participate in the study. Multiple firms were discarded at the 
onset for a variety of reasons; among these the primary motives were firm confidentiality accords impeding 
on the participation, but also the lack of suitable case firms. After initial selection, a further two potential 
firms were excluded due to the unavailability of the managing director during the holding period. 
The final sample in the multiple–case study consisted of three different portfolio firms acquired by three 
different private equity firms situated in Finland, Norway, and Sweden. The included portfolio firms were all 
mid–sized, with a turnover between 100 and 500 million euro, while the private equity firms all were top–tier 
firms in a Nordic context with a managed capitalization of 1–5 billion euro. 
A select group of contrast cases was added in order to reduce selection bias and advance research validity. 
All contrast cases consisted of relevant portfolio firms in which unambiguous value destruction ensued. These 
complementary interviews were conducted between October and November 2012 with one senior partner at 
the private equity firms that had been tied to the case. Two case interviews were conducted by telephone, 
while the third took place in person. All interviews were recorded with the consent of the interviewee and 
transcribed verbatim. Two of the failed buyout cases were comparable in data quality and extent to the 
original cases, while the third case was of substantially poorer quality. The private equity firms that provided 
the original buyout cases were identical to the firms providing the contrast cases. 
4.2 Data Collection 
4.2.1 Interview Process 
All interviews were conducted face–to–face in order to elicit rigorous responses from the interviewees. 
Furthermore, interviews were conducted in the native language of the interviewees in order to gain a richer 
narrative and limit the risks of misunderstanding. In practice this meant that all interviews were performed 
either in Finnish, Norwegian, or Swedish. To ensure in–depth examination of the case firms, each interview 
lasted between 60–120 minutes, while 2–3 executives were interviewed in each case. 
All interviews were performed according to good research practice. The key recommendations when 
conducting interviews include: (i) greeting the participant(s) in a friendly manner, (ii) briefly describing the 
steps prior to the start, (iii) assuring confidentiality, (iv) avoiding interruption, and (v) staying positive and non–
judgmental throughout the interview. As had been agreed upon earlier with each interviewee, a recording 
device was turned on, and informed consent was obtained from each interviewee during the recording. At the 
end of the interviews, interviewees were thanked for their participation and the recording device was turned 
off (DiCicco–Bloom & Crabtree, 2006). 
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4.2.2 Semi–Structured Expert Interviews 
The empirical data in this project consisted of in–depth interviews gathered through semi–structured 
interviews. The purpose of the interviews was to allow respondents to elaborate and elicit more information 
and detail than would be feasible in an inflexible structured format. Yet, the semi–structured interview 
permits flexibility, while providing a structure commensurate with the focused interview (May, 2003). The 
semi–structured interview relied on a battery of questions gathered in the questionnaire, which covered the 
complete buyout life cycle from target identification to mode of exit. This tool formed the basis for the face–
to–face interviews conducted with each participant. The questionnaire avoided leading questions and relied 
on open–ended questions. All firms received the questionnaire prior to the interviews. 
A particularity of the research project was that the subjects were highly knowledgeable in the field. Thus, 
the subjects fitted the characteristics of the expert interview, as opposed to various other narrative categories 
(see e.g. Bogner, Littig, and Menz (2009)). There are a number of issues specific to the expert interview, such 
as time restrictions, challenges of obtaining interviews, necessity for knowledge by the conducting researcher, 
and the problem of confidentiality (Flick, 2009), all of which were present in this project. 
Subsequently a formal data analysis was conducted on verbatim transcripts, from which the conclusions 
were derived via the process of induction. 
4.2.3 Questionnaire Content and Structure 
Strauss and Corbin (1998, p.48) emphasize that the researcher “brings to the inquiry a considerable 
background in professional and disciplinary literature,” including previous research, books, manuscripts, and 
reports that may be pertinent to the area under investigation. For this research project, the development of 
the questionnaire was preceded by an extensive phase of the literature review. The initial collection of research 
questions for the questionnaire was significantly more extensive (3x), which iteratively was abridged to the 
final form. The questionnaire was structured into four broad sections covering value capture, value creation, 
leverage and debt, and a supplementary validity enquiry. From an extensive assortment of questions gathered 
during the literature review, the final questionnaire was restricted to the 23 key questions seen in Table 347. 
The purpose of the questionnaire was to function as a guiding light for the semi–structured interviews. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                       
47 Regarding the question on business plans and value creation, it became evident during the interviews that while plans are 
ubiquitous; these would more appropriately be characterized as a methods or tools of the value creation. Even so, it is still 
surprising the empirical research is scant on the effect of business plans in buyouts. 
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A. VALUE CAPTURE  ACTION 
1. Investment Criteria What were the investment criteria you used and how did 
you determine these? 
2. Target Identification & Screening Which methods did you use to identify the target 
opportunity and why? 
3. Target Valuation What were the valuation methods you used and why? 
4. Due Diligence & Business Case 
Analysis 
How did you perform the due diligence process and which 
sections did you evaluate? 
5. Deal–Making, Negotiation, and 
Target Acquisition 
How was the acquisition process executed and which 
techniques did you use during negotiation? 
6. Market Timing & Business Cycle Did market timing affect your decision to enter and exit 
the market? 
7. Holding Period & Investment Lifespan How did you determine the length of the holding period 
and did you stick to it? 
8. Mode of Exit How and when did you determine the exit plan? 
 B. VALUE CREATION  
1. Tempo & Momentum When and how did you begin implementing fundamental 
changes in the portfolio company? 
2. Business Plan How important were novel business models, value 
innovation and new business strategies? 
 How was the business plan crafted and by whom? 
3. Corporate Governance, Active 
Ownership, Management, and 
Incentive Mechanisms 
Did you make any personnel changes at the portfolio 
company and when? 
 What type of management incentives did you select and 
why? 
 How was the board of directors set up with regards to 
structure, size, and background? 
4. Reporting and Key Performance 
Indicators (KPIs) 
Which Key Performance Indicators did you select and 
why? 
5. Business Strategy, Strategic 
Redirection & Refocus 
What changes were made to the business model, product 
portfolio/market mix, and the business strategy and why? 
 Did you scan markets for potential add–on acquisitions or 
divestments? 
6. Earnings, Operating Improvements, 
Restructuring, Cost Cutting 
How did operating earnings develop during the holding 
period? 
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 What opportunities for operating improvements did you 
identify and what was the result? 
 Did you analyze and improve the portfolio company’s work 
processes function by function? 
 C. LEVERAGE  
1. Deal Structuring, Financial 
Engineering, Leverage, & Tax Shield 
How did you optimize the level of leverage for the portfolio 
company and what were the interest rates? 
 How was the debt financed? 
 D. SUPPLEMENT  
1. Questionnaire Validity 
Are there other factors you would consider essential to 
the growth and performance of the portfolio company 
that have not been addressed at all or insufficiently? 
Table 3. The questionnaire used in the semi–structured interviews 
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4.2.4 Timeframe 
The meetings were held between December 2010 and May 2011 at the facilities of the executives and private 
equity firms in Finland, Norway, and Sweden. By the end of 2011, all interviews had been transcribed verbatim, 
transcripts submitted to all interviewees for clarifications and feedback, feedback interviews conducted by 
phone, and additional comments transcribed and added to the material. 
 
      Table 4. Chronology of data collection process in the research project 
 
4.3 Ethical Considerations 
Ethical guidelines for qualitative research and semi–structured interviews are often directed toward 
phenomenological research, as there are several possibilities for misuse when collecting personal information, 
such as psychological coercion and the inducement of mental discomfort. These topics are of less relevance 
in “expert interviews” with senior management, where the subject matter may be a reorganization that the 
                                                                                       
48 All in all, 55 newspaper articles and magazines that concerned the case firms were collected and analyzed, but excluded 
from the public references due to the confidentiality agreements. 
Year Data Sources and Research Events 
2010 Dec–2011 Feb Positive case 1.  On location interview in Stockholm, Sweden 
2011 Mar–Apr  Positive case 2.  On location interview in Helsinki, Finland 
2011 May Positive case 3.  On location interview in Oslo, Norway 
2012 June Negative case 1.  Interview via telephone to Oslo, Norway 
2012 July Negative case 2.  Interview via telephone to Stockholm, Sweden  
2012 July Negative case 3.  On location interview in Helsinki, Finland 
  
 Semi–structured interviews 
 11 elite interviews (7 GPs, 3 CEOs, 1 expert advisor) 
 10 interview sessions (in 13 recordings) 
 10 hours of recordings 
 81 pages of transcriptions 
  
Archival materials48 
55 external public documents (magazine–, newspaper–, web articles) 
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manager instigated in a firm. The primary ethical guidelines that are applicable in the context are assuring 
confidentiality for the interview subjects and receiving informed consent (Flick, 2009). 
Confidentiality surfaced early on during the research project and became a cornerstone for successful 
completion. First, confidentiality was assured by strictly limiting access to the raw data from the interviews to 
the researcher and a thesis advisor. Interviews in digital format were neither stored on public networks nor at 
the university campus network. Second, due to a concession made by the university, raw data gathered for the 
thesis would be kept private. Case stories for the public part of the dissertation were crafted by combining the 
interviews of several persons into homogeneous narratives. All of these case stories were anonymized by 
removing identifiable information, including firm names, locations, personnel names, distinct industry, and 
the year for the buyout and exit. 
Prior to the commencement of the interviews, participants were given the questionnaire, which outlined 
the topics to be discussed, an estimate of the time required, the reasons for the research project, and an 
assurance that the interviews would not be included verbatim in the dissertation. Participants were given the 
assurance that they would be able to comment and correct the “raw data” from the interviews after 
transcription. All participants were subsequently given the transcribed interview, and when necessary, the 
interview was corrected or supplemented. 
4.4 Previous Research 
4.4.1 Qualitative Case Studies on Buyouts 
Due to the idiosyncrasies of private equity research, high-quality studies relying on qualitative 
methodologies are scarce. The handful of well–known qualitative case studies that do exist in academic 
journals focus mainly on single portfolio firms, and the analysis frequently is a case story covering the 
historical development during a longer period, including ‘Beatrice’ by Baker (1992); ‘O.M. Scott & Sons’ by Baker 
and Wruck (1989); ‘Clayton, Dubilier + Rice’ by Kester and Luehrman (1995); and ‘Qantas’ by O'Brien (2007). A 
rather recent book by Talmor and Vasvari (2011) does provide a selection of case studies to illustrate the 
theoretical sections of private equity. Correspondingly, a book by Lerner, Hardymon, and Leamon (2012) 
contains a number of case studies that have been updated over the years. 
4.4.2 Quantitative Studies of High–Performing Buyouts 
With regards to the research questions, studies of exceptionally well–performing buyouts are rare. Several 
studies have segmented private equity performance according to quartiles, where the characteristics of the 
top quartile are contrasted with the bottom quartile (Harper & Schneider, 2004; Loos, 2006; Rouvinez, 2006; 
Aigner et al., 2008; Lopez–de–Silanes et al., 2008; Bernstein et al., 2010; Chung, 2010; Gottschalg, 2010; 
Higson & Stucke, 2012), or vice versa for the tercile (Heel & Kehoe, 2005; Acharya et al., 2011). Nevertheless, 
the author knows of no research project to date where the focus of study was on the subsample of buyouts 
that constitute exceptionally well–performing firms (cf. ‘statistical outliers’). 
A potential explanation for the lack of academic studies of the particular subsample may lie in the fact 
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that quantitative methodologies are ill–suited for examining the limited, non–representative population of 
firms. The problem is compounded by the fact that the quantitative methodology is the de facto paradigm by 
which research in finance and on private equity is conducted. Furthermore, the data bases relied upon in 
quantitative research are generally unsuitable for examining unrepresentative subsamples, but also unlikely 
to contain data of the necessary granularity. 
4.5 Qualitative Research 
It is not an exaggeration to assert that an overwhelming majority of all the research in finance is made 
using quantitative methods. As a scientific discipline finance is fundamentally rooted in the application of 
mathematics to business problems. Furthermore, since private equity research emerged as an offshoot of 
finance, quantitative methods have been perceived as being the de facto standard. A consequence of the 
prevailing paradigm is that fewer paths for publishing qualitative research on private equity exist. 
Yet, from a research perspective there are valid reasons to use a different lens than the prevailing 
methodology. Given the respective goals, both the quantitative and qualitative research traditions are 
justifiable for examining phenomena, as seen in Mahoney and Goertz (2006). These researchers specifically 
refer to a framework by Gerring (2001) in order to contrast and discern the differences between the two 
traditions: 
 
1.  Approaches to explanation 
2.  Conceptions of causation 
3.  Multivariate explanations 
4.  Equifinality 
5.  Scope and causal generalization 
6.  Case selection practices 
7.  Weighting observations 
8.  Substantively important cases 
9.  Lack of fit 
10.  Concepts and measurement
 
               Table 5. Principal differences between the two main research traditions 
In this particular case study on value generation in buyouts, some criteria appear to be more applicable 
than others. For instance, ‘conceptions of causation’ (the causal relation between events) and ‘equifinality’ 
(reaching an end state by several means) are arguably of less interest from a practical utility perspective. This 
is not the case for the factors ‘case selection practices’, ‘case selection practices’, and ‘substantively important 
cases’, which are of direct applicability. 
The first criterion, approaches to explanation, suggests that the objective of qualitative research is to 
explain and identify the causes of individual cases and particular outcomes (Mahoney & Goertz, 2006). As a 
pre–eminent example, the researchers give the investigation and identification into the causes of the 
Challenger disaster by the Nobel Prize–winning physicist Richard Feynman (Vaughan, 1986; Mahoney & 
Goertz, 2006). The 6th criterion, case selection practices, refers to the practice in qualitative research of 
beginning a study by selecting cases where the sought outcome occurred. These are primarily positive cases, 
albeit negative cases are fairly common due to causal contrast and inference. For instance, the qualitative 
research may be the only option for examining rare occurrences, e.g. causes and chains of events in wars. 
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Finally, in regard to the 8th criterion, substantively important cases, in qualitative research we do not treat all 
cases as equal, as some cases are more a priori deemed to be scientifically more important than others. An 
example given by the researchers is that a theory attempting to explain U.S. state elections that did not take 
into account the electoral results in California and New York would arguably be perceived as being flawed. 
In this multiple case study these criteria are well satisfied, since it concerns a small N–sample of cases that 
are rare and by definition ill–suited for quantitative research methods. Furthermore, the study concentrates 
on a scientifically interesting sample that displays the desired attributes, i.e. the positive cases, but also 
includes the contrasting negative cases. Finally, the research attempts to untangle and identify the principal 
causes for the ensuing value generation in the individual buyout case firms. 
Another argument is made by the well–known scholar, Bent Flyvbjerg (2006), who asserts that the 
conventional wisdom regarding qualitative case studies contains a number of misconceptions. A crucial aspect 
of case studies is the Black Swans49 from which generalizable scientific knowledge can be deduced. Flyvbjerg 
(2006, p.225) notes: 
“Galileo’s rejection of Aristotle’s law of gravity was not based on observations “across a wide range,” and 
the observations were not “carried out in some numbers.” “Nevertheless, Aristotle’s view of gravity 
dominated scientific inquiry for nearly 2,000 years before it was falsified.” 
 “Carefully chosen experiments, cases, and experience were also critical to the development of the 
physics of Newton, Einstein, and Bohr, just as the case study occupied a central place in the works of 
Darwin, Marx, and Freud.” 
Thus, qualitative methodologies and case studies consequently appear to be distinctly beneficial for the 
development of broad, generalizable theoretical contributions, as opposed to the verification of individual 
discrete variables. Indeed, often the contributions that build a theory from cases are among the most cited 
pieces in top–rated management journals, e.g. AMJ (Eisenhardt, 1989b). Likewise, Suddaby (2006) notes that 
a majority of the articles perceived as “interesting research” were based on qualitative methods, which is 
unsurprising considering that discoveries are “the result of high–risk expeditions into unknown territory”.  
Furthermore, case studies allow different strategies for sample selection with “information–oriented 
selection”, in contrast to “random selection” (Flyvbjerg, 2006). In particular the selection of “extreme/deviant 
cases” is pertinent to this thesis, since this allows the researcher to zoom in on non–representative corner test 
cases. Patton (1990) suggests that in purposive sampling extreme or deviant cases are purposively integrated 
in studies. 
In this study, where the focal object was a non–representative population of firms, the quantitative 
approach would thus be ill–suited. To examine corner–cases and outliers – both positive and negative – 
qualitative methods would allow for capturing the richness and breadth of data, whereas statistically derived 
quantitative analysis might dilute both depth and complexity. 
                                                                                       
49 Refers to concept of scientific falsification introduced by Karl Popper. It is related to the more recent theory of Black Swan 
events, which describes extreme events that appear obvious in hindsight (Taleb, 2001, 2007). 
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In–depth interviews would further permit seizing the ‘tacit knowledge’, i.e. the implicit, non–verbalized 
knowledge that is difficult to codify and transfer, and not always explicitly known by expert practitioners. This 
concept introduced by Polanyi (1958) has in recent decades increasingly received attention in scientific studies, 
as it appears to characterize the knowledge exclusively held by experts. According to Parsaye and Chignell 
(1988), there are three methods for capturing tacit knowledge: (a) interviewing experts, (b) learning by being 
told, and (c) learning by observation. In this research project, interviewing the experts and then analyzing the 
information for direct and indirect mechanisms appeared to be a viable method for detecting and quantifying 
tacit knowledge. 
4.5.1 The Grounded Theory 
The classical grounded theory emerged from the works of the sociologists Barney Glaser and Anselm 
Strauss (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Glaser, 1978; Strauss, 1987; Glaser, 1992) when the researchers collaborated 
on a social research project in the early 1960s (Charmaz, 2006). At the time of the Glaser & Strauss original 
study, the need arose for sociological theories closer to mundane or practically relevant issues (Flick, 2009). 
Glaser & Strauss coded their transcripts on a line–by–line basis, and the theory emerged from this coding of 
data. Thus, their main contribution lay in creating a set of coding procedures and a method by which empirical 
qualitative data can be categorized and transformed into theoretical constructions. Yet, it must be 
acknowledged that Glaser and Strauss did not operate in a vacuum. Both researchers came from universities 
with long pragmatist traditions, which emphasized using empirical research in conjunction with the 
development of theory (e.g. Dewey, 1922/1988; Mead, 1934; Strauss & Corbin, 1998). 
Subsequently Glaser and Strauss parted ways and each diverged in their approach to grounded theory, 
particularly with regards to the coding process. Glaser’s approach remained closer to the original method by 
claiming research categories should emerge from the data under study (Glaser & Kaplan, 1996). Strauss 
further developed the grounded theory jointly with Corbin into a model that became more prescriptive and 
standardized (Strauss & Corbin, 1990), which has since become the prevailing application of grounded theory. 
Strauss and Corbin (1998) suggest using the following practically oriented coding procedures as building 
blocks of a grounded theory: 
a. Build rather than test theory 
b. Provide researchers with analytic tools for handling masses of raw data 
c. Help analysts to consider alternative meanings of phenomena 
d. Be systematic and creative simultaneously 
e. Identify, develop, and relate the concepts that are the building blocks of theory 
In modern grounded theory it is generally recommended to not limit the conceptual development of the 
theory to the research data, but to incorporate a broad understanding of extant research. Flick (2009) suggests 
using several forms of literature in a qualitative study, including: 
1. Theoretical literature about the topic of your study 
2. Empirical literature about earlier research in the field of your study or similar fields 
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3. Methodological literature about how to do your research and how to use the methods you chose 
4. Theoretical and empirical literature to contextualize, compare, and generalize your findings 
Sheperis, Daniels, and Young (2010) echo this sentiment by stating that “data should be gathered from a 
variety of sources such as field observations, interviews, historical records, letters or journal entries, or activity 
logs” for the grounded theory. In the multiple case study project “raw data” was collected during the semi–
structured case interviews, while simultaneously conducting an extensive review of the theoretical and 
empirical literature.  
In the recent academic literature there is a debate on what constitutes a proper application of grounded 
theory, considering the wide variety of management studies using a grounded theory approach (Corley, 2015; 
Walsh et al., 2015). Jones and Noble (2007) suggest that grounded theory study should include a number of 
foundational elements, such as “joint collection, coding and analysis of data, theoretical sampling, constant 
comparisons, category and property development, systematic coding, memoing, saturation, and sorting”. 
Other researchers suggest that researchers have substantial leeway in how a grounded theory is constructed 
by relying on a considerable amount of theoretical frames from the existing literature or by beginning with no 
specific constructs or theories in mind (Graebner, Martin, & Roundy, 2012). 
In this particular case study, both the recommendations on the coding procedures and the inclusion of 
several forms of literature were to a large extent followed. Nonetheless, portions of the material related to 
the construction of a grounded theory are inapplicable to this case study. Before Glaser and Strauss created 
the framework for grounded theory, the sociologists did fieldwork in a hospital on the interactions between 
patients and their relatives. The latter subject was characterized by a wide variety of interactions, a very 
extensive sample of interviews, personal narratives, and regarded topics rich in emotion, but low on scholarly 
knowledge. The interviews and topics in this case study may well be characterized as the diametrical opposite, 
i.e. a limited amount of expert interviews that are semi–structured and with very limited emotional 
experiences, but which are rich in detail on organizational change and factual content. 
4.5.2 The Comparative Method 
Finally, a particular method applicable for this project is the comparative method. The comparative 
method is a small–N technique suitable for case–oriented research when researchers have substantial 
knowledge of the cases under investigation (Ragin, 2004). Comparative research is applied to make sense of a 
handful of rare cases pre–selected for being substantively or theoretically important (Eckstein, 1975). Ragin 
(2004) submits that a characteristic of this is a substantial inductive component developed over an extended 
time period by increased in–depth learning. When feasible, appropriate negative cases are often contrasted 
with the positive cases in order to make inferences. In this study, negative cases from the identical private 
equity firms were both feasible and attained. Attention was paid in particular to comparing and contrasting 
the enacted changes during the buyout phases between the positive and negative cases. 
What emerged during the iterative analysis was a number of conspicuous differences, such as the mode 
of the financing (a majority of debt financing from the vendor or customer) in all positive case firms, but in 
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none of the negative firms. Another salient finding was that the sellers of all negative case firms were family 
firms, while none of the positive firms belonged to the category. A third interesting finding from the 
comparative analysis was the importance of timing the entry- and exit transactions according to the market- 
and industry cycles. The results of the comparative analysis are examined in chapter 6. 
          
 
                  Figure 5. Applying contrast cases in comparative research  
4.6 Limitations to Qualitative Case Studies 
There are methodology limitations inherent to the chosen research method. Overall, in quantitative 
studies there is less control of the research content, which means the outcome is less predictable and 
predetermined. It is more difficult to divide the research into manageable, clearly defined, quantified variables 
and thus it is less suitable for verifying isolated, individual variables. Selection bias is often viewed as a central 
scientific weakness in studies relying on qualitative research methodologies and is naturally salient in a study 
focusing on a very limited sample of outliers. There are a number of ways to address biases and mitigate the 
effect on the reliability in qualitative studies, and particular attention was paid to this problem in the design 
phase of the study. 
From a research standpoint there is an inherent problem to a small–N, non–random sample, which affects 
the generalizability of the findings, although the findings may accurately describe the subsample. Open access 
to a larger sample of “outliers” would add reliability on the distribution of value generation mechanisms and 
reasonably expand the array of discerned factors. Overall the interview process is a time–consuming method 
for executing research, but at the same time an efficient means for extracting tacit “expert knowledge” that 
would be unfeasible in other research settings. 
An inherent pitfall of using post facto samples of ‘winners’ is always present. The problem is whether the 
attributes and characteristics led to the desired outcome or if outcome was entirely random. Rebecca 
Henderson at MIT’s Sloan School of Management plainly illustrates the inherent problem with an edifying 
example (Raynor, Ahmed, & Henderson, 2009): 
“I begin my course in strategic management by asking all the students in the room to stand up,” she 
says. “I then ask each of them to toss a coin. If the toss comes up tails, they are to sit down, but if it 
Observed phenomena in 
positive cases 
Observed phenomena in 
negative cases 
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comes up heads, they are to remain standing. Since there are around 70 students in the class, after six 
or seven rounds there is only one student left standing. With the appropriate theatrics, I approach the 
student and say, ‘How did you do that? Seven heads in a row! Can I interview you in Fortune? Is it the T–
shirt? Is it the flick of the wrist? Can I write a case study about you?’” 
When the researchers used statistical methods to distinguish systemic variation from luck, researchers 
were able to demonstrate the difference among 287 allegedly high–performing companies in 13 major success 
studies. The analysis suggests that only 25% were likely remarkable while the remaining 75% were 
indistinguishable from mediocre firms having luck (Raynor et al., 2009). An obvious pitfall to any scientific 
case study is that it easy to be led astray by the observed outcome and not consider it as being precipitated by 
the research approach. 
In yet another well–known real–life example in a similar vein with a focal group comparable to this study, 
researchers were at least partially mislead50. In the early 1980s, the McKinsey consultants Peters and 
Waterman Jr. (1982) studied 43 purported innovative and excellent companies and from this deduced eight 
Themes of Excellence. The subsequent bestseller In Search of Excellence catapulted the consultants into the 
limelight and the framework was perceived as a blueprint for business excellence among practitioners. 
However, a few years after the book was published several of the companies examined ran into severe 
difficulties, faring well below average, e.g. IBM, Kmart, and Delta Airlines (Ackman, 2002). Subsequently, the 
public perception has been that the themes of excellence were largely incidental. 
4.6.1 Sample Bias 
Selection bias is a principal scientific weakness in studies relying on a qualitative research methodology 
and the potential was obviously present in a study focusing on a limited sample of outliers. Consequently 
steps were taken to mitigate the effect by being observant of pitfalls, addressing biases, and mitigating issues 
with reliability. In this case study the pitfalls were addressed by several means. First, multiple information 
sources were a requirement during data collection. By using multiple sources to illuminate events, information 
is cross–checked, which means accuracy and trustworthiness increases (Glick, Huber, Miller, Doty, & Sutcliffe, 
1990). Second, at least one secondary independent source of information was required during the data 
collection. Third, having been directly involved in the case firm during the holding period was a required 
criterion for all participants. Fourth, methodological triangulation was utilized to some extent to cross–
examine research data when available. Finally, contrast cases were included in the research sample, which 
permitted inference and comparisons during the analysis. 
Obviously, the bias or subjectivity must not be overstated, as theories emanating from well–conducted 
case studies are surprisingly accurate due to the close adherence to data (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). 
                                                                                       
50 However, dismissing the findings altogether may be erroneous. Over a 20–year period, the 32 public firms in the book had 
had an annual return of 14.1% and outperformed both the Dow Jones Industrial Average (11.3%) and the S&P500 (10.1%) 
(Ackman, 2002). Thus, the conclusions from the case study may well have been instructive despite shortcomings. 
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4.6.2 Trustworthiness and Reliability 
The ensuring of trustworthiness (i.e. validity in quantitative research) is at the core of any study. 
Wiedersheim–Paul and Eriksson (2011) define validity as the method’s ability to answer the research question 
and the degree of reliability to which the study can be replicated with an equivalent result. In grounded theory, 
validity is measured by the dependability of the conclusions (Sheperis et al., 2010). Miles and Huberman (1994) 
describe 13 strategies to test the strength of findings and enhance credibility in a qualitative study:  
 
 
1. Checking for representativeness 
2. Checking for researcher effects 
3. Triangulating 
4. Weighing the evidence 
5. Checking the meaning of outliers 
6. Using extreme cases 
7. Following up surprises 
8. Looking for negative evidence 
9. Making if–then tests 
10. Ruling out spurious relations 
11. Replicating a finding 
12. Checking out rival explanations 
13. Getting feedback from informant
 
    Table 6. Strategies to test the strength of findings in qualitative research 
The purpose of the techniques is comparable to the methods for mitigating bias in quantitative research. 
Lincoln and Guba (1985) provide another framework for establishing trustworthiness, which partially overlaps 
with Miles and Huberman. These techniques include interviewer corroboration, member check, negative case 
analysis, peer debriefing, prolonged engagement, balance, auditability, confirmability, and bracketing. 
In this study, several techniques were utilized to examine the findings from different vantage points and 
enhance credibility. Negative case analysis was performed by examining patterns in the contrast cases. 
Triangulation was conducted by using external data sources, such as press and media coverage. Prolonged 
engagements within the case firms were unfeasible, as the exits had already materialized, but the effect may 
have been alleviated by repeated contacts over an extended time frame, e.g. additional feedback regarding 
interviews. Peer debriefing was completed by requesting and receiving feedback from several academics active 
in the field of private equity research. 
Interviewer corroboration was used primarily during the interview stage, which however is not uncommon 
in qualitative (or quantitative) organizational research. The primary form of member check was the validation 
question that ended each interview, which gave each participant the opportunity to add remedial information. 
Conformability, or auditability, was established by documenting the procedures for checking, rechecking, and 
auditing the collection of research data. The measures taken throughout the research project were 
documented in detail and have been depicted in the dissertation when possible. 
In addition to the above, there are two pivotal concepts with regards to research validity: internal and 
external validity (Merriam, 1998). The former refers to the degree to which the findings correspond to the 
specific reality that is being studied, while the latter to the degree to which the overall reality is generalizable. 
Individual predilections and beliefs will affect internal validity; albeit, there are a number of mitigating factors 
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in this study that increase the trustworthiness. First, the interviewed sources may all be described as experts 
within the field of study. Second, all business case information was received from multiple sources. Third, all 
interviews were conducted confidentially, which allowed for open and direct communication. 
Regarding external validity, the sample firms do not represent the average buyout. The explicit purpose of 
the research project was to examining positive outliers. However, a more relevant issue within the context is 
whether the findings can be extrapolated to the general population of cases. Merriam (1998) proposes that 
the researcher’s analysis and conclusions cannot be generalized to the entire population and should instead 
be considered as a working hypothesis – or a proposition – where the intent is to stimulate further research. 
Hypothesis– generating heuristics is often considered the major contribution of qualitative research. From a 
research perspective, this is largely a valid assumption regarding this specific case study.  
Repeatability is central to assessing trustworthiness. In this context, this may refer to the repeating of the 
process with the same interviewees. A frequently used proxy is that of examining how the research project 
was conducted and whether reasoning is consistent. In order to perform the assessment, transparency is 
crucial. The evaluator must be given the requisite information to track the reasoning in order to accept or 
challenge the conclusions (Babor, Stenius, Savva, & O’Reilly, 2006). Consequently, the progression of the case 
study and the reasoning behind the conclusions have been reported transparently and with possible 
granularity. 
4.7 Management Theoretical Considerations 
4.7.1 Originality and Utility 
During the course of this dissertation the disparity of the research paradigms prevailing in management 
and finance became increasingly clear. On one side was the research tradition of management, which 
particularly emphasized theoretical contributions in the ongoing academic discourse. On the other side there 
was a decidedly different tradition in finance, and in particular the stream of research on private equity, which 
emphasized empirical knowledge by quantitative methods and a close affiliation with practice. This research 
project has clearly been interdisciplinary, since the subject of private equity, i.e. an offshoot of finance, is 
approached using the unorthodox qualitative research methodology. Consequently, utilizing the theoretical 
conceptual frameworks of either discipline would have been legitimate academically. 
If we first examine management, the justification for the strong emphasis on theory is the generation of 
coherent explanations of the underlying causal mechanisms, which may be used to make predictions 
(Hambrick, 2007). A problem is that theoretical contributions have become a necessity to be able to publish 
articles in the top academic journals of management (Sutton & Staw, 1995; Rynes, 2005; Colquitt & Zapata–
Phelan, 2007). A consequence of this singular focus has been to remove the discourse further from applied 
research and exclude the publication of pertinent findings that potentially could advance the field (Hambrick, 
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2007)51. Moreover, the development is aggravated by the fact that relatively few of the theoretical constructs 
are ever evaluated empirically. Kacmar and Whitfield (2000) find in a study that merely 9 percent of the 
theories published in AMR are tested. This has lead to a somewhat paradoxical situation, where the theoretical 
contributions of management science are detached from the managerial environment and insufficiently 
“evidence–based” to be of use for managerial decisions (Pfeffer & Sutton, 2006; Rousseau, 2006). 
A second, but related research concern, was the evident ‘relevance gap’ between traditional management 
research and the business reality52. Although the dissertation was begun as a research project that relied on 
traditional management theories, the extant body of research was found to inadequately address the 
challenges of private equity buyouts. Thus, the traditional theoretical lens and approach was selected to 
examine the industry (agency theory, information asymmetries) with an emphasis on empirical data. 
Self–evidently, selecting the scientific lens did not imply relaxing the requirements of what constitutes a 
theoretical or conceptual contribution. What proved constructive was to examine what constitutes a value–
added academic contribution (in management). Kilduff (2006) suggests in an editorial comment on theory in 
the Academy of Management Review that theoretical articles succeed when these provide important and 
original ideas. Corley and Gioia (2011) develop the reasoning further in a paper that synthesizes the extant 
literature and further divides the dimensions into two subcategories. According to this, originality can be 
“categorized as either (1) advancing understanding incrementally or (2) advancing understanding in a way that 
provides some form of revelation, whereas the utility dimension parses into (1) practically useful and (2) 
scientifically useful” (Corley & Gioia, 2011, p.15–16). 
 
 
 
 
Originality 
Revelatory  4 1 
Incremental  3 2 
  Practically 
useful 
Scientifically 
useful 
  Utility 
                Figure 6. The dimensions of theoretical contributions 
The incremental insight in the matrix connotes the progressive advancement of our theoretical 
understanding. In turn, the revelatory insight connotes a theoretical contribution that reveals phenomena that 
would be otherwise inconceivable by providing a theory that is either novel, counterintuitive, or questions 
                                                                                       
51 The renowned management academic Donald Hamrick finds in an analysis of 120 articles published in AMJ, ASQ, and OS 
in 2005 that 100 percent contained a variant of the word theory. Conversely, in 178 articles published in the Journal of 
Marketing, Journal of Finance, and Accounting Review in 2005, 78 percent contained a variant of the word theory. 
52 Probably the most prominent scholar to incite a debate on the relevance gap is Donald Hambrick (1994, p.13). In the wake 
of his appeal followed a long–standing debate, which however is beyond the scope of this dissertation (cf. Rynes, Bartunek, 
and Daft (2001); Worrall, Lubbe, and Klopper (2007); Li (2010); Schmid (2010); Alvesson and Yiannis (2013)). 
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underlying assumptions of the prevailing theory (c.f. Davis, 1971; Shalley, 2012). However, Corley and Gioia 
(2011) find that a contribution that is deficient across the second dimension is generally insufficient. To be of 
significance the theoretical contributions must be of utility or applicability. In this context, scientific utility 
refers to advancement in the conceptual rigor or in the potential for the idea to be operationalized and tested. 
Practical utility finally appears when the theory can be directly applied to the issues that face practitioners and 
practicing managers. Hambrick (2005, p.124) offers some useful advice on the development of theories with 
practical utility: “they don’t come from scholars struggling to find holes in the literature”, but from the astute 
observation of real–life phenomena. 
In the conceptual discussion of a theoretical contribution in management, Corley and Gioia (2011) stress 
particularly that theories frequently suffer from deficiencies in practical utility and suggest methods by which 
these can be remedied. For instance, rather than narrowly addressing theoretical gaps, a significant 
contribution theory ought to be problem driven by directly or indirectly addressing longstanding problems of 
relevance to practice. Another is via an orientation toward theoretical prescience by focusing on the incipient 
future of management environments and organizations. The authors conclude with a rather menacing 
recommendation: 
“Rather than downplaying the importance of pragmatic contribution, we should celebrate it by formally 
bringing that dimension more prominently into our judgment structures and processes,” because if, 
“We do not change our scholarly traditions in ways that enhance theoretical relevance to practice and our 
sense giving potential to the wider audiences, then we will continue to underperform our adaptive role in society 
and condemn ourselves to increasing irrelevance and diminishing influence in describing, explaining, 
understanding, and improving organizations and their management” (Corley & Gioia, 2011, p.27). 
The orientation toward practical utility in the theoretical contribution directly influenced the direction of 
the dissertation. The most fruitful areas of extant research proved to be the empirically derived research in 
finance on private equity, despite the large body of research in various strands of management. At the same 
time, an obvious challenge due to the orientation was to find local academics and supervisors that could 
expedite or assist in the research. A particular challenge was the fact that no doctoral thesis had been written 
previously on private equity buyouts in Finland. Thus, even if the case study relies on a qualitative research 
methodology, which is decidedly unorthodox when it comes to finance, the analysis and discussion on value 
generation is tied directly to the existing research on private equity. 
In this case, the principal theoretical contribution of the study is twofold. First, it is a theoretical 
contribution, consisting of an empirically derived taxonomy of value generation in buyouts, which is holistic, 
logically consistent, and innovative. Second, it is an augmentation and synthesis of the model, with the 
findings from the case study of a particularly interesting sample of firms. 
4.7.2 Causal Mechanisms and Correlations 
A fundamental notion in science is “correlation does not imply causation,” which conveys that any observed 
correlation between variables does not imply the existence of a causal relationship. It is evidently a hazard 
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when attempting to identify and generalize the causal mechanisms from a case study to the wider population 
of firms. Although the variables are simultaneously present in a chain of events, it is evidently insufficient to 
establish a causal relationship. While the distinction between causality and correlation is fundamental to 
science, a range of homologous issues appears less evident. 
An observation during the literary review was that mechanisms revealed to be conducive to an outcome 
are often misrepresented as being the determining factors. A closer examination of the original research 
reveals that the mechanism, while statistically significant, is in fact peripheral (and often inconsequential) to 
the array of elements that determine the outcome. 
Furthermore, revealed causal mechanisms in the social sciences are often contextually dependent, which 
at times is either understated or neglected. While a mechanism in certain contexts is efficacious, it might well 
be inconsequential in another setting. A simple example of this would be high gearing, which is regularly 
employed to inflate the gains in buyouts. However, this presupposes a buyout firm with stable and positive 
cash flow, since applying leverage in a distressed firm with a high Beta will likely accentuate losses. 
In research on private equity buyouts, one sinister problem regarding contextuality concerns the potential 
use of biased and skewed datasets. For the more than a dozen proprietary and commercial databases used in 
quantitative research on private equity, source data is sometimes gathered using mutually inconsistent 
methods. Recently it was discovered that there is a significant bias in two studies based on the Thomson 
Venture Economics dataset (Stucke, 2011), which is likely the dominant database in private equity research. 
Phalippou (2012) concludes in a recent comment on the errors: “The real lesson to be drawn from recent 
developments is yet another reminder of the need for a comprehensive, unbiased and widely available dataset of 
private equity funds track records.” 
An idiosyncratic scientific problem germane to the social sciences and particularly certain disciplines, e.g. 
finance and equity markets, is that any uncovered sub–optimality in the market in time becomes fully 
exploited. Merriam (1998) expresses a similar notion by asserting that there will always be issues with 
reliability in the social sciences due to the non–static nature of human behavior. A consequence of the social 
feedback loop is that the uncovered mechanism propagates and spreads throughout the market until it ceases 
to bestow an advantage. Thus, due to the self–correcting property of the market any mechanism has a 
transient quality. A consequence of this is that research within social sciences, regardless of the significance 
and robustness of revealed mechanisms, tends to be temporal and is predicated to change with the market 
evolution. 
4.7.3 Data Analysis 
Goertz and Mahoney (2012, p.10) assert that there are two kinds of tools that set qualitative research apart 
from quantitative research: ‘within–case analysis’ and ‘logic and set theory’. At the core of the former are 
‘process–tracing’ and ‘counterfactual analysis’, which necessitate that the researcher make critical 
observations and discern specific processes from within his or her individual cases (Goertz & Mahoney, 2012). 
Ultimately the objective is causal inference from the event process. Logic and set theory in turn concerns the 
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necessary and sufficient conditions for hypothesis testing in qualitative research (Goertz & Mahoney, 2012). 
From a practical perspective, the data analysis was begun with a verbatim transcript of the interviews in 
the original language, proceeded by transcript verification and supplementation from the interview subjects. 
The interviews were repeatedly listened to during transcription and the written material was re–read in order 
to gain detailed understanding. During this stage, patterns within the data were identified and coded. The 
stage included heuristic interpretation of the data, done by both identifying reoccurring themes and 
highlighting idiosyncrasies in the data. The stage ensued with data verification; in a process involving checking 
and rechecking the validity of previously identified themes (Sarantakos, 1998). Finally, a particular form of 
thematic coding, defined by Strauss and Corbin (1990) as “axial coding,” was conducted to map relationships 
between factors. 
A number of approaches exist on thematic analysis. Boyatzis (1998) identifies three separate approaches, 
where the first is (i) theory driven; the second (ii) driven by prior research or data; and finally the third (iii) 
driven by the data obtained from the present research. The first two methods are deductive in character, 
meaning that the theory is developed prior to analysis and subsequently applied to the data. The third 
approach, however, is inductive in that the themes emerge as the raw data is processed and analyzed. In this 
research project, previous theoretical approaches were evidently used prior to the ensuing thematic analysis. 
The nature of the research project was essentially twofold; firstly, to function as an exploratory post–hoc 
analysis, which presumes familiarity with a broad number of theoretical and empirical approaches. Secondly, 
to examine a scientifically particularly interesting subset of firms, which furthermore is unsuitable for 
examination by the traditional quantitative research methods. The emerging themes, recurring mechanisms, 
and idiosyncrasies from the latter analysis were then used to contrast and supplement previous empirical 
findings. 
At the core of the thematic analysis is evidently to capture the factors of importance for the research 
question (Braun & Clarke, 2006). From this iterative analysis there emerged a wide selection of mechanisms 
and factors that appeared to be central to the research questions. A majority of the factors had been 
explicated, but a few significant factors can be characterized as novel. Moreover, the conceptual–theoretical 
framework used to categorize and summarize value generation mechanisms appeared inconsistent and 
incomplete. This conceptual–theoretical contribution is explored in detail later on in the dissertation. 
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Chapter 5. Case Narratives 
The objective in this chapter is to present the consolidated narratives for each of the six case firms, prior 
to conducting the cross–case analysis and drawing any conclusions. 
The case study source material consists of multiple source interviews for each case that have been 
combined into a single narrative for each firm. Due to the confidentiality agreements with the private equity 
firms, each case firm had to be anonymized by removing identifiable data, including the names of interviewees, 
private equity firms, and portfolio companies, the locations, investment size, and specific industries. 
Nevertheless, an effort was made to present the narratives ‘as is’ and remain true to the intention and verbiage 
of the interviewees, while refraining from direct quotations. 
All case stories are presented separately and chronicle the events from the pre–buyout phase to the mode 
of exit. Aside from being research data in this qualitative study, the cases provide a unique insight into the 
modus operandi of the private equity portfolio firms in an industry often characterized by secrecy. 
In the study the positive case firms were designated by the names Alpha, Beta, and Delta, while the contrast 
cases were designated Sigma, Tau, and Upsilon. 
5.1 The Positive Case Study Firms 
5.1.1 Alpha: An Infrastructure Services Corporation 
Alpha began taking shape as a separate corporate entity when the management of a multinational 
electrical power utility made the decision to spin off the maintenance, construction, and service division. The 
unit consisted of two core businesses. First was the construction and maintenance of power supply lines and 
second was the service and maintenance of mobile telecommunications networks. The latter business 
principally consisted of a separate company that had been acquired a few years earlier. In addition to the core 
business activities, the entity consisted of a cluster of minor companies in half a dozen countries that were 
loosely connected to the core business units. There was a construction company for streetlights in a second 
country, one procuring rooftops in a third country for the anticipated demand for 3G mobile base stations, 
and a number of adjacent businesses in other countries. Overall the spin–off unit was moderately profitable 
and had a stable cash flow. 
The buyout case was outsourced to an investment bank that contacted the private equity firm directly. The 
vendor did not seem to know what to do with the entity, and the buyout case was not gaining much traction 
among private equity firms. In retrospect, the sales process could be best characterized as the quintessential 
failed auction, since ultimately there was only one prospective buyer left. Above all, the sales process debacle 
may have been due to the fact that the vendor did not know what buyers ought to do with the entity and no 
professional consulting firm was ever hired to prepare the business case. It resulted in an extended sales 
process that took six months to finalize, particularly since the key figures and data the PE firm received were 
of poor quality. 
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The PE firm performed four due diligences, which consisted of outsourcing the financial, legal, and 
environmental due diligences and performing the business due diligence in–house. The first due diligences 
revealed no major roadblock for the buyout, while the business analysis revealed a substantial potential for 
development and improvement. In their valuation of the firm, the GPs used a basic LBO model that consisted 
of using an estimated exit date and calculating backwards to arrive at a money–back multiple and IRR. While 
the purchase price is important, the GPs find that just as important, albeit often neglected, is that the terms 
of the deal are structured and financed. Despite the importance of the latter factors, most GPs tend to spend 
the majority of their time and effort on purchase price negotiation. 
5.1.1.1 Facilitating the Creation of a New Market Space 
The business due diligence revealed that it would be possible to build a leading player in Northern Europe 
by consolidating an inherently fragmented market. However, and more importantly, it showed that the firm 
could facilitate a major business change by creating a new industry that had previously been tied to power 
utility companies. Furthermore, the business could be turned into an independent company where the 
prospective customer would include prior competitors. With regards to wireless infrastructure, it was clear 
that the trend was the construction of a denser network of base stations. Viewed from this perspective, 
business timing was perfect and the upside huge. Moreover, the industry was reasonably robust and non–
cyclical. 
In the years before the spin–off, mobile networks had been booming, but a few months after the initial 
contact the market slumped. As a consequence, the PE firm lowered its bid and the tone during the 
negotiations undoubtedly changed. The investment bank engaged by the vendor responded to the PE firm by 
saying that the negotiations were over. However, negotiations were resurrected when the vendor CFO called 
an expert advisor and colleague at the PE firm. The two professionals met and continued negotiations face–
to–face and finalized the deal. In the end, the initial bid was lowered by 20% due to a decline in revenues. 
Furthermore, a substantial portion of the buyout transaction price (50%) was financed through two vendor 
notes. Another noteworthy aspect was that the PE firm financed the deal by using high levels of equity (30%), 
i.e. significantly more than the average level today (15–20%).  
Directly after the buyout the PE firm began making changes to Alpha. A new, dynamic managing director 
with solid industry experience was recruited as the president for a large corporate division. The managing 
director was previously known, as was part of the contact network of the PE firm. However, the new managing 
director changed nearly all managers in the top management team by bringing along a cadre of prior 
colleagues. A new board of directors was set up that consisted of two GPs, two presidents with operational 
experience, from electrical and telecommunications respectively, and the managing director. 
 The working relationship between the board and the managing director proved to be superb, and the 
interaction could be characterized as supportive and constructive. Overall the board functioned as a sounding 
board for new ideas. Particularly useful was that each member had been handpicked and added value within 
their field of expertise. Besides the self–evident role of a board in hiring and firing a managing director, the 
most important function is to support the managing director if a company is functioning well. 
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In every buyout the PE firm participates in, managing director co–investment is expected. Not only is it 
expected, it has to be significant, albeit not in excess. A slightly facetious rule of thumb is “it is sufficient when 
the managing director has to sell his summer cottage in case the buyout firm defaults, but not his residence”. 
In this case the management team invested roughly a million Euros, which was divided between equity and 
debt. Because of the moderately priced buyout, the management team became fairly large shareholders at 11–
13%. The funds invested by the management team had a high lever, which meant that in this case the buyout 
returned ten times the initial investment; the funds invested by management would receive 20 times the 
investment. Furthermore, the management team was included in the options program while an internal 
shareholder investment program extended the ownership to 50 employees (or 5% of the personnel). In 
addition, there were incentives for the management team based on the corporate performance. The fourth 
component of the internal incentives was an Economic Value Added plan, with the purpose of rewarding 
teams and units that achieved or exceeded objectives. A fifth component was a bonus system to reward 
individual personnel down below in the corporate hierarchy. The management philosophy was to distribute 
incentives as widely as possible in the buyout firm. 
Management and the board of directors used a few select KPIs to monitor the firm. At the board level EVA, 
cash flows, and an EBITDA ratio were followed. EVA is the value of an activity after subtracting from it the 
cost (including the opportunity cost of capital) of executing the activity. EVA was no ordinary KPI at the PE 
firm, but was selected in this case as the balance was almost zero. Cash flows were compared to those in the 
original plan. Management used P&L and EBITDA to track the development separately by country, region, and 
business area. At the bottom of the corporate structure on the level of the technicians, the amount of billable 
hours per day was measured. Conversely, management did not use – or find any benefits from investing time 
and money on – any of the popular and traditional measurements, such as tracking customer satisfaction 
indexes or using balance scorecards. 
5.1.1.2 Defining a Distinct Strategy 
The centerpiece of the strategy was that it was crystal clear, acceptable to all parties, and communicated 
throughout the company. At Alpha, the development of the post–buyout strategy started by analyzing the 
current position of the company and defining a vision for the future. Following this came the identification of 
the critical capabilities needed to execute the strategy, comparing this with what existed, and determining 
which resources would have to be acquired, e.g. by recruiting personnel or by acquiring companies. Finally, the 
business plan was the blueprint for the realization of the strategy and what to pursue during the upcoming 
year. 
The analysis showed that the company was present in a number of non–core businesses, especially abroad. 
The core was defined as being within electrical infrastructure networks and wireless telecom networks. 
Gradually the minor non–core companies were divested in the Nordics, U.K., Italy, and Indonesia. That freed 
up capital assets, which instead were used to acquire a number of companies that strengthened the core in 
the Nordic and Baltic countries. Alpha grew exceedingly fast in Poland and within a few years the company 
employed more than 1,000 people in that country. In one Nordic country, the company had jointly co–owned 
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a struggling firm with a German corporation for years, which eventually went into reconstruction. At this 
time, the German corporation sold their stake to Alpha. Soon thereafter a lucky break came when the 
domestic market suddenly took off. In a third Nordic country, the market position was further strengthened 
through an acquisition. The idea behind the add–on acquisitions was clear. Companies were bought by using 
the divestment capital and the generated cash flow at multiples of 3–5, while the intent was to receive a 
multiple of roughly ten times during the exit of Alpha. Another lesson from the acquisitions was that cross–
country knowledge transfer could be bi–directional. Sometimes new ideas could be picked up from a minor 
acquired firm and disseminated throughout the corporation. 
The fundamental notion of the strategy was the pumping out of synergies from the entire value chain. 
Many electrical utilities and telecom companies had held an excess of staff for managing service and 
maintenance peaks. Often the resources were kept idle, as they could not freely compete when the companies 
that might use the resources were competitors. When Alpha became an independent entity, management 
could pitch and market their services to any company. Moreover, service and maintenance were never a core 
business for the electrical utilities and telecom companies. On the contrary, it was a business characterized by 
low margins and a high upkeep. This meant there was little business logic for these to remain in the business 
and maintain services in–house. 
5.1.1.3 Shifting From Silo Mentality to Service Mindedness 
The business analysis also revealed some rather intriguing facts. While the PE firm had seen the mobile 
networks business as a competitive advantage, it was peripheral to the success. (In fact, the mobile networks 
never truly developed according to the plan during the holding period.) At Alpha the management created an 
animated video that showed the complete landscape of infrastructure networks and the interconnections of 
electrical power lines, optical fibers, and base stations. At the inception, Alpha consisted of several separate 
entities. A business line managed the construction and maintenance of fixed telecom networks, whereas 
another business line managed similar activities for mobile networks. Finally, there had been business units 
operating high–voltage lines, electrical power distribution, and the electrification of electrical lines. Instead of 
having five separate business units, why not integrate all the fieldwork activity into a single function? Clearly, 
it would be much more efficient with multi–skilled, expert technicians who were capable of commissioning 
all assignments. Moreover, the business analysis revealed that 40% of the mobile telecom network was de 
facto a fixed network, with only the last mile being mobile. In addition, when a mobile base station became 
disconnected, in nearly 80% of the cases the defect was due to a power outage. Even if the expertise could be 
found in–house, the two functions were in separate departments with scarcely any contact. Seen from this 
light, the business methods seemed outdated and old–fashioned. 
Another aspect uncovered in the analysis was that Alpha was not a project firm, as originally envisioned, 
but a service company with three distinct offerings: building, maintaining and connecting. The ‘world changed’ 
when the firm was redefined and people began seeing themselves as part of a service business. For instance, 
the redefinition implied an inverted organizational pyramid, with the technicians at the top and the managing 
director at the bottom supporting the people. 
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In an effort to profit from the business analysis, an internal academy was created to provide further 
education. The main purpose was to provide technicians, who were proficient in either electrical or telecom, 
to become proficient in both fields. The unions objected vigorously but surprisingly not the technicians 
themselves. The technicians could see the personal advantage in the marketplace, with much more job 
security during market cycles, higher salaries, and more interesting and varied jobs. Obviously, the change was 
a huge productivity boost for the company. 
5.1.1.4 Transforming Work Flows and Operating Processes 
A while later, the management realized that having regional offices all around the country was inefficient. 
There was little to be gained from requiring that technicians drop by the office in the morning, check recent 
or outstanding fieldwork, and then drive to the field. Instead, the teams of technicians could be provided with 
fully equipped, state–of–the–art vans. During mornings, the technician would leave home in the van, pick up 
a colleague, drive straight to the field for an installation, and return home after a day at work. At night, a 
logistics firm would pass by and refill the van with all the components necessary. Work could be coordinated 
centrally so that all technicians knew the next morning to which location they were assigned. The operational 
change to the workflow proved to substantially improve productivity. 
These cutting–edge technicians further had to have the best tools available, and this included the IT 
equipment. A leading project was kicked off internally to create a world–class information system, which 
included giving all technicians mobile handheld computers. As soon as information was entered in the mobile 
devices it was directly uploaded to centralized servers, which obviated the need for repeating the procedure to 
document the information. Moreover, the mobile IT system allowed the head office to pinpoint the location 
of each technician at all times. This was a breakthrough, since the unions were vehemently opposed to 
tracking the technicians. Again this undertaking was opposed less by the individual technician than the union, 
and was solved through negotiations. As a result of the change, the call center had virtual maps of the country 
and all the technicians in the field with their names and contact details. When an alert came (e.g. that a base 
station was down), the call center could quickly find out which technician was in the vicinity and notify the 
employee of the alert. As a consequence, a great deal of unnecessary and unproductive travel could be avoided. 
Another operational efficiency improvement emerged during the process of upgrading residential remote 
reading electrical meters. While the main competitor would install 6–7 meters a day, the technicians at Alpha 
were able to install 15 meters a day. The key to this conundrum was simply to plan ahead fastidiously. For 
instance, the call center called people the day before to check and see what time they would be home the next 
day. 
In the pre–buyout firm, each region in all countries had been self–sustaining. As a consequence, teams 
would manage their local area during emergencies, e.g. storms. In the post–buyout firm, preparations and 
plans were made with clients ahead of time. When a particular region was about to be hit hard by a storm, 
vast numbers of technicians were transferred to the region before the storm struck. This is feasible because 
weather patterns and precipitation frequently vary between regions as a storm front migrates. The first power 
utility client where this scheme was applied became so pleased with the service that the client was featured 
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in a trade magazine about the advantages of outsourcing the services. In much the same way technicians were 
moved between countries during massive thunderstorms. The development of preparation for emergencies 
accelerated when power utility companies became legally obliged to compensate end–user customers during 
outages. An offshoot of this development was the creation of service–class offerings based on urgency. Power 
utility companies could subscribe to disparate service classes for distinct network defects, which meant a 
defect could be repaired in 2, 4, or 12 hours. 
5.1.1.5 The Incentivized Service Organization 
The business culture of the firm changed in a number of ways. Prior to Alpha being able to stand on its 
own two feet, the technicians had simply been non–core; a necessary evil the corporation had to put up with 
in order to conduct business. Suddenly the same people were the core business, working as multi–skilled 
experts. It turned out to be a crucial function for raising employee morale. Another vital change was making 
the move from the project business to the service business, which transformed the interaction between 
technicians and clients. The technicians were the people dealing with the clients on a daily basis, while top 
management lacked insight. In this realm, service organizations are different, since they cannot be controlled 
by giving orders, but instead must be guided and supported. The optimal environment is achieved when 
management empowers the personnel autonomously. 
At Alpha, the technicians worked in teams of 8–10 people, which optimized their output. It was an 
enormous difference having everyone on the team knowing the team’s results and billed hours, and further 
having bonuses and incentives tied to the earnings. A third cultural change came by unleashing the 
imagination and creativity of the entire management team, which culminated in a number of initiatives and 
offerings. A contributing factor for the revitalized management team was that the managing director 
purposefully strived to recruit people with a creative drive. To paraphrase the saying: people make the 
difference – and the only way to change people is to change the people. 
5.1.1.6 Sufficient Equity Levels to Enable the Strategy Execution 
A contrarian notion from Alpha is that the typical levels of leverage in buyouts may impede growth. In this 
case the total level of debt was moderate, while equity was comparatively high, which proved to be an 
advantage. When debt levels are too high, as is often seen in the case of secondary buyouts (or even more in 
tertiary buyouts), the possibilities for management to act are circumscribed. Even when a great opportunity 
appears it has to be passed over. Furthermore, the tax benefits from high leverage are more limited than those 
proclaimed by academics. Due to a plethora of tax deductions, e.g. depreciation and goodwill, buyout firms 
rarely pay much tax in any case. 
Alpha developed at a rapid pace, and the exit was completed after 3.5 years. The preparation for an exit 
came early on, and the PE firm took all opportunities to commend the firm in the media. In fact, there was a 
major PR event where the PE firm proclaimed its having acquired Alpha. However, the process of garnering 
favorable publicity was ongoing and after a year or two the PE firm started receiving tenders. After three years 
Alpha had developed tremendously, and a natural progression would be a substantial acquisition, which 
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would require new funding. The sentiment in the market was bullish, and a substantial price premium could 
be expected. The initial investment bank soon proved to be a mistake, which was remedied by selecting 
another bank that found an excellent fit in another PE firm with a comparable portfolio firm. Financially Alpha 
developed from an EBITA level of €5.5 million to an EBITA of €18 million, while revenues nearly doubled during 
the holding period. The exit price received for Alpha lay at six times the entry transaction. 
5.1.2 Beta: A Travel Services Company 
The travel services company Beta had had, prior to the buyout, a long history as a privately held enterprise. 
It had gradually grown over the years and become the dominant player in the domestic market in business 
travel services. The shareholders were first and foremost a handful of financial investors, but a number of 
minor shareholders had emerged due to acquisitions based on stock swaps. At this point an external firm 
made an initial bid on the company, which meant that external firms were hired to do financial and legal due 
diligences and prepare the data room. Soon after the preparations had begun, the management team realized 
that the acquisition could be recast as a management buyout by making a competing bid. However, carrying 
out an MBO by necessity requires the financial backing of external investors. This expectation prompted the 
managing director to contact a former business associate at a private equity firm and set up an initial meeting. 
Carrying out the buyout deal would have to entail some bank debt, but surprisingly a supplier to Beta was 
willing to provide a substantial portion of the financing. Moreover, the management team was willing to 
invest personal funds, even if the amounts were insufficient for securing the deal. With the other prospective 
bid on the table and negotiations with the board ongoing, the private equity firm had to make a decision 
rapidly. 
5.1.2.1 Capitalizing on Critical Junctions 
The private equity firm that management had contacted were particularly keen on funding buyouts that 
are at inflection points, whether this is due to restructurings in the marketplace, the consolidation of a 
fragmented market, or firms that are facing a generational shift. It also means having a preference for market 
areas in which no other private equity firm is present. In this particular case they saw a company with a 
footprint in three Nordic countries, but with separate companies and brands in each country. Another key 
investment criterion is that the business must be scalable, meaning that there are opportunities for further 
development and value creation. Furthermore, the business must also be sufficiently large to garner buyer 
interest at the exit and to provide an opportunity for multiple expansion. In a nutshell this means buying a 
company at a reasonable multiple and gradually building a more sizeable Nordic entity that warrants a higher 
multiple. In each case, the PE firm strives to create an upside and a downside for management by insisting on 
having management invest personal funds in the buyout. Aside from spurring management to work harder, 
investment participation also reduces the risk inherent to the buyout. In this case it was clear from the 
inception that this would be an MBO (specifically a LIMBO) and that the deal would be structured in such a 
way that management would lose their money before other investors. 
Overall there is an appreciation at the PE firm for buyouts where they can acquire relatively large 
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companies with limited amounts of equity and thereby obtain a high gearing. An obvious investment criterion 
is an identifiable stable cash flow, since it makes the case predictable. The GPs at the firm look for cases that 
are at critical junctions, which is a concept commonly used in the United States. It plainly means that the 
business is facing a critical change, and that by investing in such a case you can facilitate development. With 
Beta, aside from further pursuing the consolidation angle, there was a perception that the market faced a 
technological shift with the growth of web portals and internet sales. The complete sales value chain was 
changing rapidly, that is, the method by which customers were reached, as more and more sales moved 
straight to the web. 
Since another bidder was actively involved and as due diligence and data room had been prepared, the 
acquisition process evolved rapidly. The whole process took just six weeks from contact to buyout. Good deals 
are attractive and get snapped up quickly, so momentum and personnel chemistry must develop rapidly. The 
additional due diligence was conducted by having some attorneys and accountants review the case material. 
What helped in this case was that the supplier of the IT service platform, the largest in the world in this 
industry, was willing to finance the buyout, provided a long–term agreement could be reached on the 
continual use of their IT platform. The incentive for the supplier was the assurance that the customer would 
remain locked in to the service platform for multiple years. This arrangement resulted in a deal structure 
where the supplier provided two vendor notes that ran for eight years and were financed at a bit over 40%. 
An inventive arrangement was that each time an airline booking was made relying on the IT service platform, 
the airlines paid a fee to the IT supplier, which in turn passed on a minor portion to Beta and used some of it 
as a down payment. All in all, bank financing was close to 25% and PE firm equity and management funds a 
bit over 30%. A drawback with the bank debt was that it had to be amortized during the holding period. 
The contact network of the PE firm included one of the most experienced vice presidents in the airline 
business. The GPs discussed the case with him, and his assessment was that the case was very positive. The 
same VP subsequently joined the board of directors after the buyout was completed. But what was important 
was that the secondary opinion on the commercial due diligence supported the case. We could not have 
gotten a better reference from one of the largest suppliers for Beta. 
The GPs at the firm did all the classical valuations, such as Net Present Value (NPV) and a comprehensive 
cash flow analysis. All investment decisions they undertook were meticulously prepared as they had to pass 
through the internal review board. Generally speaking, they estimated what the company might be worth in 
a few years and what would be a reasonable price today. In this case they knew the level of the offer for Beta 
from the external bidder. Finally, the GPs applied the multiples that they reasoned would apply for a company 
in this industry on a Nordic level, which differs from the national multiple. In this particular case, with the 
financing structure in place and providing the cash flow just remained stable, the payback time would be in 
3–5 years. Based on all this data the offer was made. Duly noted, the pricing was at market level, and the Beta 
buyout was not a bargain. 
The industry was cyclic, although the business cycle at the time of transaction was reasonable (here this 
implies being in a trough business cycle). Market timing however was substantially more important during the 
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exit. During the holding period we saw that the stock market window was open while we were discussing the 
case with two trade buyers. With the trade buyers we never reached the target, so we initiated the process for 
an IPO. This whole process took nearly six months and when the company was finally listed on the exchange 
the stock market had peaked. 
5.1.2.2 Roll–Up and Bolt–On Acquisitions 
In the post–buyout phase, work began immediately and proceeded according to the business plan. Because 
of the industry know–how by the management, it was easy to know which Nordic companies should be 
pursued. The business plan included the company names along with the allotted capital for each acquisition. 
Negotiations were initiated without delay by carrying out an acquisition of a major retail chain in a neighboring 
country. In yet a third Nordic country negotiations began with a state–owned retail chain, which eventually 
would last for 6–7 months before closing due to extensive pre–existing employee obligations. Negotiations 
were also carried out in a fourth Nordic country, but the deal never materialized. The two major acquisitions 
were then followed by three minor acquisitions of online portals in each of the three countries. 
One of the methods utilized to preserve value and liquidity was to cap the allowance on acquisitions. For 
instance, 50% of the payment might be composed of capital and 50% of stock swaps. In the largest 
acquisition, which happened to be owned by an entrepreneur planning to retire, the equity portion had to be 
increased to two–thirds by taking out a supplemental bank loan. 
There were no changes at the top management level of the company and all the personnel changes made 
were for streamlining back–office functions. This resulted in a reduction of the work force by 15% in 
accounting and back–office functions. Simultaneously the board of directors was completely changed. First, 
the size was reduced to encompass six people, including an observer without voting rights. Second, the board 
composition changed to include three people from the PE firm –the airline VP, the managing director of Beta, 
and an observer representing the IT supplier. 
The incentive program was comprised mainly of kickbacks for management based on invested funds. The 
lever was disproportional, meaning that management acquired a steeply rising percentage of increased 
returns. On a practical level, this was arranged by the construction of multiple share classes. The downside 
for management with the lever was that they stood to lose the invested capital ahead of the remaining 
investors. The incentive arrangement is fundamentally different from the stock options provided to top 
management in public companies where CEOs can depart to another company if the share price performs 
below the options price. Moreover, the incentive model used by private equity also alleviates the effect of 
cyclical fluctuations on the stock market, whereby management can profit without adding any substantive 
value. In buyouts, stock market fluctuations are much less prevalent, since assets are illiquid during the 
holding period and tied to the payback at a single point in time, i.e. value at exit. 
5.1.2.3 The Quest to Improve Cash Management 
The most important KPIs used by the GPs were following up the development of EBITDA and observing 
the cash flow. In addition, a limited assortment of key figures was used, such as productivity numbers from 
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measuring sales per employee and the contribution margin per employee. The majority of the work effort 
went into improving productivity measures. Another key measurement was controlling the balance sheet, 
such as the working capital. The PE firm found that capital management was one of the most crucial activities 
to spend time on, since by reducing the capital tied up in business this can be redirected to serve the debt. In 
this case, there were no inventories, but receivables and payables could still be improved. For instance, why 
should the government be able to use Beta as a bank by having payment terms extending for 45 days, when 
Beta respectively had to expend customers in 30 days? It warranted tough negotiations with large customers, 
which resulted in the payment terms going down from 45 to 35 days. Moreover, the business of Beta was one 
of the few industries where it was possible to benchmark efficiency with competitors, such as productivity per 
terminal and employee. Here an encouraging development was that Beta had close to 700 bookings a month 
while the main competitor had 500. 
5.1.2.4 Expanding the Product Mix 
Another development was the building of an online portal in–house, which eventually became the largest 
of all online portals and reached all of the countries. The thesis behind this development was that if 7–10 
online portals existed, Beta would own 4–5 of these. Furthermore, a critical strategic step was to purposefully 
use different brands to reach the end–user customers. One thing that the board was very preoccupied with in 
the beginning was the anticipation of soaring online sales, which is characterized by lower margins. It was 
both a concern and an opportunity that in time proved to be less serious than anticipated. 
Aside from the increased productivity per terminal, a self–booking system was designed. It meant end 
customers could perform additional steps of the process, which freed up time for personnel. It also grew 
dramatically to encompass half of all bookings today. An obvious beneficial effect is that it tied large corporate 
customers to a much higher degree to the service provider. It required customization for large accounts with 
regards to permitted options such as vendors, hotel chains, and credit cards. Furthermore, it entailed 
improving security and safety for corporate customers, e.g. by being able to track employees at every point 
during the itinerary. In short, this is what is referred to by the term travel management. It has developed much 
further now, as compensating revenue streams have to be sought from key account customers at a time when 
airlines are gradually reducing provisions. 
The GPs consider KPIs to be excellent tools for managing companies, as these render simple binary ON–
OFF criteria for board discussions. The overall perception is that monitoring five key measurements is 
sufficient for any portfolio firm. 
Much effort was spent on process quality assurance, such as ISO certifications, which were in demand by 
a particular customer segment. A similar related focus area were the value–added services by crisis teams 
during a force majeure. Natural catastrophes could affect tens of thousands of travelling business people. This 
type of novel service offering was highly appreciated by (and profitable for) leading corporate clients. 
5.1.2.5 Alternative Sources of Revenue 
A crucial revenue stream came from airline bonus payments, which were close to 50% of EBITDA. Bonus 
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payments, i.e. the compensation paid by airlines, had to be negotiated, and this required some tough 
negotiations. Admittedly, the key here was being aware of the pain threshold and not to overreach. A related 
business activity was ensuring all airline prices were up to date to efficiently serve end–user customers. 
As Beta grew in size, more opportunities emerged for size discounts. For instance, 50 hotel rooms could 
be booked in advance at the largest hotels with a guaranteed occupancy. When a travel service firm can 
guarantee a fixed degree of occupancy, the prices the hotels provide are at an entirely different level. 
In this case, there was no asset stripping, just tuning up the barge and going. No assets were tied up in 
facilities or head offices that could have been divested. Prior to the buyout, two companies had been divested 
that were not serving the same segment of customers. More importantly, there were no acquisition mistakes, 
or torpedoes, which can be very costly and require an inordinate amount of time. The primary source of the 
value generation was multiple expansion, which emerged as a result of gaining control of a higher market 
share and by capitalizing on synergies. 
5.1.2.6 Accelerated Holding Periods 
The holding period lasted two years and was one of the shortest periods ever at the firm. The primary 
reason being that Beta developed much faster than originally anticipated. From a market position of having 
perhaps a third of the market share domestically, it grew to having an absolute majority market share in two 
countries and a proper footprint in a third country. Suddenly the company was the largest in the Nordics after 
just two years. This sales volume included internet sales, since Beta was also the largest in online sales. The 
next logical step would be to either slow the tempo for a few years or to expand in Northern Europe. Thus, 
this was a natural point for exiting Beta. 
It needs to be recognized that even if the funds of the PE firm have a formal holding period of seven years, 
the GPs prepare for a holding period that lasts three to five years. This differs from the competition, which 
frequently uses ten years. One of the reasons is having more leeway during the exit in case of a 
disadvantageous market climate. Another reason is that having a shorter time period is a tougher condition 
and puts more pressure on our buyouts. Obviously it is more strenuous to develop companies in a shorter time 
span, but at the same time it is clear that the faster the development, the more conducive it is to higher 
returns. At the PE firm, the GPs have learned that when collective intelligence indicates a change ought to be 
executed, it is detrimental to procrastinate. 
The exit was, in retrospect, not entirely optimal. Initially, the GPs and management met with the largest 
market leaders in the E.U. and the U.S. to gauge the interest, but were disappointed at the valuations. The 
valuations differed substantially from the prior valuation received from a leading investment bank. The 
response led to the decision to list shares in an IPO. There was a bull market at the time, even if its steam 
slowed down before the IPO was completed. At the same time, once this process had been advancing for 
several months, it would have been almost impossible to stop it because of costs and loss of goodwill. If an 
IPO is halted at that stage, both the portfolio firm and the PE firm suffer substantially from the lack of 
goodwill. 
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A week before the IPO a bid came from a PE firm, although the IPO went ahead. A month later another 
bid came from the same bidder, but with a significant risk premium. As it turned out, the exit price was 
substantial; nonetheless, the buyer made a good investment. During the holding period, the gross turnover 
grew by nearly 250%, while the reported turnover grew by 80–90%. The growth chiefly originated from add–
on acquisitions, but some percentages per year were organic and due to online sales. Overall the performance 
as measured by EBITDA improved during the two years by an impressive 110–120% from the pre–buyout level. 
5.1.3 Gamma: A Chemical Processing Plant 
The story of Gamma as an independent company begun after the decision was made to spin off the 
Gamma plant. According to an internal benchmark conducted a short time previously, the Gamma plant was 
the least competitive of all plants in a market plagued by excess capacity. The plan was to divest the plant, if 
feasible, but otherwise to close it down. The corporation commissioned an investment bank to probe 
prospective trade buyers and private equity firms. The sale was difficult for obvious reasons. The trade buyers 
were wary of acquiring a low–performing plant in a market plagued by overcapacity while private equity firms 
tend to steer clear of cyclical industries with high capital expenditures. As expected, the GPs at the firm had 
initially no interest in the deal. However, this began to change when an old colleague with a long history in 
the industry told them more about the prospect and asked if they had looked into it. Gradually their eyes were 
opened to the case. This industry expert proved to be an excellent resource in analyzing the prospect in detail 
and joined the company as Head of Sales after the buyout. 
5.1.3.1 A Hidden Gem Discovered on Closer Examination 
The due diligence process revealed a number of things. At the outset, the plant carried a well–known and 
appreciated product that had been overshadowed by the corporation. The brand was strong, with a history 
going back decades in the market. End–user professionals, in particular, showed a high appreciation of the 
product and within the niche market segment the product was one of the market leaders in the world. Yet, 
the product was half invisible in the market and the brand was even hard to find in the marketing journal that 
ranked the industry. The GPs realized that there might exist a potential for making the plant into a stand–
alone company by dusting off the brand and hiring a dedicated sales force. This would be a new organization 
that would be centered completely on the brand and the product. 
Another thing the commercial diligence showed was the desire of the corporation to get rid of Gamma, 
which in turn allowed the buyer to adjust the contract parameters in order to reach an attractive valuation. 
Simultaneously a majority portion of the deal could be financed by vendor notes, which added safety during 
potential market cycles. It meant the PE firm received completely different financing conditions compared to 
those it would have procured, had it relied on bank debt. This gentler form of financing gave the flexibility 
needed for investing in a cyclical industry, as loans do not have to be amortized each month. 
Since the plant was in a cyclical industry, the PE firm commissioned a study by a leading accounting firm 
to look into the market conditions and the opportunities ahead. At the time, the margins were at an all–time 
low, which might be viewed as an unfavorable time for an acquisition. The study showed that the spread was 
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minimal, i.e. the delta between the market price of the raw material and the manufactured end product. 
However, a more astute view was that the spread would again diverge and market prices improve, even if the 
timing of the recovery remained uncertain, and thus the macro factors appeared favorable for an acquisition. 
Besides the commercial due diligence, the PE firm commissioned three additional due diligences. Because of 
the long history of the plant the environmental due diligence was particularly urgent. Luckily there were no 
surprises. 
Legally the case was complicated because of a number of agreements that had to live on after the buyout 
to the corporation. The umbilical cord was not severed on day one – it had to live on during a transitional 
period. For instance, the plant had to rely on the vendor’s sales organization and logistics chain for months 
and secure the access to raw materials for a year. Thus, the reliance could only gradually be phased out. 
However, it soon became clear that the incumbent site manager was the wrong person to lead the plant 
as a stand–alone company. Although the manager was highly skilled in technical matters, the person lacked 
the necessary commercial background. With regards to the risk factors, it all comes down to envisioning what 
can be achieved under different leadership, as well as what would be possible under different ownership, 
where instead of being a hidden unit or division inside a large corporation, the new firm suddenly gets all the 
attention from the owners. 
After the buyout, many people looked at the investment with astonishment, including a number of the 
LPs. How could the firm invest in a cyclical industry requiring massive CAPEX? The buyout was completely 
atypical and unorthodox for the private equity industry. However, there was one more crucial element 
uncovered in the due diligence; the corporation had, in fact, over the years made huge investments in the 
plant. Subsequently a few moderate sized investments would be made during the holding period to increase 
efficiency, but overall the plant was well invested. 
Then there was luck. A year prior to the investment the plant had made a profit of €10 million, but the year 
after, just in time for the buyout, the profit dropped to €3.6 million. It meant the GPs could renegotiate the 
price based on revised parameters. In practice, this reduced the price by 30% from the starting bid. At the 
same time, the GPs realized that more vendor notes were needed and that the degree of bank debt had to be 
reduced. In the end the financial structure consisted of 40% vendor notes, 40% equity and 20% bank debt. 
For the valuation the firm did not use DCF or similar methods, but examined and compared the multiple 
valuations of public companies in the industry. In essence, the firm looked at the enterprise values in relation 
to EBIT or EBITA, and took into consideration that public companies typically carry a premium of 20–25%. 
Immediately following the buyout a new board of directors was set up that contained people with solid 
industry experience. The colleague who got the firm to reconsider Gamma took the position of chairman of 
the board, while two GPs came from the PE firm. A new managing director was recruited, but due to a present 
position abroad it took five months before the sales–oriented manager could join the firm. A new incentive 
program was established. Management, defined as the executives rather than as employees of the PE firm, 
became shareholders of 10% of the company. An upside and a downside were secured by insisting the 
managing director invest personal funds. 
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Close collaboration and momentum were quickly forged between the new owners, the boards of directors, 
and the top management team. It is vital that the top management team has an identical view of the strategy 
as the board. A particularity in this case was that the GPs firm added a junior person to support the managing 
director, a Ph.D. researcher they knew prior to the buyout that could act as a facilitator, e.g. on the business 
plan. The researcher did not have a background within the specific industry, which meant not having rigid 
perceptions on how “everything must be done”. For instance, the researcher questioned how the contribution 
margin was calculated in the industry. Why is the output calculated in metric tons, a weight measurement, 
instead of as a pecuniary measurement? With the latter question, the reasoning had always been that, the 
more metric tons, the better. It appeared that no one had ever examined the effect on profitability. 
Management quickly realized that contribution margin and profitability had to be considered and the necessity 
of digging deeper into the cost per metric ton and per hour. 
The guiding principle for running the firm was the business plan, which in this case was a ‘living document’ 
in the form of a set of slides that totaled one hundred pages. Quite often the business plan is a neat document 
locked in a cabinet, but that was not the case here. The researcher facilitated the work and ensured that the 
various department heads did their sections, and at the same time relieved the CEO. In the plan the explicit 
goals for the year were stated, even if corrections had to be made a few times a year. 
5.1.3.2 Analyzing the Contribution of Varying Product Mixes 
One of the key objectives the management team realized early on was that more than 25% of the volume 
went overseas to the Far East. It was partly due to historical reasons, since the company had a gigantic 
customer in the region, but partly because Asia had been perceived as a dumping ground for European 
manufacturers. Excess capacity was traded at substantial discount overseas. The industry was immersed in 
old tradition and conventional wisdom, where one of the tenets was that the wheels must be turning at all 
times and standstills avoided at all cost. Output metric tons per hour and machine efficiency were the key 
measurements. However, a closer breakdown of the margins showed that the contribution margin varied 
depending on the surface weights, which made this a priority. While low surface weights might reduce the 
output metric ton by two–thirds, profitability was higher. Thus management made the decision to measure 
the contribution margin per hour, which is a fairly complicated measurement in the industry. This 
measurement would include all variable costs, but would come before the fixed cost deductions. This new 
analysis made the firm management realize that under certain conditions it would be worthwhile to bring the 
machines to a standstill even for weeks, although this meant incurring high costs during the break. 
This previous system had meant producing excess volumes, which had to be sold at heavily subsidized 
prices overseas and were liable to high transport costs. However, the cost analysis showed that the company 
did not even recuperate the variable costs, meaning that the company was losing money on each shipment. 
After this, management decided to inform the client overseas that the price levels would need to rise. The 
response was that while the product was superb, a price hike would exceed the market price in the region, and 
they could not purchase at a higher price. The solution for Gamma was to move the volumes closer to the 
home market. The internal analysis had showed a definite geographical connection regarding price levels: the 
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closer the customer was to the plant, the better the prices. Price levels peaked in the saturated Nordic market 
and fell slightly in continental Europe. Here is where the management saw a business potential: if the overseas 
volumes could be transferred to the continental market, this would boost profitability significantly. 
Management communicated to the sales department that machines would be closed down rather than 
accepting orders from overseas. It sent a clear signal to the sales force as to what the new priority was. 
A bridge agreement permitted Gamma to use the corporate sales force during a transitional period of six 
months. A few weeks after the new managing director had been installed, a new sales force had been 
recruited. This new sales department had been organized in an unconventional way by having sales personnel 
working from home offices in each country. Traditionally the industry had used agent companies as the 
distribution channel and an intermediary for wholesalers and large end–user customers. In this case the plant 
managed all of the related functions, such as administration, order handling, technical support, and claims. It 
placed a high demand on language skills for new recruits since competency in the Nordic languages had to be 
found as well as competency in German, French, and English. Regional sales personnel would only focus on 
meeting new customers, but as soon as a customer was ready to order, they would need to call the plant. 
Many people thought this would never work and that customers would shun the company. On the contrary, 
the company received splendid feedback for being much easier to deal with than competitors. It was pure and 
simple: one–stop shopping. When the customer called the plant they promptly received answers. Traditionally 
the industry workflow was set up in such a way that the customer asked a question of the distributor, who 
then called the corporation, which checked internally with the manufacturing plant, and so forth all the way 
back. The problem is not merely in the delay, but that information gets filtered along the route. With this new 
arrangement, communication became quicker and simpler, while the plant managed to have a minimal sales 
force. Moreover, the plant got valuable communication channel customer feedback. 
5.1.3.3 Judiciously Assessing Ad Hoc Increases in Capital Expenditures 
An investment that the PE firm had been unaware of prior to the buyout, but which quickly dawned on 
them, was the necessity to invest in a new mill. Since the factory was unintegrated, it had to purchase the raw 
material at international market prices, which soared the year following the buyout. The management team 
realized that a paradigm shift was going on and that the price hike was part of a long–term trend. The 
conventional wisdom in the industry had been that a plant integrated through vertical integration provided a 
competitive advantage. However, the perceived weakness of being one of the few non–integrated factories 
could be turned into an advantage. The global market was changing, as more and more low–cost producers 
of the raw material needed sprang up in emerging countries. Management quickly realized that it had to find 
a way to use this low–cost raw material. At first the response from the lab at the plant was that this was 
impossible. The new raw material left residues, which adversely affected product quality. A closer examination 
showed that this was due to the fact that the mill at the plant could not process the raw material sufficiently. 
The new mill created a completely different sourcing base and a much better negotiating position vis-à-vis 
suppliers. In the beginning, the company was bound to use regional raw material, but with the new mill 
suppliers from all around the world could be used. Today, just three years after acquiring a new mill, 100% of 
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the raw material comes from low–cost producers. This is something no one could have dreamed of a few years 
ago. 
The whole process, from identifying a need in a new mill to investing, was rapid. During the summer, the 
investment was prepared and in the autumn the board of directors swiftly approved of the investment 
decision. This can be contrasted with the investment hold–up time in a multinational corporation, where an 
investment proposal would sluggishly advance through the bureaucracy. It is no surprise that it can take years 
to make a decision because of the minimal visibility of a non–core unit and the logic present in a corporate 
hierarchy for avoiding mistakes. 
A critical market transition occurred when price of oil shot up from less than half the price to $140 a barrel. 
In an industry that depends heavily on low–cost energy, this hits directly at the bottom line. Calculations 
indicated that at this oil price level the payback time for replacing an oil fuel boiler with an energy efficient 
biofuel boiler would be just six months. However, a replacement required co–investing in an electric boiler, 
since a new biofuel boiler would require regular intervals of cleaning. The board of directors made the decision 
at lightning speed and only had one requirement: that the plant would have to finance the investment by 
itself. The solution was to create a leaseback plan with a bank. Furthermore, the new biofuel boiler was more 
flexible in that it could use heavy pitch oil, aside from the standard bio pellets. Another benefit with both bio 
pellets and pitch oil is that these are classified as environmentally friendly fuels. It supported the motto of 
being environmentally friendly and having close to zero CO2 emissions. The company vision was to be the 
most environmentally friendly company in the industry. 
5.1.3.4 A Systematic Approach to Reducing the Cost Structure 
When looking at the accumulative costs at the plant, the numbers one and two costs were the price of 
raw materials and the energy price, while numbers three and four were the logistics costs and the personnel 
costs. The next logical step was to tackle the third largest cost pool. In the pre–buyout firm, a logistics system 
was used that relied on transporting the product in circular containers. These containers had been optimized 
for the bulk products that formed the backbone of the corporation and the prevailing notion was that these 
were extremely efficient. No logistics competency existed within the plant since the corporation had managed 
all transports. There was an inkling among the members of the board that this prevailing notion might not be 
true, and so they contacted an old colleague with extensive experience in logistics improvements. 
The examination proved that the circular container system was both unsuitable and inflexible, as it was 
intended for transport by rail and cargo, not truck. Because there was no railway to the plant, the products 
first had to be transported by truck to a local railway station 80 km away. Then the products had to be 
repackaged into the containers at the railway station for further transport by a regional railway to the closest 
port. Thereafter the containers were shipped to two large ports in continental Europe and again unpacked for 
truck transport to distributors or end–user customers. The end–to–end transport system thus consisted of a 
number of steps. A new system was created that was optimized for the Gamma products. It relied on truck 
transport to a domestic railway hub further away, but from which there was a direct railway connection to 
the continent. By using rail transport, Gamma also got much closer to the key customers. The local press 
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initially chastised Gamma for the move, but after a while the tone changed and a more objective debate was 
held. Even if the mode of transport was changed from ship to rail, the net effect was more environmentally 
friendly and cost efficient. The environmental benefit came from reducing the amount of transports by truck 
in continental Europe and the regional diesel train. The cost savings amounted to €6 million of the annual 
logistics costs of €19 million. 
A more sinister problem in the post–buyout firm was that the IT system used for administration was 
outdated and the support was soon to be terminated. In addition, there were a cacophony of different IT 
systems needed to control the process machinery. Management made the decision to update the various IT 
systems in the plant to a single enterprise system that covered everything from order processing to 
manufacturing to invoicing. A major international corporation had a new but unproven system that satisfied 
the specifications. On their part, the corporation was not one of the main suppliers of enterprise systems and 
was thus eager to get a pilot as reference. The implementation took longer than expected; in fact, to iron out 
all the minor bugs took a year. However, the end result was that today the plant has an extraordinary state–
of–the–art IT platform. Not only that, the system could at the time be purchased at a fraction of the cost it 
would have taken to implement one of the standard enterprise systems. 
5.1.3.5 A Focused Effort on Reinforcing the Product Brand 
Much effort went into strengthening the product brand, and Gamma was quite alone in the solitary 
pursuit. Many companies focus on corporate branding, but at Gamma the work was on the product brand. 
The effort grew out of the realization that the company had an excellent product that was known throughout 
the industry. Thus, a professional firm was enlisted to redesign the logo (to add a horse to the logo), and to 
create a smart tagline for the product. Why the horse? The region is known throughout the country for its 
horses and the figure was associated with positive connotations. Not only that, a big horse made of glass was 
placed at the entrance to the plant. The beauty of using the regional horse is that it was not copyrighted. Two 
years ago a group of German customers actually thought the company must spend huge amounts on 
marketing because they had seen this regional horse figure on a billboard at an airport. 
Overall the industry of Gamma tended to be traditionalist and reactionary in marketing, and slow to adopt 
new mediums for channel marketing. At Gamma, they decided to go against the mainstream and create a 
marketing campaign based on streaming videos over the internet. This was unheard of in an industry 
unaccustomed to using digital media. Despite the naysayers, the campaign was well received and ended up 
being awarded the first prize in an international competition for best marketing campaign that year.  
Three years ago, before the buyout, it was almost impossible to find the Gamma product in an 
international marketing publication that measures the recognition of brand names in the industry. Today it is 
one of the strongest brands listed in the publication. It is something that would have been altogether 
unthinkable if Gamma had remained hidden within a large corporation. 
The KPIs and measurements which were followed at Gamma were obviously the total costs, particularly 
the raw material, the energy price, and the logistics costs. All of these were addressed in individual programs. 
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The fourth largest aggregate cost was personnel. The company did have lay–offs, but these were limited to 
10% of the personnel over a two–year period and largely managed by the use of early retirements. The other 
KPIs centered on changing the measurement from output per metric ton and machine efficiency to the 
contribution margin per hour and profitability of product mixes. A target measurement was moving sales 
volumes closer home to the Nordic countries and continental Europe. 
With regards to currency fluctuations, Gamma was currency neutral. There was an effort to ensure that 
the firm balanced the different currency exposures, which were reviewed in detail by the PE firm during the 
buyout. 
Before the buyout, the new owners had been warned that the unions could be belligerent. This caused 
concern for the new management and board initially, but the collaboration turned out to be fruitful and 
cooperative, which may have been due to the changed atmosphere. The unions were represented on the 
executive management team and knew the justifications for the decisions that were made. There was an 
understanding of the precarious situation and the repercussions that would occur if the plant had to close 
down. Moreover, by including the union on the executive team, it became much more involved with the plant, 
to a completely different degree than in the past as part of a huge corporation. 
5.1.3.6 The Hard Core of Soft Cultural Factors 
Soft factors, such as corporate culture and values, are often forgotten when discussing value creation, 
since these are hard to measure. Naturally this includes the dynamic between owners, the board of directors, 
and top management. Equally important is the commitment of the personnel to the company. In this case 
there was a feeling of indignation and indemnity ––a wish to show the corporation that selling the plant had 
been a mistake. All this energy could instead be utilized to develop the company. 
The spirit of the plant was often discussed, since the region had long been known for perseverance and 
toughness, as well as for cooperation, self–assurance, and the feeling that nothing is impossible. The new 
management began to work on the corporate culture early on. The management team came up with answers 
to the questions “What is our vision of the future?” and “What is our business strategy?” For the equally 
important but more generic question “What are our core values?” the whole plant was surveyed. A number of 
working groups were established to ponder questions like “What is our culture?” and “What is it that makes 
customers return year after year?” The idea was that the company must be doing something right, since 
customers kept returning. Finally, a small group and a consultant put everything together in a neat package. 
It was followed by many workshops throughout the plant to make sure values felt right to all the people. 
Aside from including all personnel in the vision of the future of the plant, another positive was that it improved 
the atmosphere. For instance, sick leaves dropped substantially to 4%, which includes the figures for both 
long– and short–term sick leaves. 
Soon after the buyout, a dialogue was opened with different actors for an exit. One discussion concerned 
an exit via an IPO, but the plant was still too minor for the stock exchange. Furthermore, the journey would 
have been long and uncertain. Another discussion was with a strategic buyer, who had been a bidder before 
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the buyout and thus was well acquainted with the firm. This contact resulted in a preliminary deal a year 
before the final exit, which fell through when the buyer was unable to complete their own IPO. The reason 
was the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy, which spread throughout all money markets. In retrospect, this proved 
to be a stroke of luck since a deal at that time would not have been nearly as good. The operating result grew 
dramatically each year and by the year of the exit the profits were an astounding 1,200% higher than three 
years previous, an all– time record for the plant.  
However, the reason for the development was far from being only the internal improvements. A number 
of macroeconomic factors were favorable, e.g. the spread between the market price for raw material and the 
manufactured product. A few years back there had been an enormous overcapacity, while during the holding 
period 4–5 competing plants were closed down. Consequently, when presenting Gamma the PE firm 
emphasized the ten–year cycle of the industry, which showed that the expected average profits would 
probably be three times lower than during the year of the exit. Even if the entry and exit price were never made 
public, media analysts estimated that Gamma was exited after a 3–year holding period at a premium of 90–
110% compared to the entry. 
5.2 The Negative Case Study Firms 
One of the methods for mitigating the selection bias in a sample is to have negative contrast cases, i.e. in 
this case buyouts that not only did not succeed, but that represent failures at the opposite end of the 
spectrum. All of the cases came from the same three private equity firms that supplied the core cases, which 
avoids the introduction of further factors due to having non–comparable samples. 
Nevertheless, for the negative case only the senior GP involved in the buyout case was available for the 
interview. This means that the negative case interviews are based on first–hand accounts, but are single 
sources. Consequently all the negative cases are of lower quality from a research perspective, but particularly 
the Upsilon case. At the same time, the negative cases are likely to be more compact simply due to limited 
options for improvement. 
5.2.1 Sigma: The Furniture Chain 
Sigma was the leading office furniture chain in the domestic market and known for quality products and 
a strong brand. Ever since being founded 60 years prior, the company had been under the auspices of the same 
family, but now it was faced by a problematic generational transition. Financially the performance of the firm 
had been lackluster during the last few years, even if it was by no means in financial distress. The company 
employed 350 people in three manufacturing plants and a retail chain. The company footprint was large on 
the domestic market, but it still lacked presence outside of the country. 
At this time, the market was on a roll and the dot com boom was in full swing. Demand in the office 
furniture market was growing in pace with the business sector and the market expansion. When the PE firm 
discovered the company was up for sale, the investment thesis was that a substantial company could be 
created by carrying out the buyout. Afterward, the buyout firm could be merged with a highly profitable 
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producer of chairs and a minor portfolio firm owned by the PE firm that specialized in office interiors. Carrying 
out the consolidation required expansion capital, which the PE possessed. 
5.2.1.1 A Consolidation Case with a Strong Improvement Potential 
During the due diligence it was discovered that the company would be vulnerable to foreign competition 
due to domestic manufacturing facilities and high–cost labor. Moreover, all three manufacturing facilities 
were outmoded and the methods of production inefficient and irrational. On the other hand, the products 
were top–of–the–line and the management team experienced and skilled. The issue of a lackluster 
profitability level appeared to be caused by the excessive levels of highly paid personnel. The balance sheet 
was strained due to rapid growth, which is often the case in family businesses. However, due to these 
inefficiencies there was a high potential for improvement. 
The PE firm used a discount cash flow model to value the company. Net asset value was substantial, but 
mainly tied to century–old factory buildings. However, the downside was alleviated by the fact that the 
opportunity lay foremost in the market consolidation and efficiency improvements. Due to mediocre 
profitability, no bank was willing to finance the buyout at the time, which meant the acquisition was all equity. 
A new board was set up, which included a senior GP from the PE firm, but also included the managing 
director of the previously mentioned chair manufacturer. By including this executive, the board obtained 
excellent industry know–how. Nevertheless, problems began soon after the buyout, as the market was 
stagnating. The company had been acquired some months before the business cycle peaked, and a year before 
the market collapsed completely. The recession which began overseas had soon permeated the domestic 
market and had a huge impact on the office market in the city center. For example, the rental market for 
offices fell by 50% during the year and a half after the buyout. The office furniture market in turn fell by 40–
45% in one year. What made the situation worse was that the furniture produced by Sigma was a high–end, 
high–quality, expensive product mix that was ill–suited for the market during a downturn. 
5.2.1.2 Resizing the Firm in Lock–Step with an Evaporating Market 
The chairman of the board had to spend an inordinate amount of time on the company, which took time 
and focus from all other portfolio firms. The board and company management made a number of changes to 
adapt to the market. The head office was shut down and relocated to the facilities of the main factory. 
Following this operation, a second factory with 100 employees had to be closed down, and thereafter a third 
factory with 40 employees. Factory buildings were sold off to town municipalities, but in a downturn old brick 
buildings are of little value. Then the operations of the main factory were sold to the employees while the 
company kept the furniture designs and the brand. All manufacturing was then outsourced to the company 
that bought the operations but at new, substantially lower price levels. The new prices were accomplished by 
making exclusive purchasing agreements over the next three years. Two years later Sigma had gone from a 
pre–buyout level of 350 employees to a mere 35. The only remaining employees were critical to the running 
of the firm, i.e. the top management and the sales department. Through the drastic cost cuts, the demand 
shortfall was met, and the company broke even. 
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During the buyout, the chairman of the board took a more executive–oriented function and worked 
extensively in meeting directly with unions and municipalities. To shut down factories was a complicated 
process due to national labor laws, which demanded mandatory notice periods of three months. Often, there 
would in addition be a strike at the factory a week after the announcement. Layoffs were also taxing for 
another reason ––employment reductions in rural areas had an enormously negative effect on the 
community, since a single salary could support many people due to the chain effect. 
The investment in Sigma was minor. It was, in fact, one of the smallest ever made by the PE firm. Despite 
this, it took away all focus and time from other portfolio companies. A strategic buyer within the same 
industry contacted the PE firm a number of times during the holding period. The company, which was from a 
neighboring country, had a turnover twice the size of Sigma but lacked any footprint in Sigma’s country. 
Despite repeated contacts from this company, the bids provided for Sigma were stingy and dismal. This ended 
when the PE firm made the decision to give up and in effect give away Sigma to the buyer. The financial loss 
was 50–60% of the equity, even if the loss evidently amounted to more than the equity. After the exit, the 
market slowly, but surely began to pick–up. Two years later the majority of all the profits the new owner 
generated came from what had been Sigma. The massive restructuring had finally paid off, although the new 
owner garnered all profits. 
5.2.1.3 Paddling Against the Tide 
A key lesson from the Sigma case was that if a single portfolio firm gets in trouble, it steals an inordinate 
amount of time and effort from all other firms. Another lesson is to make every effort to enter and exit during 
the right business cycle. It is essentially impossible to fight the direction of the market. In this specific case, 
the strategic vision was correct, the managing director adept, and the board professional, but when the floor 
falls out from down below none of this matters. All that matter is how to survive the downturn by cutting 
costs. It was not a surprise that the market was cyclical, but the amplitude of the cyclicality was entirely 
unexpected at three times the expectation. 
5.2.2 Tau: The Logistics Conglomerate 
Tau was a spin–off of a family–owned business conglomerate in transports and logistics. The portion of 
the company that was spun off was the business in automotive logistics and particularly in import vehicle 
transports, import–related technical services, and transit services. In the first field, transport of vehicles, the 
company was a minor competitor domestically with a 15% market share. In the second field of import related 
services, the company had a decent market share, as customers included the car manufacturer with the largest 
market share in the country. This import service is commonly known as Pre–Delivery Inspection (PDI), which 
refers to the inspection of a vehicle prior to customs, making minor installations such as Webasto motor 
heaters, and finally adding materials, such as floor mats and manuals in the local language. The third field 
was transit services for the Russian market, which were analogous to the PDI services. In transit services the 
company had an astonishing market share. Of all vehicles imported to Russia, 70–75% came through a vast 
port where the company performed the transit services. While the transit traffic was enormous, it did not 
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include transports and shipping. 
Furthermore, by an acquisition a year earlier in another Nordic country, the company had achieved a 
significant market share in the country with 40% of the import vehicle transports. This change made the 
company as large as that of the chief competitor, while a third competitor had the remainder of the market. 
In the same country the company did have import–related services, but with a minor market share. In a third 
Nordic country and a Baltic country, the company had smaller market shares in both transports of vehicles 
and import–related services. The pre–buyout company employed 500 people and had a turnover of €104 
million. 
5.2.2.1 A Dual Track Opportunity of Consolidation and Expansion 
The corporation that made the decision to spin off the business used a professional firm to find prospective 
buyers, which contacted the private equity firms. The business proposition was two–fold: the first part was to 
create a market leader in the Nordic countries through market consolidation, while the second was to secure 
high–growth business in Russia. The financial and legal due diligence did not uncover anything out of the 
ordinary. The vendor had used PwC to perform the financial due diligence prior to contact with the PE firm 
and PwC was a trusted provider. The legal due diligence was performed in–house and revealed no roadblock. 
The business due diligence, performed by BCG, uncovered the fact that car manufacturers would prefer 
pan–Nordic service agreements, as opposed to having to make separate agreements for every country. 
Consequently, any company that could provide such a service would have a competitive advantage. In 
addition, in the domestic market the company had a long business relationship on PDI services with the largest 
car manufacturer. Then there was the high–growth market of Russia, where subsidiaries could be established. 
It was not impossible that the transit service could disappear in the future if vehicles were shipped directly to 
Russia. For a few years ahead, Russian ports would not have sufficient capacity to deliver the transit services, 
but this was likely to change in the future. Thus, there was a limited market window for establishing the 
presence at a Russian port. There was also a potential for gaining a market share in import vehicle transports 
by truck inside Russia. Taking into consideration the state of the car park in Russia, it was clear that the market 
was far from saturated, and that the trajectory was ascending for the foreseeable future. The business of 
vehicle sales was known to be cyclical. However, the company managed market swings of 15% for decades. 
By the same token, there was no possibility to outsource PDI services to low–cost countries from the domestic 
market. 
The acquisition process turned into a hot auction, specifically with another sizeable bidder. Otherwise the 
process proceeded smoothly as the chairman of the board at the vendor was an old colleague. The bank was 
also willing to finance more than the PE firm had estimated and as a consequence the equity portion could be 
reduced. The price ended up rising to a level of 7.9 times EBITDA (debt–free value), which at that point was 
normal in the market. An anomaly was that the managing director of the vendor joined the buyout, which 
meant it became an MBO. Aside from a new CFO, there were no substantial changes at the top management 
level. The management team received excellent incentives with large upsides, but also invested substantial 
amounts for their personal funds. 
– 112 – 
The post–buyout work began immediately with the recruitment of a CFO and the installation of a new, 
professional board. Two board members came from the company, two from the PE firm, and an external 
business owner with a chain of car dealerships. An action plan was created that outlined what had to be done, 
which included the consolidation of the Nordic market and the expansion into Russia. Management had 
negotiations in Russia well underway before the buyout, while some board members focused on the Nordic 
countries. In addition, reporting procedures were instigated for the large foreign subsidiary, which had yet to 
be integrated and consolidated. 
5.2.2.2 A Bungled Key Account 
Already during the first year problems were mounting. A key customer of the transit service business made 
the decision to transfer vehicle volumes directly to Russia, which took everybody by surprise. Around the same 
time, a tender was ongoing from a long–time customer of PDII services domestically. It did not go in the way 
that the account manager had assured the board it would go, and for the first time in five decades the account 
was lost to a competitor. To rectify the situation, the PE firm went back to the vendor and received an 
additional discount for Tau. The business, which had seemed very healthy and stable on paper, was beginning 
to crack. Despite the setbacks, revenues remained fairly stable during the first calendar year and shrunk by a 
mere 5%. 
During this time, PDI know–how in Russia was still nascent and the company possessed the necessary 
know–how. There were far advanced negotiations on substantial acquisitions in Russia. The first of these 
concerned a major importer of cars, which also had vehicle transports. In this case the seller withdrew when 
Tau had financing in place for completing the acquisition. It is possible that this Russian company was not as 
financially sound as it appeared, which is not uncommon in the market. Then there were a number of minor 
targets, which either were uninterested in selling or at price levels that were absurd even for 2007. After this 
followed negotiations with a second, substantial importer, which in essence would have been a merger and 
would have formed a leading northern European corporation. Negotiations were ongoing until summer 2008, 
when the financial crisis struck the market, and financing could not be obtained for the acquisition. 
5.2.2.3 The Financial Crisis Causes the Market to Nosedive 
The financial crisis had a profound effect53. In just a few months, the Russian transit business made a 
nosedive and lost 50% of its volume, which occurred in a business that carries high fixed costs. This resulted 
in drastic cost cuts and a remediation of the debt structure. As it happened this was one of the first companies 
hit by the financial crash, which meant covenants could be renegotiated, and the bank agreed to write off 
parts of the debt. However, the negotiations were tough and necessitated that the PE firm invest more equity 
in the company. Concurrently the managing director of the company was replaced. 
A year later the PE firm brought in the consulting firm AlixPartners, which specializes in turnarounds and 
is familiar with the vehicle industry. A plan was constructed, which management began executing. 
                                                                                       
53 The Lehman bankruptcy in the summer of 2008 was the largest bankruptcy ever with assets exceeding $700 billion. 
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Employment was further reduced by 35% and two companies abroad were divested. Since the domestic 
competitor was not willing to sell the business, the board made the decision to sell the remaining domestic 
business to the competitor. At the same time, the board made the decision to divest from import vehicle 
logistics in the other Nordic country. The reason was that competition had turned increasingly fierce and from 
the undermined price levels no one had made any profit. However, the sell–off was completed in such a way 
that the company received in return another business in PDI services. This strengthened the company’s PDI 
business in the country and today it performs 70% of all import–related PDI services. The company now has 
a turnover of €45 million and is moderately profitable. The PE firm learned a few lessons from the debacle. 
Specifically, a number of investment criteria themes were created, out of which at least two have to be 
present, which makes Tau an unlikely case today. 
5.2.3 Upsilon: The Construction Machinery Firm 
Upsilon is a company that makes industrial mining and quarry equipment. Before the buyout it was a 
stable, family–owned company with roots going back several decades. The company had production mainly 
in the Nordic country and Ireland, although the domestic production was dispersed in a few locations. Sales 
were concentrated on the domestic market, Ireland, Italy, and the United States. The most recent year’s 
growth and profitability had been remarkable due to technological innovations and market growth. In 2006, 
the company was facing a generational transition and the principal owner was interested in selling a majority 
share in the company. Moreover, investment capital would be required to develop the company in the future. 
5.2.3.1 The Financial Crisis Hits the Export Markets 
The buyout turned out to essentially be an MBO, since the managing director transferred with the buyout 
and management retained sizeable stock incentives. However, with the financial crisis in 2008, the business 
came to a grinding halt. The market landscape changed figuratively overnight, and the operating profits 
shrunk from €10 million a year down to nothing. The cause was largely due to over exposure in certain 
markets, specifically Southern Europe and Ireland, where motorway construction had been substantial. Since 
then a number of adjustments have been made, which include selling off portions of the company to reduce 
the risk exposure. Since the downturn, firm management has actively focused on identifying substituting 
markets and had some success, e.g. on the construction of railway tunnels in the Alps. The managing director 
remains at the company, as the GPs attribute the lack of success to the financial crisis of 2008. 
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Chapter 6. Cross–Case Analysis 
“In the business world, the rearview mirror is always clearer than the windshield.” 
– Warren Buffett, investor 
The objective of the cross–case analysis was to identify the disparate mechanisms that were conducive to 
the ensuing value generation. This was conducted by juxtaposing the case firms horizontally (side–by–side) 
and by systematically analyzing the six cases conjointly. Prior to the comparative cross–case analysis, the data 
was scrutinized during the process of thematic analysis (or thematic coding) by actively reading and re–reading 
the transcribed interviews. The intention with the recursive method was to identify and capture re–occurring 
themes and idiosyncrasies. The focal point was similar to that of cross–case analysis, i.e. neither to generate 
conceptual abstractions nor to identify theoretical gaps, but to distinguish principal events and activities 
during the lifecycle. Color–coded mind maps were created in the process of the thematic analysis, which are 
included in Appendix B. 
6.1 Synthesizing Findings With the Derived Taxonomy 
In this section the outcome of the cross–case analysis has been contrasted with the previously derived 
empirical taxonomy of value generation. In Table 5 below the observed effect of each mechanism for every 
firm has been quantified using five positions: very positive (blue arrow up); positive (blue arrow slanted); 
undetermined/insignificant (unmarked); negative (red arrow slanted); very negative (red arrow down). To 
enhance readability, when a mechanism was observed to have had a very positive or very negative effect, the 
specific square has been shaded with the color blue or red. 
While there always remain elements of subjectivity of the qualitative data, both in information that is 
conveyed by the interview subjects and in the interpretation by the researcher, a fundamental research 
objective is to accurately reflect the interview data. By a cross-case analysis of each firm and interview, it is 
nevertheless feasible to approximate whether the enacted changes and activities were conducive or 
unfavorable to the value creation according to the interview subjects. For instance, on the mechanism I–A6. 
Creative Finance, in each of the positive case firms it is clear from the interviews that the GPs consider the type 
of financing a key explanatory factor of the success. Moreover, the principal portion of debt financing in the 
positive cases was either vendor notes or supplier loans. This was not the case for the negative case firms, 
which were financed by (excess levels of) bank debt, no debt at all, and debt data is missing. Consequently, 
the effect has been marked very positive for all three positive case firms and undetermined/insignificant for all 
three negative case firms. The difference between very positive and positive is well illustrated e.g. in III–G8. 
Divesting the Firm, were it is explicit in the interview data. 
Correspondingly, all the mechanisms are analyzed for separately each firm in chapter 6.2, which is 
presented in Table 7. 
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Table 7. Key value generation mechanism in the case firms vs. the empirical taxonomy 
I. DIRECT VALUE CREATION Alpha Beta Gamma Sigma Tau Upsilon 
A. FINANCIAL       
I–A1. Financial Expertise and 
Contact Networks ì ì     
I–A2. Debt Market Cycles: 
Mispricing and Overheating ì ì ì î î î 
I–A3. Alleviating Capital Market 
Constraints  ì  ì  ì 
I–A4. The Effects of High–
Leverage: Inflating Gains, Inducing 
Efforts 
ì ì ì ì ê î 
I–A5. Capital Structure 
Optimization in Buyouts       
I–A6. Creative Finance 
é é é    
I–A7. Asset Conversion and 
Securitization   ì ì   
B. OPERATIONAL       
I–B1. Functional Experience and 
Operational Expertise ì ì ì ì   
I–B2. Cost Structure 
Improvements é ì é é é  
I–B3. Capital Management and 
Asset Utilization  ì ì    
C. STRATEGIC       
I–C1. Focusing on the Core: 
Complexity Reduction é      
I–C2. Focusing on Consolidation: 
Buy and Build Strategies é é     
I–C3. Focusing on Growth: Market 
Expansion   é    
II. INDIRECT VALUE CREATION Alpha Beta Gamma Sigma Tau Upsilon 
D. GOVERNANCE       
II–D1. The GP Effect: Experience 
and Expertise ì ì ì ì ì ì 
II–D2. PE Firm Constraints: 
Industry Focus and Fund Size       
II–D3. Reducing Agency Costs: 
Incentivation, Interest Realignment é é é ì ì ì 
II–D4. Restructuring the Board of 
Directors ì ì ì    
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II–D5. Reinforcing the 
Management Team é  é ì   
E. CULTURAL       
II–E1. The Parenting Advantage: 
Monitoring and Mentoring ì ì ì    
II–E2. The Value of Corporate 
Culture: A Revived Entrepreneurial 
Spirit 
ì  é    
II–E3. Performance Management: 
Stretch Budgets, Ambitious Goals ì ì ì ì ì  
II–E4. Revising the Firm KPIs: 
Novel Yardsticks ì ì ì    
F. TEMPORAL       
II–F1. High–Tempo and Inchoate 
Change ì ì ì ì ì  
II–F2. The Holding Period Time 
Horizon ì ì ì    
III. VALUE CAPTURE Alpha Beta Gamma Sigma Tau Upsilon 
G. COMMERCIAL       
III–G1. Proprietary Deal Flow 
 ì     
III–G2. Deal Making Expertise 
ì ì ì    
III–G3. Target Firm Identification 
and Investment Criteria   ì    
III–G4. Uncovering the Business 
Potential ì  ì    
III–G5. Detecting Nascent Market 
Trends: Multiple Expansion ì ì ì ì ì  
III–G6. Timing the Business Cycles 
é é é ê ê ê 
III–G7. The Entry Transaction: Firm 
Valuation Criteria ì  ì  î  
III–G8. Divesting the Firm: The 
Mode of Exit é ì ì ê ì  
H. ORGANIZATIONAL       
III–H1. Mitigated Legislative and 
Regulatory Constraints       
III–H2. The Corporate Tax Shield: 
Debt and Taxes ì      
III–H3. Carried Interest and Capital 
Income       
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6.2 A Systematic Review of the Key Events 
6.2.1 Pre–Buyout Phase 
6.2.1.1 Deal Sourcing and Firm Characteristics 
With regards to deal flow, the management of Beta contacted the private equity firm directly, while Alpha 
and Gamma both originated at investment banks. In the case of Gamma the PE firm would have rejected the 
investment if not for an external colleague with substantial industry experience. Consequently, we cannot 
conclude that the proprietary deal flow was as fundamental, as has previously been speculated (Schmidt et 
al., 2004; Kaplan & Schoar, 2005). An examination of the negative case firms by comparison reveals that the 
PE firms received information stating that the family–owned firms had become available on the market, but 
not the exact source. A conspicuous feature is that every singly negative case firm was, before the buyout, 
family–owned. The comparison might indicate that the firms became available on the market not because 
the firms faced strategic inflection points, but because the owners anticipated a business contraction, i.e. 
exploited an information asymmetry54. The case study firms do not validate the notion that family–owned 
firms are poorly managed and thus suitable target opportunities, as previously reported by Bloom and Reenen 
(2007). It is unclear if the observed outcome in the buyouts of the family–owned companies is an idiosyncrasy 
of the Nordic countries or a random outcome due to the sample size. 
The positive case firms all displayed moderate profitability and stable cash flows. Alpha and Beta had 
dominant market shares in the domestic markets, while Gamma was one of the market leaders within its 
niche internationally. The negative cases Tau and Upsilon showed a profitability and stability, while Sigma was 
merely breaking even. Sigma had a dominant market share in the domestic niche market, while Upsilon had a 
strong position domestically and in high–growth countries in Europe. Furthermore, Upsilon was in a very 
export–driven business. Tau was very dominant (but likely temporary) in transit services for a third country 
and was one of the two market leaders for transports in a second country, but only had a minor share in 
domestic transports. Based on this basic information can be inferred that both Tau and Upsilon had precarious 
market positions: Tau due to the fractured and temporary market position and Upsilon for being in an export–
driven business with exposure to volatile high–growth markets. With the possible exception of Tau and 
Upsilon, the basic characteristics of the target firms (stable, positive cash flow, dominant market position) are 
in line with the common notions of target characteristics (e.g. Arundale, 2010).  
6.2.1.2 Due Diligence and Business Potential 
Of the positive case firms, it can be observed that in the case of Alpha four analyses were performed: the 
financial, legal, and environmental due diligences were all outsourced, and the commercial due diligence was 
completed in–house. The business was largely in disarray, as it consisted of multiple firms on several 
continents that had not been consolidated and were only marginally related. One of the more salient 
                                                                                       
54 A less risky alternative to the LBO when acquiring a family–owned business would obviously be to pursue an MBO, see 
e.g. Schmohl (2009). 
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opportunities was that maintenance and construction of electrical networks did not exist as an independent 
industry, probably not in Europe and at least not in the Nordics. Then there was the growth opportunity with 
3G mobile networks, which meant higher density of base stations. Finally, there was the combination of the 
two networks. Only the last mile of 3G networks was mobile, whereas 40% was the fixed network. 
Furthermore, 80% of the time when a base station was down it was due to lack of access to electricity. 
In Beta the legal and financial due diligence had already been performed, while the PE firm performed the 
commercial due diligence in–house. A form of deal clearance came by way of a senior vice president for a 
major company, for which Beta was a supplier. The analysis showed that the target firm was at a critical 
junction, or a strategic inflection point, partly due to rapid technological change and increasing online sales 
portals, and partly due to a fragmented market in the Nordic countries. 
Likewise, for Gamma the PE firm contracted the financial, legal, and environmental due diligences and the 
commercial due diligence was performed in–house. However, the business/industry cycle analysis was also 
contracted to a large accounting firm (KPMG). Moreover, the firm also always outsources a secondary 
commercial due diligence. The assessment is essentially an added security measure for fund investors to 
ensure that each case is vented meticulously. In this particular case a third factor was the external senior 
colleague with extensive functional experience from the specific industry, which permitted the PE firm to 
examine the case more deeply. The core opportunity here was the revelation that the firm possessed a potent, 
but hidden brand. It was one of the global market leaders within the niche and highly appreciated by end–user 
customers. There was a potential for creating a solid company that could stand on its own feet. In addition, 
the macroeconomic factors looked good. The spread was minimal, i.e. the market price for the end product 
compared to the market price for the raw material. The similitude signaled that the market price had reached 
the lowest point and that prices would appreciate. To boot, even if the plant was in a high CAPEX industry, it 
was actually well invested. Finally, since the competition knew the industry was highly cyclical and high 
CAPEX, the market sentiment meant reduced competition. 
During the commercial due diligence of Sigma, it was discovered that the firm would be vulnerable to 
foreign competition due to domestic manufacturing facilities and high–cost labor. The real estate was 
furthermore old–fashioned, and the manufacturing had a high potential for efficiency improvements. The 
vision lay in consolidating three firms, of which the second firm was highly profitable, although still 
independent. For Tau the firm outsourced all the due diligences, including a commercial portion to a 
consulting firm (BCG). The commercial due diligence noted both the Russian and Nordic opportunity, but 
endorsed the buyout. The only information on Upsilon is that the commercial due diligence revealed it was a 
solid, well–run business that faced a generational shift and was in need of expansion capital. In retrospect it 
appears that more attention should have been paid to the commercial risks of Tau and that this should have 
been evident in the due diligence. 
The types of due diligences performed were in line with the basic recommendations in earlier research. 
However, existing empirical studies on private equity related to the due diligence are scant. This is somewhat 
surprising since the commercial due diligence is pivotal and often performed in–house by PE firms. 
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6.2.1.3 Valuation and Negotiation 
The critical factor with Alpha was that the business case hadn’t been prepared commercially since the 
seller and investment bank did not know what to make of it. The situation resulted in a failed auction, with 
only one PE firm negotiating. As the negotiation dragged on, the business plummeted, which allowed the PE 
firm to lower the bid by 20%. For Beta we know the price was at market level, i.e. not particularly low–priced, 
because the bid was on par with the preceding external bid. However, Beta differed in that the negotiation 
proceeded swiftly and was finalized in six weeks. Gamma was likewise a case with no other interested bidders 
after the negotiations proceeded, in all likelihood because it was an atypical private equity buyout case in a 
high CAPEX industry that was highly cyclical. Furthermore, the result fell during the months of the 
negotiation, which resulted in a lowered bid. With regards to the negotiations, we find the valuations 
decreased substantially for both Alpha and Gamma during the months of negotiation. However, the 
development was mainly due to the fortunate external circumstances on market timing, which is discussed in 
chapter 6.1.1.5 Cyclicality of Business and Market Timing. 
Regarding the negative cases, there is no other information on the negotiations and valuations, besides 
the fact the Tau case constituted of a hot auction with several bidders that drove up the price, which in turn 
is an indication of unfavorable market timing. 
6.2.1.4 Financing and Leverage 
With Alpha, the buyer received two vendor loans that financed 100% of the buyout. These loans allowed 
the target firm to finance all subsequent acquisitions with the generated cash flow and by divesting the non–
core businesses. The Beta case was particular in that a supplier (of IT services) financed a considerable portion 
of the deal with more than 40% of the capital. This financing agreement was made possible because the case 
firm was at the time negotiating on changing the IT platform to the largest competitor of the supplier. In 
addition, the “supplier loan” demanded that the firm remain locked in an agreement for nearly a decade. A 
similar form of financing agreement was made in the Gamma case, where non–amortizable vendor loans 
covered 40% of the capital. 
For the contrast cases it is known that Sigma did not use any amounts of leverage, as bank financing could 
not be ensured. With Tau it is known that the firm was financed to a very high degree by amortizable bank 
debt, as the bank provided more financing than anticipated. With Upsilon, the financing is unclear. 
Interestingly, creative financing is found in all three of the positive business cases, but none is found in the 
known negative cases. This is remarkable, and clearly different from the financing reported in a large 
longitudinal study of average buyouts, in which Axelson et al. (2013) finds that alternative funding (a group 
that includes vendor financing) constituted merely 2.4% of the debt financing in average LBOs. 
6.2.1.5 Cyclicality of Business and Market Timing 
The Alpha case was primarily a non–cyclical industry, even if the mobile part of the business was cyclical. 
The business cycle was favorable at the time for a buyout and further improved when the mobile part of the 
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business fell prior to negotiations. The Beta firm was in a cyclical business, but in a reasonably opportune 
phase during the transaction. Gamma was in a cyclical business as well, but one which at the time had reached 
the trough in the business cycle. 
Sigma was in a cyclical business, but the extent of cyclicality was underestimated before the buyout. It was 
characterized by a high degree of fixed costs, i.e. CAPEX, but especially in personnel. Tau was not merely in a 
cyclical business but in a “transient business,” and was expected to disappear within a few years. However, the 
business had withstood several business cycles during its history going back half a century and for this reason 
a 15% drop in demand was calculated to not cause long–term problems. For Upsilon the PE firm knew the 
business was cyclical, but at the time of the buyout it was largely export driven by high–growth markets and 
the expected business expansion was a core concern. Clear warning signs can be discerned for all of the 
negative cases: high–fixed costs in a cyclical business, mediocre profitability, and no access to bank debt 
(Sigma); a high valuation multiple, hot auction and banks willing to provide very high amounts of debt and 
covenant light (Tau); and finally the last case firm was highly sensitive to the cyclicality of markets and was 
exposed to high risk markets. 
While the evidence for a consistent and exact market timing ability among practitioners is problematic (cf. 
efficient–market hypothesis), research supports the post–hoc effect of business cyclicality and vintage years 
(e.g. Kaplan & Schoar, 2005; Cornelius et al., 2009). With the positive case firms, there is evidence that all 
occurred at the beginning of an opportune business cycle. By contrast, the buyouts of the negative case firms 
occurred during peak business cycles (or within a year of the peak Sigma). Thus, both the positive and negative 
case firms support previous research, which generally reports a substantial effect on buyout performance due 
to the timing of the entry and exit. 
6.2.2 Post–Buyout Phase 
6.2.2.1 Corporate Governance 
Work on Alpha began immediately with setting up a new board that was restricted in size and consisted 
of well–qualified directors. It included business line presidents from both major electrical and mobile telecom 
companies, besides the junior and senior GP and the CEO. The working relationship was supportive and 
creative, while decision-making was rapid. A new CEO was recruited, which in turn almost completely changed 
the top management team. The thought process was that management profiles with drive and creativity 
would be necessary for an expansion. 
Work on Beta began directly by setting up a new, small board, which consisted of an industry president 
from an airline, besides the junior and senior GP and the CEO. A particularity of Beta was that the PE firm 
always works with shorter holding periods. This approach is arduous and the tempo has to be high to be able 
to implement all the necessary improvements. 
Likewise at Gamma a new, small board was set up immediately that included people with functional 
experience, i.e. the external colleague with long industry experience, a senior GP and the cofounder of the PE 
firm, the CEO, with the addition of a Ph.D. candidate in finance. A new sales–oriented CEO was recruited and 
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joined after a five–month waiting period. Dynamics and a rapid decision–making process characterized the 
working relationship. In this case a junior academic functioned as an idea generator and sounding board for 
the CEO. Another particularity is that the relationship with the unions was amicable, which is noteworthy 
since the PE firm had been cautioned about unions. In the top management team only the CEO and VP of 
market and sales were changed. 
In all of the negative cases small, knowledgeable boards were set up, which included external board 
members with long operational experience, a junior and senior GP, and the CEO. For Sigma this included the 
recruitment of a new, talented CEO. In Tau and Upsilon the CEO came from the seller, and both deals display 
characteristics of an MBO. 
All positive–case firms display the common characteristics of recommended corporate governance in 
private equity research, such as the board of directors (board size, composition, decisiveness, participation) 
and management (reinforced, dynamic) (e.g. Acharya et al., 2011; Guo et al., 2011; Cornelli et al., 2012). 
However, this was true for the negative case firms as well. A minor difference was that two CEOs among the 
positive case firms were replaced, but only one among the negative. A plausible explanation regarding why 
the characteristics of corporate governance were similar among all case firms is that the governance know–
how is widely dispersed among private equity practitioners. 
6.2.2.2 Reporting and Key Performance Indicators 
At Alpha a selection of cash flow–based metrics was used at the board level, which included EBITDA and, 
in this case, the atypical measurement, economic value added (EVA). Particular attention was paid to the 
EBITDA and EBIT, by which the firm is divested. On the operational level, metrics were used for the 
optimization of the team profitability, especially the amount of billable hours per day for field teams. At Alpha 
no customer satisfaction targets or balance scorecards metrics were used, which is in line with all other 
portfolio firms in this study.  
At Beta there were identified a few major indicators to monitor the development, primarily EBITDA and 
the cash flow. Other key figures were productivity as measured by sales per employee and the contribution 
margin per employee. One key measurement was controlling the balance sheet, particularly the working 
capital. In this case there were no inventories, but receivables and payables could still be improved. In this case 
the operational efficiency measure bookings per employee was used. 
At Gamma there were established a different set of operational metrics than those which are traditionally 
used. Instead of metric tons of output per hour, they measured machine efficiency, i.e. the uptime of the 
process machinery, which meant minimizing unplanned stops. Furthermore, there was the earnings per hour 
for different product qualities, which meant examining the contribution margin for each product. A third KPI 
was the transport costs to customers. A fourth KPI was the market mix and establishing clear objectives for 
moving volumes from overseas to the continent. 
The structured work was greatly impaired in all negative case firms by the development, which meant KPIs 
became unimportant as the monitoring went into crisis management. Sigma experienced a dramatic loss 
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when the market contracted by 40% and the firm lost 30% of the sales volume in a few months. In this case 
measuring the contribution margin became the most important factor, along with a relentless focus on 
productivity improvements. The post–buyout work at Tau begun with load factor, but never advanced until 
the financial crisis. For Upsilon there are no details, but the GP assessment was that this was unimportant 
after the market crash. 
In all the case firms, a new, small set of key financial and operational metrics appears to have been 
established, in accordance with previous research (Rogers et al., 2002a; Heel & Kehoe, 2005; e.g. Acharya et 
al., 2008). A plausible explanation as to why a similar approach to KPIs could be observed in all case firms is 
that the process is widely dispersed among private equity practitioners. 
6.2.2.3 Operating Improvements 
There were numerous operating improvements and innovations at Alpha. First there was the dilemma of 
having one technician for electrical networks and another for mobile telecom networks. To remedy this 
problem, the firm established a training facility that provided further education and qualified multi–service 
technicians. The facilitation of retraining proved to be a significant productivity improvement. Another 
improvement were the fully equipped vehicles, which allowed the company to close all regional facilities and 
technicians to go straight from home to work in the field. A third were the tracking devices for locating people 
and mobile workstations. A fourth elementary measure was to call ahead to the end–user customer the day 
before to decide on the time for installing meters, which resulted in Alpha installing twice the amount of its 
biggest competitor. A fifth improvement was making preparations for incoming storms by technicians ahead 
of time, based on the location. A sixth improvement was focusing on optimizing the teams billable hours by 
establishing bonus systems based on team performance. A seventh method was to learn best practices from 
acquired companies, i.e. bidirectional learning. 
At Beta there was a program for improving productivity, which resulted in bookings per terminal rising 
40% above the level of the main competitor. In addition, there was a concerted effort to optimize the working 
capital, which freed up capital to reduce the debt. There was no inventory in this particular case, but instead 
receivables and payables could be improved, in particular payment terms. There were some lay–offs early on 
when the back–office personnel were reduced, which resulted in a workforce reduction of 15%. 
At Gamma the main operational improvements – aside from the sales function – concerned the logistics 
and transports, which were redesigned from end to end and optimized for the manufactured products. This 
change resulted in cost savings of 30% on logistics. Personnel reductions were at 10% during two years, which 
largely were managed by early retirements. 
In Sigma, the cost cutting measures were extreme, as the market contracted over an extended time period. 
The results were that the workforce was reduced by 90% and manufacturing was completely outsourced. 
Inventories went down to one week, i.e. in effect production–to–order. Net asset value was freed up by the 
divestment of all facilities and the letting of a small main office. In Tau, a number of measures were taken to 
adapt to changed market conditions during the years, which eventually resulted in work force reductions of 
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50%, but the changes were primarily strategic. The amount of operational improvements in Upsilon is 
unknown. 
Overall, we do find a remarkable amount of operational improvements in the case study firms and thus 
support for the considerable amount of studies reporting on operational improvements (Cumming et al., 
2007; Bernstein et al., 2010; Chung, 2010). What is rarely reported is the wide variety of techniques, 
heterogeneity of the improvements, and ingenuity displayed at the positive case firms. A plausible explanation 
for the scarcity of detail in earlier research is that the depth and granularity of data is unavailable in the source 
data used in quantitative studies. 
6.2.2.4 Strategic Redirection 
Alpha was an excellent fit for a portfolio firm that both pursues a buy and build strategy and a focus on 
the core. At the inception, it consisted of a large number of diverse companies located in several countries. 
The resulting divestments of the non–core business units freed up capital for the subsequent roll–up 
acquisitions in the predefined geography. It was also fairly profitable from the inception and debt levels were 
never so high as to obstruct using portions of the cash flows to complete acquisitions. Furthermore, top 
management actively pursued an acquisition strategy whereby add–on acquisitions were acquired at a fairly 
low multiple (2–5), with the expectation that Alpha would receive a substantially higher multiple (10). Finally, 
there was the method of paying for add–on acquisitions substantially by using stock swaps. A critical 
component of the business strategy was to transform the former maintenance division from a project 
company to a service company, which consisted of three legs: building, maintaining, and connecting. The final 
piece of the internal strategy was to improve the skill set of technicians to become multi–skilled for serving 
both electrical and telecom networks. 
Beta pursued a distinct buy and build strategy from the onset by acquiring multiple similar companies in 
neighboring countries, but also by acquiring several minor internet travel agencies. Management had a clear 
picture of the companies within the region from before the buyout, which means no time was used to identify 
targets. There was no reason to divest assets as this had been done in the years prior to the buyout. The firm 
was profitable, meaning add–on acquisitions could be made partly with the generated cash flow. Another 
important method was the buying of the firm with a substantial amount of stock swaps (40–60%). Finally, 
the company pursued a market strategy that used multiple brands to reach end–user customers on the 
internet. 
Gamma was essentially a single plant, which meant that there was no opportunity for add–on acquisitions 
or asset divestments. All improvements were due to other changes, e.g. CAPEX investments. 
Sigma was at the onset a plain buy and build case. However, the strategy soon changed from consolidation 
to survival. All in all, Sigma went from being a completely integrated manufacturer with their own chain of 
stores to a private label company based on a brand and design IP.  
Likewise, the strategy of Tau changed completely from consolidation and expansion to survival and 
corrective actions. Within the first few months, the firm lost the largest domestic customer in a tender. The 
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loss resulted in the PE firm contacting the seller of Tau and renegotiating the price down. After this came the 
global financial crisis, which resulted in the transfer business dropping by 50%. This meant renegotiating with 
the bank to write down a portion of the debt, in return for a capital infusion by the PE firm. One and a half 
years later a consulting firm specializing in turnarounds was invoked, which resulted in the divestments of 
businesses in all but the two principal countries. Furthermore, the personnel were reduced, with 30–40% of 
remaining in the two countries. In conjunction with the retrenchment, the CEO was replaced. Finally, the core 
domestic business was sold to the main competitor in the market. After the restructuring, Tau succeeded in a 
venture by swapping all of the remaining transport business in the second country for technical import 
services. Through the deal, Tau achieved for the first time a dominant market position and currently 
undertakes 70% of the import services in the second country. 
For Upsilon, it is known that the strategy changed from expansion to retrenchment and the changes are 
evident with regards to the sales function. 
A surprising heterogeneity for the apposite business strategy can be observed among the positive case 
firms. There is the focus on the core business and complexity reduction at Alpha, factors which have long been 
reported in different studies as improving buyout performance (John & Ofek, 1995; Phan & Hill, 1995). There is 
a common buy and build strategy in both Alpha and Beta, which has been supported in a significant amount 
of previous research (Ernst & Young, 2008; Hoffmann, 2008). Finally, a particular focus on growth and market 
expansion can be observed in Gamma, which supports the previous findings on the performance effect in 
buyouts (Meerkatt et al., 2008; Acharya et al., 2011).  
6.2.2.5 Market Expansion and Sales 
In Alpha the updates in work methods enabled the firm to create new service offerings, which meant 
network errors would be repaired in 2, 4 or 12 hours. In Beta, new sales channels were created by having 
multiple brands on the internet portals aimed at customers. The ISO service certification enabled the firm to 
offer additional services for large corporate customers during force majeure events. Moreover, there was novel 
service offering that allowed major corporate customers to complete bookings internally, which required 
tailoring the booking system to each customer. Finally, there were the bonuses from the airlines for each 
booking, which were crucial to the bottom line. 
At Gamma, the challenge was to build an organizational structure after the buyout. One of the central 
efforts concerned the sales function, which in this case differed from the traditional by relying on having only 
a dozen sales representatives in the main countries. These all worked from home offices, which meant no 
extra cost for facilities. The sales process was streamlined into one–stop–shopping, where all the order 
handling personnel and customer service were handled by personnel at the factory. The reorganization 
naturally placed a high value on language skills at the factory. Much of the sales volumes went through major 
distributors in various countries instead of having a vast sales force in–house. Finally, there was a tremendous 
effort on strengthening the product brand, as opposed to the corporate brand. The work effort resulted in the 
brand becoming one of the most known in the industry and niche. Then there was the novel use of the web 
for promoting the product in videos, which resulted in the firm winning a prestigious award for best marketing 
– 125 – 
campaign.  
In Sigma, both margins and market share improved as the overall market volumes dropped. For Tau, no 
sales or marketing improvement is known. In Upsilon, sales have now been refocused on both new 
geographical markets and industries. 
Overall the research on private equity concerning market expansion and sales is limited and primarily 
concerns the quantification of the function (e.g. percentage of the buyout performance due to increased sales) 
or the indirect effect (e.g. how growth resulted in multiple expansion and thus a higher exit valuation) 
(Meerkatt et al., 2008). Consequently we are rarely given the opportunity to examine the buyout firms from 
the inside and assess the concrete methods and techniques by which the sales function is improved in practice. 
6.2.2.6 Investments in Capital Expenditures 
While CAPEX investments are not observed in Alpha and Beta, the investments are significant in Gamma. 
First is the investment in a biofuel boiler, which had an extremely short payback time of six months as the 
market price for pitch oil soared. Second, there was the investment in a new mill, which allowed the firm a 
much higher flexibility in sourcing the raw materials. The third major investment was in renewing the 
enterprise IT platform from a patchwork of old systems to one homogeneous system. Furthermore, the board 
rapidly approved all of these investments. For the negative case firm no investments are known. 
The substantial CAPEX investment made in Gamma is a phenomenon rarely studied in private equity 
research. In later years Kaplan and Strömberg (2009) do not find empirical support for short–termism or the 
reduction of CAPEX at the expense of long–term performance, but with Gamma there is a substantial 
increase. This suggests that the simple heuristic of refraining from CAPEX investment during the holding 
period is false and that the applicability depends on the context. 
6.2.2.7 Cultural Change 
The culture and entrepreneurial spirit were improved at Alpha and Gamma, which were both spin–offs of 
larger corporations. Specifically this could be observed in Gamma, with several measures, not least during the 
creation of the corporate values. In this process management involved all personnel and lifted the spirit of the 
community. Another indication of this was that sick leaves, both long and short term, went down 
dramatically. This is largely supported in extant research, as multiple researchers have found a reinvigorated 
corporate climate in the post–buyout firm, particularly in the case where the pre–buyout is carved out of a 
non–core division (Kester & Luehrman, 1995; Bruining & Wright, 2002) 
In the negative case firms there is no information on cultural renewal. In the case of Tau, a culturally 
demoralizing factor may have been the lack of any “early wins” to inspire personnel, since none of the 
objectives and acquisitions succeeded. 
6.2.2.8 The Mode of Exit 
The market timing for the exit was opportune in the case of Alpha. Furthermore, the firm had (purportedly) 
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reached an inflection point where the next natural step was to create a larger Northern European firm. At this 
point, the firm was exited by a secondary buyout to a PE firm that owned an equal sized portfolio firm, which 
complemented Alpha. It was also an opportunity identified and advanced by the CEO. Exit planning began 
early by publicizing the progress of the Alpha in the press and to investors. 
The timing of the exit of Beta was a few months after the peak in the business cycle. The exit was through 
an IPO that took over six months to complete and once initiated would have been costly to terminate. The 
expected market price did not materialize, as the price was 35% below target after two months. However, at 
this time another PE firm made a bid that was 40–50% higher than the market price and was at 90% of the 
original estimate. 
For Gamma, market timing was exceptionally opportune during the year of the exit, with earnings being 
ten times higher than during the entry. The business cycle peaked at the time of the exit. Exit planning began 
early by discussing the firm in the press and with prospective buyers. The firm was exited by a trade sale. 
The PE firm held on to Sigma for several years until the exit through a trade sale. Sigma was divested at an 
unsatisfactory price level near the low point of the business cycle. Two years later the buyer made the largest 
profits from the Sigma unit. Parts of Tau had been divested during the turnaround during a moderate business 
cycle, although the remaining portion of the firm is still owned by the PE firm. Upsilon has not been exited to 
date. 
Aside from the evident effect of market timing on the exit valuation and thus the ensuing IRR, no clear exit 
pattern can be discerned in the case firms. All three positive case firms were exited by different modes: Alpha 
to a financial investor (in a secondary buyout), Beta listed in an IPO (but after a few months acquired by a 
financial investor and delisted), and Gamma to a strategic investor (a larger corporation within the same 
industry). Of the negative case firms, both Sigma and Tau were exited to strategic investors (competitors 
within the same industry), while Upsilon remains in the PE firm portfolio. Extant research similarly is 
ambiguous on the preferred route of exit. Generally an IPO is the preferred route to maximize the exit 
valuation if the buyout firm is highly profitable and in a period of high GDP growth (Schmidt et al., 2009), but 
otherwise secondary buyouts have tended to garner the highest valuation (Achleitner et al., 2012). 
6.3 Classifying the Mechanisms in the Case Firms 
6.3.1 Conspicuous High–Level Drivers and Mechanisms 
A number of drivers and mechanisms are commonly reported in empirical research to substantially effect 
buyout performance, e.g. access to low–cost debt, while other factors tend to be commonly known, e.g. the 
import of the CEO. In this chapter, the high–level drivers are presented that appeared to significantly affect 
the value generation in the buyout firms, while simultaneously being conspicuous due to the lack of extant 
research. 
The first step in the attempt to discern the mechanisms was to examine the results of the cross-case 
analysis, which are summarized in Table 7. Several of the value generation mechanisms in the table appear in 
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previous research recur in the case interviews; principally the financing driver (I–A4 leverage, I–A6 creative 
finance, I–A2 debt market cycles), operational driver (I–B2 cost structure improvements), governance driver 
(II–D3 reducing agency costs, II–D1 the GP effect), commercial driver (III–G6 timing the business cycles, III–G8 
divesting the firm). 
The second step was to contrast the principal mechanisms of the case firms with extant research. Of the 
commercial drivers, the import of the business and industry cycles clearly come across in the interview 
material on III–G6 and III–G8. Furthermore, the import of cycles is evident in previous research. What can be 
deduced from the interview material is that GPs did sufficiently pay attention to the cycles, especially in the 
negative case firms. This suggests that an important consideration for the private equity firms would be to 
adjust the amount buyout transactions and by extension potentially adjust the fund inflow to the cycles. Of 
the financing driver, I–A6 and especially securing an alternative mode of debt financing is noteworthy. All 
positive case firms were debt financed principally by vendor and supplier, while none of the negative case firms 
were. Moreover, it is a factor have not been received much attention in previous research. Whether or not the 
vendor and supplier financing is a factor that contributed to the value generation or a consequence of pursuing 
superior buyout cases, the mode of finance provides advantages. There is interest alignment in the deals; since 
both the buyer and seller of the firms has an ongoing interest in seeing the buyout firm succeeds. For instance, 
renegotiating the terms of the amortizations is simpler and more flexible in case of changing business 
circumstances. 
The import of operational driver and I–B2 could be observed in the concentrated efforts on reducing the 
costs, albeit the primary driver in the positive case firms were often on improving the operational efficiency 
and operative processes. An important aspect in the positive case firms that facilitated the wide-reaching 
operational improvements appeared to be the cultural reinvigoration that permeated the post-buyout firms. 
While several researchers have that buyouts are associated with operational improvements, it was the wide 
array of specific examples of improvements that was the main surprise. Finally, even if selecting the right 
strategic direction I–C1/2/3 was crucial in all the positive case firms, selecting similar strategic alternatives in 
the negative case firms without regard of the business- or industry cycle proved disastrous. In retrospect it 
seems obvious that market cycles should be considered attentively before selecting the business strategy. 
# Levers  Drivers, Mechanism And Methods 
1. VCAP  Adjusting the buyout entry and exit transaction to business cycle 
2. DVC  Actively pursuing alternative modes of finance 
3. DVC  The apposite strategy affected by market timing and industry cycle 
4. DVC  Enacting an array of operational improvements 
   Table 8. Conspicuous high–level drivers and mechanisms 
6.3.1.1 Adjusting the Entry and Exit Transaction to the Business Cycle  
Regardless if it was due to a particular timing ability, it is striking that market timing was opportune in all 
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positive case firms both during the entry and the exit transaction. By contrast, in all negative case firms the 
entry transaction market timing was decidedly inopportune, as all transactions took place at the business cycle 
peak. Sigma was, in addition, exited near the trough of the business cycle at a modest price level. 
While the evidence for a consistent and precise market timing ability over time is problematic (cf. efficient–
market hypothesis), there is research that has shown a post–hoc performance effect from business cyclicality 
and vintage years (e.g. Kaplan & Schoar, 2005; Cornelius et al., 2009). Moreover, there are studies that report 
that the timing of the buyout explains a substantial portion of the performance variance (Kaplan & Schoar, 
2005; Chew, 2009). Moreover, the performance variation that can be induced from case analysis is particularly 
striking. Even if the effect may be concealed when observing case firms in isolation, it is conspicuous when 
multiple cases are juxtaposed in a cross–case analysis. 
Despite the fact that select researchers have been drawing attention to the effect of market timing, the 
overall import is frequently obscured by the variety of studied mechanisms that effect performance. The 
findings suggest that PE firms should pay considerably more attention to the business and industry cycle by, 
for instance, by increasing the weight of the cycle as criteria for the entry and exit transaction55. In the research 
there are several proxies that arguably could be used to detect the business and industry cycles, e.g., 
committed capital in the private equity versus public equity, capital inflow to debt markets, GDP growth rates, 
tracing development of industry multiples, monitoring the aggregate performance of the portfolio firms, and 
examining relevant industry indicators and spreads. 
From a methodological perspective, an interesting research finding was the analogous result on the effect 
of market timing to IRR both in the prior quantitative studies and in this qualitative case study. 
6.3.1.2 Actively Pursuing Alternative Modes of Debt Financing 
In the cross–case analysis it was revealed that the positive case firms were all principally debt financed 
with alternative modes of finance. Two of the positive case firms received debt financing through vendor notes 
and the third firm received supplier debt financing. By contrast, two of the negative case firms were financed 
primarily by bank debt, while the third was an equity–only transaction. The revealed pattern in the financing 
of the case firms is conspicuous, even if the precise debt levels remain confidential. 
This can be contrasted with the figures from the quantitative study by Axelson et al. (2013), which reports 
that debt financing in average LBOs consisted of Senior Bank Debt at 72.5%, Subordinated Debt at 12.4% and 
Bonds at 11.6%. The study found that the last group, Alternative Funding, which included vendor financing, 
provided merely 2.5% of the debt financing. 
The difference between the debt financing structure of the average buyout in the study by Axelson et al. 
(2013) and the positive case firms is in fact surprisingly large. There are several possibilities for the apparent 
difference. First, in small–N samples of case studies there is always a possibility that the observed phenomena 
                                                                                       
55 In the case study, no distinction was made between overall business cycle and the particular industry cycle (aside from 
Gamma). It could be argued that private equity firms as agnostic industry investors might be less familiar with a particular 
industry cycle than, e.g. owners of family firms, which would explain the three failed buyouts in this study. 
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are given a post–hoc significance, albeit that the actual cause is random variations and a failure to account for 
probability (see Raynor et al. (2009)). Second, the explanation may be due to the dataset used in the 
quantitative study. The study by Axelson et al. (2013) covers an extensive time period from 1980 to 2008. 
During this period the structure of buyout financing has changed considerably, e.g., the reliance on ‘junk bonds’ 
for financing buyouts in the U.S. in the 1980s. Consequently, the debt distribution in LBOs may have changed 
considerably from the more recent qualitative data. Furthermore, the quantitative dataset is somewhat 
skewed, as the authors note: “our sample is still somewhat biased towards public–to–private deals (which tend 
to be larger) and against independent private companies (which tend to be smaller)” (Axelson et al., 2013, p.10). 
The debt financing structure of large buyouts, such as PtP transactions, likely differ considerably from the 
mid–sized buyouts in the case study. Finally, the geography differs substantially as a majority of the firms in 
the quantitative study are located in U.S., while most of the remaining firms are located in Western Europe.  
Another potential problem with the conspicuous alternative modes of debt financing among the positive 
case firms is the problem of causation versus correlation. The reason that vendor and supplier financing could 
be secured by the PE firm might be a consequence of a priori intrinsic attributes of the positive buyout firms, 
e.g., stable business and positive cash flow. Thus, the outperformance of the positive case firms would not be 
caused by the alternative modes of financing, but financing would be a consequence of inherent attributes. 
Arguably, the most basic explanation is that vendor financing can be secured when the seller is eager to 
divest and supplier financing secured when the supplier strives to ensure a continuation of the business 
relationship. It is plausible that securing the mode of debt financing creates a significant advantage for the PE 
firm that is conducive to the value generation, e.g., by providing the portfolio firm with lenient and flexible 
terms for the loan – as submitted by the interviewees in the positive case firms – but a detailed financial 
analysis would be required to establish this unequivocally.  
6.3.1.3 The Apposite Strategy Affected by Market Timing and Industry Cycle 
In the three positive case firms there can be discerned three distinct strategic alternatives: (i) focusing of 
consolidation, (ii) focusing of the core, and (iii) focusing on growth. What is noteworthy is the spread of 
alternatives and the resulting positive outcome for all firms, indicating that the apposite strategic alternative 
is substantially contextual and depends on the specific business opportunity. In each of the positive cases 
firms, establishing and executing the apposite strategy appears to have had a decisive impact on the value 
generation. The conclusion is not controversial and is in line with conventional wisdom on strategic 
management among academics and practitioners. 
In correspondence with the positive case firms, the initial strategy in all the negative case firms was growth 
oriented, and two of them had mainly a buy and build strategy. Due to the changed market conditions a 
quarter after the buyouts were completed, the capacity of management to act on the strategy was increasingly 
circumscribed. Arguably the chosen strategy in all of the negative case firms was ill–conceived and erroneous, 
mainly due to an insufficient consideration of market timing. Perhaps surprisingly, the explicit effect of the 
industry cycle (and by extension market timing) on the apposite buyout strategy has received little interest by 
academics studying private equity buyouts. 
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The principal research interest has been in establishing the performance effect in buyouts from a buy and 
build strategy (Ernst & Young, 2008; Hoffmann, 2008) or a focus on the core (John & Ofek, 1995; Wiersema 
& Liebeskind, 1995)56. By induction from the case firm analysis, it can be argued that the apposite business 
strategy in buyouts is not only heterogeneous and contextual, but to a substantial degree determined by the 
industry cycle and market timing. 
6.3.1.4 Enacting an Array of Operational Improvements 
In all of the positive case firms, the analysis indicates that operational improvements and cost reductions 
had a considerable effect on firm performance. This is obviously not surprising, considering that operational 
improvements are likely the most widely reported consequence after a buyout (Cumming et al., 2007; Kaplan 
& Strömberg, 2009; Chung, 2010). However, what is salient is that the improvements in all of the positive case 
firms are pervasive and diverse, including redesigning work processes, retraining technicians, restructuring the 
supply chain, accelerating the flow of receivables, and implementing team–based incentive systems. The 
diverse range of operational improvements – and the specific means by which these are achieved – is not 
captured in quantitative analysis, typically because necessary granularity of data is unavailable. 
The personnel reductions in all the positive case firms are moderate at 5–15%, while the overall net 
employment effect for the duration of the holding period is substantially positive for two of the firms (mainly 
due to acquisitions). By contrast, in the negative case firms, personnel reductions are drastic and considerable 
– up to 90% in one case firm. It is also the case that the operational improvements are scarce in the negative 
case firms, aside from the personnel reductions and asset sales. 
6.3.2 Conventional Mechanisms Observed in the Case Firms 
Multiple mechanisms that have appeared to be conducive to buyout value generation are known from 
empirical studies. Overall, the GPs in all private equity firms have appeared to be well–acquainted with the 
mechanisms, as evidenced by the fact that the mechanisms could be observed in both the positive and 
negative case firms. Extant research on all of these mechanisms appears in Chapter 3. 
# Levers Drivers, Mechanism And Methods 
1. DVC; IDV Considerable functional operational experience found in one or several senior GPs or 
expert advisors. These executives were involved in both the pre–buyout negotiation and 
with the board of directors during the holding period. 
2. DVC Collaborative and involved GPs that actively contributed to the commercial assessment 
and development, especially during the early stages of the buyout. 
3. IVC Realigned interests and high–powered incentives for the top management team and 
the board members. Additionally, in all cases the CEOs were required to co–invest. 
                                                                                       
56 Potentially the advantage that private equity firms maintain relative to industrial buyers may not be in recognizing the 
apposite strategy, but in superior execution skills during implementation. 
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Disproportionate levers with an exponential upside were used in all cases. 
4. IVC The top management team was strengthened. In two of the positive case firms, the CEO 
was replaced, whereas the incumbent CEO continued in the MBO. Conversely, the 
incumbent CEO remained in two of the negative case firms and was replaced in the third 
firm. Except for the MBO, the CEOs strengthened the management team in all case firms. 
5. IVC All boards of directors were substantially restructured to incorporate external 
directors with functional experience in the industry. In addition, the board members 
included the CEO, and a senior and junior GP. In all cases the board was limited in size to 
five board members. 
6. IVC All boards were actively engaged in monitoring and mentoring the portfolio firms. A 
constructive relationship and innovative atmosphere characterized the board–
management interaction in all positive case firms. The board decision–making process 
was rapid in all positive case firms. While boards of the negative case firms appear 
similar, the decision–making process and corrective actions appears slower in two of the 
firms. 
7. IVC Stretch budgets and revised key performance indicators were implemented in all firms. 
Ambitious growth targets were present at the inception in both positive and negative 
case firms. The identification of revised financial and operational KPIs was observed in all 
positive case firms, but especially evident in the process industry. In the negative case 
firms, the generation of new KPIs soon became overshadowed by the market 
contraction. 
8. IVC High–tempo and inchoate change could be observed in both the positive and negative 
case firms. The result in completing actions of the 100–day plan, or more frequently, the 
first 12 months, could be observed in all positive case firms. In one of the negative case 
firms, a high–tempo market adjustment could be observed, while in another there was an 
evident lack in achieving the business objectives, e.g. completing the acquisitions. 
9. IVC Rapid holding periods could be observed in all the positive case firms, but in none of the 
negative case firms. The rapid holding period does not constitute quick flips, since the 
average was three years. Two of the negative case firms had not been exited during the 
interviews, while the holding period for the third firm was four years. 
10. VCAP Extensive deal–making experience and expertise was evident among all senior GPs of 
the PE firms and for the CEOs in two of the positive case firms. Likewise, this appears to 
have been the case with the CEOs of two of the negative case firms. 
11. VCAP The active pursuit of multiple expansion or ‘market riding’ by the PE firms was evident in 
all positive case firms. At least initially, this appears to have been an objective in all the 
negative case firms. However, the timing of the market entry in the negative case firms 
was uniformly adverse within 6–12 months of the business cycle peak. 
Table 9. Conventional mechanisms present in a majority of the case firms 
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6.3.3 Contextual Mechanisms Observed in Select Case Firms 
In certain case firms contextually dependent mechanisms can be observed that are less prevalent (or non–
existent) in extant research on buyouts. In some cases the absence is because these involve traditional 
business functions (e.g. sales, marketing), which are not specific to buyouts. 
# Levers Drivers, Mechanism, And Methods 
1. DVC A systematic approach to organic sales expansion. In particular, the positive case firm 
in process industry; the concerted effort to create a new, non–traditional sales function 
was observed. However, new product and service offerings were also created in the two 
other positive case firms. In extant research the increased sales efforts tend to be noted 
merely indirectly as market expansion or operational improvements. 
2. IVC A concerted effort on marketing and branding was observed in two of the positive case 
firms. For instance, in the first firm there was an effort to decisively strengthen the 
product brand, while in the second firm an effort to create multiple brands on internet. 
3. DVC Asset conversion and securitization clearly contributed to the performance in one of the 
positive case firms and abetted the result in one of the negative case firms. Particularly 
sale–and–leasebacks can be practical methods for financing CAPEX investments. 
4. DVC A structured approach to capital management and asset utilization was observed in all 
three positive case firms, respectively receivables and payables; logistics and transports; 
and the termination local offices and coordination of transports. In one of the negative 
case firms, manufacturing and real estate were adjusted to the market contraction. 
5. VCAP An effort to uncover the concealed business potential in buyout targets. Particularly 
one of the positive target firms was a non–traditional buyout target for the private equity 
industry. In essence the notion is that an evident disadvantage of a target firm in certain 
conditions can confer an advantage, e.g., by reducing the competition among private 
equity firms for the buyout target. 
6. IVC A reinvigorated entrepreneurial corporate culture could be observed, particularly in two 
of the positive case firms. This cultural reinvigoration in turn appeared to energize the 
personnel, stimulate ideation, and improve personnel commitment. 
7. IVC Moderating firm valuations to discovered deficiencies during the due diligence. This 
recognized approach during negotiations can be extended to include adjusting tenders to 
performance fluctuations during the entry and exit transaction phase. In two of the 
positive case firms the target firm performance deteriorated substantially, which resulted 
in substantially lowered tenders. A similar, but opposite effect could be observed during 
the exit negotiation and in addition during the exit of a negative case firm. Granted, the 
occurrence of performance fluctuations is largely coincidental. 
Table 10. Business–specific mechanisms in select case firms 
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6.3.4 Peripheral Mechanisms 
Financial experience seems to have been important in securing creative or alternative modes of financing 
and the gearing, but otherwise it was less salient than operational experience. Arguably the PE firms may have 
gained implicitly from such financial expertise by taking advantage of the market mispricing between debt 
and equity markets during the buyouts of the positive case firms. However, by the same token the same PE 
firms did fail to scale back prior to the overheated debt markets in the negative case firms. 
It is unclear whether alleviating capital market constraints was an issue in any of the buyout cases, 
although this was one of the justifications for pursuing one of the positive and two of the negative case firms. 
Finally, the source material does not provide sufficient detail on capital structure optimization to assess if and 
how this was pursued. 
6.3.5 Undetermined Mechanisms 
In the source material, the evidence is limited to the fact that the PE firms benefited from a proprietary 
deal flow, with the possible exception of one positive case firm. Furthermore, it could not be determined if PE 
firm industry focus was conducive to value generation. Likewise, this was the case for the remaining factors 
previously discussed during the empirical review, including the target firm identification and investment 
criteria, restriction of PE fund size, mitigated legislative constraints, corporate tax deductions, and the possible 
effect due to carried interest. 
6.4 Comments on a Prospective Nordic Approach to Buyouts 
Even if the Nordic dimension was peripheral to this study, there are some indications that the private equity 
firms in geographical region differ from their counterparts in the U.S. and U.K. For instance, a recent article 
asserts that many of the theories and much of the empirical research on private equity in the U.S. may not be 
applicable to the Nordic region (Spliid, 2013). Previous empirical research has reported differences in the 
performance of buyouts, the bankruptcy rates, and the fee structures of private equity firms57. 
With regards to performance, Lopez–de–Silanes et al. (2011) report Scandinavian buyouts show a public 
market equivalent (PME) internal rate of return (IRR) performance at 1.66, which is higher than that of the 
U.S., at 1.33. Another study reports similar findings on outperformance, particularly concerning the top quarter 
of pooled net IRR from inception until the end of 2007, which was 43.2% for the Nordic countries while 24.9% 
for the rest of Europe (EVCA, 2008). However, the reported time period is merely two years, which casts doubt 
on the generalizability over an extended time period. Furthermore, the reported figure comprises all forms of 
private equity investments, including venture capital and turnaround investments. Finally, as with most 
studies on Nordic private equity, there is the dominance of Sweden which skews the data, since half of the 
private equity firms in the Nordic countries are situated in Sweden. The impact is even more pronounced 
                                                                                       
57 At least a handful of masters theses concern Nordic PE firms, e.g. Trønnes (2009) looks at the extent of optimal portfolio 
allocation in PE, Jääskeläinen (2011) at performance compared to non–buyout peers, and Mathisen and Ornelas Camas (2012) 
at post–IPO performance. However, none of these theses explicitly examine the Nordic buyout characteristics. 
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concerning the quantity of the raised capital, since Swedish funds captured 70% of the inflow in 2006 and 
79% in 2007 (EVCA, 2008). 
A third study reports that four prominent Nordic private equity groups have delivered an average IRR of 
18% since 1993 and have thus significantly outperformed public markets (Smiddy, 2011). An investment firm 
report based on figures from the Thomson Economics dataset supports the notion of outperformance. The 
report shows that Nordic private equity funds have consistently outperformed U.S. and European firms 
(measured as pooled IRR for 5, 10, 15, and 20 years after the inception of the funds) (BerchWood Partners, 
2013). 
The previously mentioned study by Lopez–de–Silanes et al. (2011) also reports substantially lower 
bankruptcy rates for Scandinavia58 at 5% versus the average of 12% for the U.S. Finally, there may be a 
difference regarding the fee structure between U.S. and European PE firms, particularly the Nordic PE firms. 
Morris and Phalippou (2011) indicate that according to their observations Scandinavian PE firms have contracts 
with negligible or non–existent fees. 
From the data in this case study it can be inferred that none of the positive case firms experienced major 
personnel conflicts. On the contrary, conspicuous characteristics of Gamma were the congenial relationship 
with the unions and the fact that the entire personnel of the firm were invoked in constructing the corporate 
culture. This is surprising when considering that Gamma, according to the previous corporate owner, had a 
history of strident conflicts with the unions. Likewise, in Alpha there were examples of circumventing the 
initial negative response from the unions and in collaborating with the work force to implement substantial 
changes. Only in one of the negative cases, Sigma, where the personnel reductions reached 90%, were union 
conflicts and strikes evident. 
It is conceivable that Nordic private equity firms differ from their Anglo–American counterparts. A 
potential area of research would be the question of whether the Nordic PE firms cooperate to a higher degree 
with the unions and invoke union representatives in the decision–making process. The assumption seems 
plausible based on the observations of the case firms. This would be congruous to the difference reported by 
Bruining et al. (2004) in a study of HR practices in buyout firms in the U.K. and Netherlands. The study found 
that the HR practices in buyout firms in the U.K. were raised after the buyout to be on par with that of the 
Netherlands, whereas in the latter the buyout had no effect on the HR practices. Subsequent research could 
shed light on whether or not buyouts in the Nordic countries differ and, if so, along which measures. 
6.5 The Derivation of Propositions 
The intention with this chapter is to outline the central propositions observed during the analysis phase 
and how that might be operationalized to hypotheses generation. It is decidedly a particular advantage of case 
study research that compelling and interesting research propositions can be generated, which in turn can be 
used for subsequent examination in quantitative studies. For the preceding analysis and argumentation that 
                                                                                       
58 The researchers do not define the countries they include in the category Scandinavia, but based on the used regions it 
seems this is inaccurately equated with the Nordic countries. 
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resulted in the particular propositions, see chapters 6.1–6.3. 
What appeared particularly salient in the data analysis was that the debt financing falls into the category 
of creative financing or alternative modes of finance. In all of the positive case firms the majority of debt 
financing originated at the firm vendor or supplier. Moreover, in the negative contrast case firms this mode of 
finance was non–existent. Previous quantitative studies by Axelson et al. (2013) report that this mode of 
financing constitutes merely 2.5% of the overall debt financing in the typical leveraged buyout. Finally, that 
GPs actively pursued alternative modes of finance was evident in the case interviews, where the professed 
reasons were the increased flexibility in case of changed market conditions. 
From the perspective of the business strategy, a few important observations could be made. There was the 
heterogeneity of the strategic opportunity, since the apposite business strategy proved to be disparate to all 
positive case firms. We can induce from the case study that the correct strategy is largely contextual and 
depends on the intrinsic capability of the firm and the extrinsic competitive environment. Depending on the 
opportunity, the strategy in a buyout is typically to focus on the core business, market consolidation, organic 
growth, or on a hybrid strategy. 
More importantly, but less evident, was that the business strategy was deficient in all negative case firms. 
The principal reason for the deficiency was that the business and industry cycle were insufficiently considered, 
which resulted in strategies that were poorly suited for market contractions. While the import of contextuality 
is an important determinant of the business strategy, the significance of market timing and industry cycle on 
the optimal strategy in buyouts has received little consideration by academics. 
As discussed previously, whether or not the market timing was due to the timing ability of the GPs, the 
result of the market timing was opportune in all the positive case firms during both the entry and the exit 
transaction. By contrast, in all the negative case firms the entry transaction market timing was decidedly 
inauspicious, since all transactions occurred in the immediate period preceding the business cycle peak. 
Assuming that market timing is to some extent achievable, e.g. weak or semi-strong form of the efficient 
market hypothesis, and that PE firms underrate the import of market and industry cycles, then a prospective 
method to improve returns would be to increase the weight of cycles during the buyout entry and exit. 
Proposition P1: Portfolio firms that are predominantly financed by alternative 
modes of debt finance attain higher returns compared to peers 
Proposition P2: The business– and industry cycles determine the apposite 
business strategy of the buyout firm to a substantial degree 
Proposition P3: Increasing the weight of the market and industry cycle as criteria 
for entry and exit could improve returns 
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Contrary to the previous research regarding family–owned businesses being subject to management 
deficiencies, the three negative case firms in this study indicate that the ability of the shareholders of the 
family–owned firms may in some respect exceed that of the GPs of private equity firms. Remarkably, none of 
the positive case firms was family owned, while all of the negative case firms were family owned. The 
discerned pattern among the case firms could be arbitrary or exaggerated, but it is conceivable that family–
owned firms are divergent from other traditional buyout categories. A plausible explanation is that the 
shareholders of family–owned firms have superior skills in assessing the particular industry cycle compared 
to private equity firms, which often are industry agnostic investors. 
A salient aspect of the positive case firms was the pervasive and diverse array of operational improvements, 
e.g. redesigned work processes, retrained employees, restructured supply chains, accelerated flow of 
receivables, and team–based incentive systems. In all the positive case firms, a wide array of operational 
improvements could be observed. Implicit in the interview material was the notion that operational 
improvements necessitate the participation of a motivated and cooperative workforce. 
Albeit peripheral to the research questions of this study, we do know the Nordic countries differ across a 
number of socio–economic measures compared to the majority of OECD countries, e.g. with the Gini 
coefficient of income inequality or the ratio of CEO to median employee salary after income taxes. The study 
by Bruining et al. (2004) finds evidence of a clear distinction in HRM practices in buyouts in both the U.K. and 
the Netherlands. For instance, the Netherlands was characterized by trade union influence, strong labor 
legislation, the legal status of work councils, and overall by substantially more progressive HRM practices. By 
inference of the societal similitude, we can hypothesize that the HRM practices in the buyout portfolio firms 
located in the Nordic countries will exceed the practices of the counterparts in the U.K. and U.S. We can reason 
that the positive attitude of the management might affect propensity for cooperation. Potentially the degree 
of commitment and cooperation of the entire workforce in Nordic buyouts results in improved returns of the 
buyouts.  
        
Proposition P5: The pervasive operational improvements where dependent on 
the cooperation of the entire personnel 
Proposition P6: The high degree of cooperation between management and 
personnel in Nordic buyouts is conducive to improved buyout performance 
Proposition P4: The shareholders of family–owned firms have superior expertise in 
identifying the industry cycle compared to GPs of private equity firms 
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Chapter 7. Discussion and Conclusions 
This chapter is organized into four sections. First, there is a discussion on the research questions set out 
in chapter 3, accompanied by a discussion surrounding the results of the empirical case study and the 
ensuing research propositions. The chapter proceeds by outlining the contribution to research and 
practice, the limitations of the findings, and finally directions for future research and concluding 
remarks. 
7.1 Discussion on the Results 
7.1.1 Does value generation differ in outperforming buyouts? 
The first research question posed was “Do value generation mechanisms differ in the small–N sample of 
outperforming buyout firms from the mechanisms currently recognized in extant research?” The observed 
mechanisms do differ across three dimensions. First, a select amount of the value generation mechanisms 
that emerged from the analysis has received scant or moderate attention in extant research, e.g. the import 
of employing alternative modes of debt financing and the effect of business and industry cycles on the buyout 
performance. 
Second, while the evidence has been substantial that buyouts result in operational improvements, more 
detailed accounts of the particular changes that occurred have been limited. A potential explanation is that 
establishing and quantifying the result of the wide–ranging categories of operational improvement is essential 
to assess the relative effect on value generation. However, it is also the case that the necessary granularity of 
source data often is lacking in the data bases used for quantitative research. The multiple–case study permits 
a deeper examination of the specific changes that occurred and a broader coverage throughout the investment 
life cycle. The case material revealed that the operational improvements at the positive case firms were 
pervasive and manifold. There was no ‘silver bullet’, but instead an array of improvements that included 
substantial efficiency improvements to internal operating processes and the workflow such as entirely 
redesigned supply chains, retrained personnel for improved flexibility and efficiency, more attention paid to 
capital management, and redesigned team incentives. 
Third, the relative import of the discerned mechanism in the outperforming case firms did differ 
substantially from the typical segmentation in quantitative research with regards to leverage, margin 
improvements, and industry growth. The inductive case analysis suggests substantial performance 
improvements could plausibly be achieved by placing more consideration on the timing of the entry 
transaction and exit to the relevant phase of the market cycle. While distinguishing the exact market cycle is 
impossible, determining the overall phase of the business and industry cycles is generally a viable option. Since 
the effect of the market timing was substantial, this might guide not only individual buyout investment 
decisions, but also portfolio investment volumes, depending on the phase of the business cycles. 
Contrary to the extant research on the optimal business strategy in private equity buyouts, the case study 
revealed that no single business strategy is optimal and that the apposite strategy is largely contextual and 
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dependent on the business opportunities and the competitive environment. However, it did indicate that the 
typical buy and build strategy used in private equity buyouts is largely determined by the business and industry 
cycle. During incipient recessions and market contractions the buy and build strategy appeared to be a 
particularly ill–advised alternative. 
7.1.2 How should value generation be augmented conceptually? 
The second research question the study attempted to answer was “Provided discrepancies exist, how 
should the framework for value generation be augmented to provide a more accurate theoretical–conceptual 
view?” Responding to the question required a two–fold approach. First, the conceptual model of value 
generation in buyouts had to be established by creating a novel and considerably more complete model than 
found in extant research. The main attempt at collecting and classifying value generation in buyouts is a 
seminal working paper from HEC based on doctoral dissertations by Berg & Gottschalg, 2003. However, the 
model that appears in that conceptual paper, while novel at the time, suffered from inconsistencies and was 
to a large extent incomplete. This necessitated a rigorous review of the mechanisms by which value generation 
is achieved, followed by an overarching analysis of the elements and the construction of a novel cohesive 
taxonomy. 
Second, the case study source material had to be processed and analyzed in order to determine the sources 
of the value generation and value destruction in the case firms. These findings in turn had to be contrasted 
and juxtaposed with the empirically derived taxonomy. The analysis revealed a number of potential areas in 
which our view of value generation could be augmented. First, the relative importance of timing the buyout 
entry and exit to the business and industry cycles should receive substantially more attention. Some previous 
research has reported that the effect of business cycles and vintage years is essential to buyout performance, 
e.g. Kaplan & Schoar (2005) and Cornelius et al. (2009). There are a number of aspects of the business cycles 
to consider, such as the overall business cycle or macro–economic factors, the specific industry cycle of the 
focal industry, and the cyclicality of the private equity industry, e.g. committed capital to private equity as a 
fraction of public equity in stocks. While in practice the import of business cycles are incorporated to the 
investment decision during the due diligence, the weight of the cycles in the entry and exit decision might be 
underrated in the overall private equity firm. 
Conventional wisdom suggests that private equity should refrain from buyouts of target industries 
sensitive to business cycles. This includes cyclical industries such as chemicals, energy, and telecom, which 
display substantial variations in the gross IRR across fund vintage years (Cornelius et al., 2009). Timing the 
entry and exit of cyclical industries can be a decisive difference between generating top quartile returns or 
value destruction. The case study analysis suggests, to the contrary, that target firms in cyclical industries can 
constitute eminent buyouts if the industry cycle is carefully examined. On a broader note, investors may 
actively pursue non–obvious buyout targets where the initial perceived deficiency is alleviated or mitigated. 
Surprisingly, the buyouts of family–owned firms were associated with a substantially lower value 
generation, as all of the negative case firms were family owned, while none of the positive case firms were. 
Potential explanations for the dismal performance of family–owned buyouts may be that the sellers possess 
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superior information on the specific industry cycle or on the future prospects of the industry compared to 
industry agnostic private equity investors, i.e. an advantage based on an information asymmetry. 
With regards to the debt financing of the buyouts, a surprising finding was that all the positive case firms 
were financed primarily by alternative modes of finance (e.g., vendor notes and supplier loans), while all the 
negative case firms where financed by bank debt or equity only. This is remarkable considering a recent 
comprehensive study by Axelson et al. (2013) covering a large sample of 1,157 private equity deals worldwide 
between 1980 and 2008, which reported that alternative debt funding comprised merely 2.4%. While creative 
finance and the alternative modes of debt financing are by no means a new phenomenon to private equity 
research that this mode of finance has not been explicitly identified as being closely associated with value 
generation is striking. 
Regarding corporate culture, the cooperative corporate climate that characterized the positive case firms 
and encompassed the whole workforce and the unions was a surprise. While the reinvigoration of the 
corporate culture and entrepreneurship has been reported in numerous studies, the research is scant when it 
comes to the effect of motivating and invoking the entire workforce and collaborating with the unions during 
the buyout. The research that is most closely related is a study by Bruining et al. (2004), which finds evidence 
that buyouts in the U.K. improved the HRM practices across several measures. What is furthermore interesting 
is the effect that invoking the entire personnel has on the wide–ranging operational improvements and 
consequently on the performance. 
The final research question the study attempted to answer was “Can novel value generation mechanism 
be induced from the case material to generate propositions suitable for subsequent quantitative 
examination?” Based on the analysis, a number of propositions were generated that are of particularly interest 
from a research perspective. 
7.2 Contributions To Research 
A principal research gap filled by the case study was to examine an academically important set of firms 
that hitherto have not been researched, i.e. substantially outperforming buyouts. Previously a number of 
studies have divided portfolio firms or funds into quartiles based on performance and juxtaposed the top 
quartile with the bottom quartile (Harper & Schneider, 2004; Loos, 2006; Rouvinez, 2006; Aigner et al., 2008; 
Lopez–de–Silanes et al., 2008; Bernstein et al., 2010; Chung, 2010; Gottschalg, 2010; Higson & Stucke, 2012), 
or vice versa for the tercile (Heel & Kehoe, 2005; Acharya et al., 2011). However, the focal set in this case study 
can be construed as displayed performance that was a magnitude above the top quartiles. A plausible reason 
for the research gap has been that the study required a change in the prevailing quantitative research 
methodology, which is ill–suited for studying a limited, non–representative population of data, e.g. statistical 
outliers and corner test cases. 
Consequently, this research project approached the phenomena by relying on a qualitative research 
methodology, which is appropriate for the research topic. While a few salient qualitative studies on buyouts 
do exist (e.g. Baker (1992), Baker and Wruck (1989), ‘Kester and Luehrman (1995), O'Brien (2007)), none of 
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these studies focus primarily on value generation in particular outperforming buyouts. The multiple case study 
provided an in–depth perspective of value generation throughout the buyout life cycle. This in turn revealed a 
number of drivers and mechanisms that have received insufficient attention by academics, such as the 
considerable import of timing the buyout entry and exit to the business and industry cycles and the potential 
effect of pursuing alternative modes of debt financing. The overall finding is not that the drivers and 
mechanisms are completely novel, but that the relative weight and import of the factors change substantially. 
Another original and innovative contribution comes from materially extending previous attempts to 
organize the drivers and mechanisms of buyout value generation into a cohesive and logical structure. There 
have been a few attempts to synthesize the previous research of value generation into models (e.g. Berg & 
Gottschalg (2003), Loos (2006), Wilms (2007)). Particularly the joint paper by Berg and Gottschalg (2003), 
which was based on their respective doctoral dissertations, extended our understanding of value generation. 
However, the model was problematic with regards to internal consistency, the restricted amount of extant 
research that was incorporated into the model, and finally that the paper is beginning to become outmoded. 
A central ambition with constructing a new model was to address the earlier shortcomings of internal 
consistency, to substantially expand any earlier models by incorporating considerably more previous research, 
and to create the necessary nomenclature. The end result is a holistic, conceptual model of value generation 
in buyouts in a four–layered hierarchy composed of Levers, Drivers, Mechanisms, and Methods, arranged in 
order of abstraction from the generic to the specific. All in all, in the model distinguishes and classifies 
between three levers, eight drivers, and 35 mechanisms, which are all depicted in detail in Table 1 The complete 
empirically derived taxonomy for buyout value generation. 
The top–level levers comprise the direct and indirect levers of value creation and value capture. The primary 
distinction between the value creation levers is that the direct levers have a directly measurable effect on the 
profitability of the portfolio firm, while indirect levers tend to affect multiple mechanisms that concurrently 
improve profitability. Value capture refers to the appreciation of firm value due to exogenous factors such as 
industry growth, or the wealth transfer occurring during the entry and exit transaction. Consequently, it refers 
to the excess value in the post–exit phase that was not created by changes within the portfolio firm. 
7.3 Contributions To Practice 
7.3.1 Implications for Private Equity Practitioners 
The study makes a number of contributions that are highly relevant to private equity practitioners. Instead 
of focusing on a minor selection of variables, which explain a negligible portion of the overall value generation, 
the post hoc ‘explorative analysis’ allows for evaluating the complete landscape of mechanisms. The findings 
suggest that practitioners need to rethink the approach to a number of high–level value generation drivers, 
particularly with regards to selecting the right business strategy, assessing the market timing of entry and exit, 
identifying the concealed business potential, and pursuing the correct mode of debt financing. Moreover, the 
study makes a number of prescriptive contributions to pursuing low–level mechanisms, both implicit within 
the presented business case stories and additionally by collecting and reviewing previous research on various 
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mechanisms.  
Finally, in Appendix A is a functional table that organizes previous research on buyouts according to value 
generation drivers and mechanisms. 
7.3.2 Implications for the Management of Portfolio Firms 
The contribution to the management of portfolio firms lies particularly in the operative changes and 
improvements that need to be pursued by highly motivated and dynamic top management teams. What is 
less frequently discussed in the research on private equity is the import of collaborating with the whole 
personnel of the buyout firm in order to be able to harness their know–how in improving the organization. 
This obviously includes building the correct financial incentives throughout the organization, but the 
ramifications are wider as it requires management to understand the importance of finding and constructing 
the corporate culture of the firm. In addition, management can benefit from knowing the mechanisms 
conducive to value generation, including the implicit mechanisms presented in business case stories and in 
the empirically derived taxonomy that collects and reviews previous research. 
7.3.3 Implications for People Involved in Corporate M&A 
Albeit peripheral to the research objective, the notion of transferring the systematic and cross–disciplinary 
approach taken by private equity firms to corporate M&A is particularly compelling. Despite the long tradition 
of M&A, the outcome is still too frequently value destruction. What this study suggests is that knowledge of 
the structural approach to acquiring the portfolio firm and value creation during the holding period would be 
highly applicable to corporate M&A. The practical utility to corporate management in locations and markets 
with no previous research or expertise may be even more pressing. 
The sections of prime interest for people involved in corporate M&A would be Chapter 3 (“An empirically 
derived taxonomy of value generation”) and the case stories presented in Chapter 5 (“Empirical data”). 
7.4 Limitations of the Study 
The general limitations to the research methodology were earlier discussed in Chapter 4.4. In this section 
will be presented the limitations to this particular study. 
Limited amount of case firms. From a research standpoint there is an inherent problem with small, non–
random samples, which affects the generalizability of findings. Having access to a larger sample of firms with 
similar characteristics and either extending the case study or combining quantitative research methodology 
(i.e. mixed–methods) could increase the trustworthiness of findings. However, it needs to be acknowledged 
that this limitation is inherent to all qualitative research and corresponds to the lack of data of depth inherent 
to quantitative research. 
Limited scope and resources. Obviously the financial resources and the opportunity to extend the research 
project were limited in the project, as it was completely financed through grants provided by private 
foundations. In a larger scale research project, the examination of the case firms could have included multiple 
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hierarchical layers, which again would have bolstered the trustworthiness and potentially augmented the 
findings. Access to additional resources in research personnel and finance would have alleviated the limitation. 
Employing perceptual measures. A case study by necessity relies on perceptual and subjective measures by 
eliciting source data in an interview, which is a salient difference compared to quantitative research. However, 
relying on a quantitative methodology to meticulously examine the scope of mechanisms explored in this 
study would be unfeasible. Moreover, the quantitative approach is inappropriate for extracting any tacit ‘expert 
knowledge’ and inferior for capturing the ‘soft factors’ of corporate culture leading to improvements. 
Lack of detailed financial data. The issue concerns the lack of detailed financial data of the firms over time 
which, e.g. potentially could have been used to increase the trustworthiness of findings. The limitation 
particularly concerned one of the private equity firms and could to some extent be mitigated by the use of 
secondary data sources, such as published articles in magazines and newspapers. 
Limited geographical focus. At the onset of this study, the geographical scope was defined as being the 
Nordic countries. While the study shed a light on the idiosyncrasies of value creation in the particular Nordic 
portfolio firms, it simultaneously implies that the findings may be geographically limited. This again ties into 
the discussed limitation posed by having limited scope and resources. 
Trustworthiness. Since this is an inherent problem of the case study, multiple measures were taken to 
increase the trustworthiness. First, at least dual sources of information were stipulated during the data 
collection. Second, at least an independent source of information was compulsory. For the positive case firms 
this meant at least two independent interviewees and published information, albeit for the supplementary 
contrast cases it was a senior partner and published information. Third, direct involvement in the case was 
mandatory for all interviewees, which obviously meant being intimately familiar with the case. Fourth, 
contrasting cases of value destruction were added to the sample, all of which came from the same countries 
and the same PE firms, which in turn added comparability. 
While prolonged engagement with the interviewees from the case firms was unfeasible (the exits had been 
completed years earlier), this was at least partially alleviated by the repeated contacts over an extended time 
frame, e.g. feedback process. The primary form of member check was the validation question ending each 
interview, which gave each interviewee the possibility of adding information uncovered in the interview. 
Furthermore, peer debriefing was performed by discussing the research with academics active in private equity 
during the project, but particularly in the final stages of the dissertation the feedback process has been 
exhaustive. 
Finally, interviewee corroboration is a method used in the final stages of a research project, as the purpose 
is to assess the findings by the interviewees and will be initiated when sharing the dissertation with the specific 
private equity firms. And finally, it must be acknowledged that some scholars maintain the view in which the 
purpose of a qualitative case study is to generate interesting propositions, not to establish generalizability of 
findings. When this criterion is used, the reliability of findings is altogether established in ensuing quantitative 
studies.  
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7.5 Directions for Future Research 
A reasonable assumption is that further studies of outperforming buyout firms would reveal additional 
novel mechanisms, while corroborating (or refuting) the validity and reliability of the mechanisms in this 
study. This research project set out as an unassuming explorative case study of a substantively important 
sample of cases that had not been examined before. In retrospect this approach proved fertile and worthwhile, 
particularly in the generation of interesting propositions that should be subject to more research. By 
replicating the qualitative study using a larger sample, we would gain a more robust understanding of 
outperformance. Simultaneously, this would allow widening the scope to encompass the entirety of the 
empirically derived taxonomy, including more tangentially addressed mechanisms. 
Another important step would be to augment this study by a quantitative approach in order to assess the 
propositions and establish the validity and reliability. As of now, the revealed mechanisms may be construed 
as having had varying impact on the value generation in the case firms under study. While the findings and 
propositions are important from a research perspective, in order to generalize the findings more studies would 
be necessary over a larger population of firms. 
Research on performance improvements in private equity buyouts could benefit from incorporating an 
additional set of organizational functions into the study, e.g. the reorganization of the sales function, the 
reinvigoration of marketing and branding in mature industries, and the efficiency improvements to supply 
chains. A fair amount of research on buyouts has examined the effect of improving various organizational 
functions, such as finance and governance, but research on the effect on sales and marketing is effectively 
non–existent. 
An interesting direction concerns the geographic scope of the Nordic countries. A wider or different 
geographical scope could reveal whether the application of value generation mechanisms differ between 
geographical areas. While a fair number of studies have been conducted on individual Nordic countries 
(particularly in Sweden and Denmark, but also in Norway), little research has explored the variation between 
buyouts in the U.S., the U.K., Continental Europe, and the Nordic countries. 
Finally, an important research topic would be to establish the relative import and preconditions of the 
distinct levers, drivers, mechanisms, and methods in the value generation of buyouts. With the empirically 
derived taxonomy, there is a cohesive model of real–life buyout value generation that is less afflicted by 
overlaps and of considerably higher granularity than previous conceptual models. Nevertheless, the model 
does not explicitly attempt to establish the relative import of the factors or the heterogeneous preconditions 
for the factors to materialize in value generation. 
7.6 Concluding Remarks 
The study is unique in the examination of a particularly important sample of private equity buyouts: firms 
that substantially outperformed the peers of portfolio firms. The research objective was to elucidate the 
characteristics and preconditions for exceptional value generation in acquired firms. In particular, the objective 
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was to discern the potentially critical mechanisms by which outperformance ensues and the prospective 
discrepancy to the average performing buyouts.  
The research approach is the inductive multiple case study to comprehensively examine earlier research on 
the value generation in buyout portfolio firms. This ambitious research project allowed the examination of a 
substantially wider spectrum of value generation mechanisms than by relying on the traditional quantitative 
approach in private equity research. As a consequence, the result has been the construction of a structured 
and cohesive model, which serves to explicate the sources of value in private equity owned companies. 
Specifically, the empirically derived taxonomy allows us to conceptually identify where and how economic value 
is created and generated in buyouts. 
The study has a number of direct implications for scholars and practitioners with regards to the activities 
that result in performance improvements in private equity portfolio firms and corporate acquisitions. The 
dissertation contributes foremost to the literature on value generation and performance improvement in 
private equity buyouts and second to the wider body of literature that concerns corporate mergers and 
acquisitions. 
What is abundantly clear from the research project is that private equity firms need to expand their 
competency repertoire and pursue the full arsenal of value generation tools in order to succeed over the long 
term. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A. Studies on Buyout Value Generation 
Figure 7. Previous research on various sources of buyout value generation 
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Jensen (1989a); Ryan (2006, 
p.140); Axelson et al. (2007, 
2008); Chapman and Klein 
(2009); Axelson et al. (2013) 
 
Asset Conversion 
Rogers et al. (2002b); Mishkin 
and Eakins (2011) 
Alleviating Capital Market 
Constraints 
High–Leverage: Inflating Gains 
and Inducing Efforts 
Market Substitute In Weak 
Capital Markets 
Boucly et al. (2008); Chung 
(2010) 
High–Leverage Inflating the 
Returns 
Lowenstein (1985); Bull (1989); 
Meerkatt et al. (2008); Valkama 
et al. (2010) 
Inducing Efforts 
Grossman and Hart (1983); 
Jensen (1986a, 1986b, 1989b); 
Rappaport (1990) 
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2. Operational Drivers 
General Functional Experience and 
Operational Expertise 
Cost Structure Improvements 
1(2) 
Cost Structure Improvements 
2(2) 
Capital Management and Asset 
Utilization 
Operating Improvements in 
Buyouts 
Baker and Wruck (1989); Bull 
(1989); Jensen (1989a); Lehn 
and Poulsen (1989); Kaplan 
(1989b); Lichtenberg and Siegel 
(1990); Muscarella and 
Vetsuypens (1990); Singh (1990); 
Smith (1990a); Jones (1992); 
Opler (1992); Long and 
Ravenscraft (1993a); Opler and 
Titman (1993); Ofek (1994); 
Smart and Waldfogel (1994); 
Phan and Hill (1995); Thompson 
and Wright (1995); Holthausen 
and Larcker (1996); Weir and 
Laing (1998); Desbrieres and 
Schatt (2002); Amess (2003); 
Harris et al. (2003); Bergström et 
al. (2007); Cressy et al. (2007); 
Cumming et al. (2007); 
Nikoskelainen and Wright (2007); 
Pindur (2007); Boucly et al. 
(2008); Bernstein et al. (2010); 
Chung (2010) 
Modest / Negative Increase in 
Operating Performance 
Vinten (2007); Guo et al. (2011) 
 
Cross–Utilization of Managerial 
Talent 
Hite and Vetsuypens (1989) 
GPs with Operational 
Experience 
Schmidt et al. (2004); Acharya et 
al. (2011) 
Reduced Corporate Spending 
Grossman and Hart (1983); 
Jensen (1986b); Bull (1989); 
Kitching (1989); Magowan 
(1989); Kaplan (1989b); 
Muscarella and Vetsuypens 
(1990); Smith (1990a); Anders 
(1992); Baker (1992); Opler 
(1992); Seth and Easterwood 
(1993); Phan and Hill (1995); 
Holthausen and Larcker (1996); 
Wright et al. (2001a) 
Reduced Costs in 
Manufacturing 
Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990); 
Muscarella and Vetsuypens 
(1990); Wright, Hoskisson, 
Busenitz, and Dial (2000); Harris 
et al. (2003) 
Reduced Levels of 
Employment 
Kaplan (1989b); Muscarella and 
Vetsuypens (1990); Smith 
(1990a) 
Modest Employment 
Reductions 
Wright et al. (2007); Davis et al. 
(2008) 
Increased Levels of 
Employment Long–Term 
Amess et al. (2008); Shapiro and 
Pham (2008) 
Reduced White–Collar 
Employment and Wages 
Easterwood et al. (1989); 
Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990); 
Butler (2001) 
Reductions in R&D 
Hall (1990); Lichtenberg and 
Siegel (1990); Smith (1990b); 
Opler (1992); Long and 
Ravenscraft (1993c, 1993a); 
Hoskisson, Johnson, and Moesel 
(1994) 
Preserved R&D Investments 
Wright and Coyne (1985); Bull 
(1989); Kravis (1989); Malone 
(1989); Lichtenberg and Siegel 
(1990); Zahra and Fescina 
(1991); Thompson et al. (1992); 
Wright et al. (1992) 
Increased Product 
Development 
Wright and Coyne (1985); Bull 
(1989); Malone (1989); Zahra 
and Fescina (1991); Thompson 
et al. (1992) 
Rationalization of Fixed And 
Current Assets 
Lowenstein (1985); Baker and 
Wruck (1989); Bull (1989); 
Easterwood et al. (1989); 
Magowan (1989); Muscarella and 
Vetsuypens (1990); Singh 
(1990); (1990a); Wright et al. 
(1992); Long and Ravenscraft 
(1993a); Kester and Luehrman 
(1995); Holthausen and Larcker 
(1996); Baker and Smith (1998); 
Butler (2001); Damodaran 
(2001); Niemeyer and Simpson 
(2008) 
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3.	Strategic	Drivers	
General Focusing on the Core: 
Complexity Reduction 
Focusing on Consolidation: 
Buy and Build Strategies 
Focusing on Growth: Market 
Expansion 
 
Importance of Strategic 
Redirection 
Muscarella and Vetsuypens 
(1990); Singh (1990); Seth and 
Easterwood (1993); Phan and 
Hill (1995); Rogers et al. (2002b); 
Heel and Kehoe (2005); Zong 
(2005) 
Core Business Focus 
Rumelt (1974); Montgomery et al. 
(1984); Palepu (1985); Lubatkin 
and Rogers (1989); Lubatkin and 
Chatterjee (1991); Kaplan and 
Weisbach (1992); Liebeskind et 
al. (1992); Seth and Easterwood 
(1993); John and Ofek (1995); 
Phan and Hill (1995); Wiersema 
and Liebeskind (1995); Gadad 
and Thomas (2004) 
Asset Sales and Divestment 
Kaplan (1988); Baker and Wruck 
(1989); Jensen (1989b); 
Magowan (1989); Hoskisson and 
Turk (1990); Muscarella and 
Vetsuypens (1990); Singh 
(1990); Smith (1990b); Anders 
(1992); Baker (1992); Seth and 
Easterwood (1993); Singh 
(1993); Denis (1994); Chevalier 
(1995); Wiersema and 
Liebeskind (1995); Baker and 
Smith (1998); Aslan and Kumar 
(2009) 
Buy and Build Strategy 
Baker et al. (1994); Allen (1999); 
O'Donnell (2001); Wright et al. 
(2001a); Brau et al. (2003); Brau 
and Fawcett (2006); Ernst & 
Young (2008); Hoffmann (2008) 
Growth Strategy and Multiple 
Expansion 
Singh (1990); Lockett et al. 
(2002); Meuleman et al. (2009); 
Acharya et al. (2011) 
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4. Governance Drivers 1(2) 
The GP Effect: Experience and 
Expertise 
PE Firm Industry Focus and 
Fund Size 
Reduced Agency Costs and 
Interest Realignment 1(2) 
Restructured Board of 
Directors 1(2) 
Restructured Board of 
Directors 2(2) 
PE Firm Knowledge Transfer 
Hite and Vetsuypens (1989); 
Baker and Smith (1998) 
Extensive Contact Networks 
Anders (1992); Kaufman and 
Englander (1993); Baker and 
Smith (1998); Bruining and 
Wright (2002) 
PE Firm Buyout Experience 
Schmidt et al. (2004); Kaplan and 
Schoar (2005); Diller and Kaserer 
(2007); Hahn (2009); Acharya et 
al. (2011) 
 
Industry Focus and Experience 
Specialization 
Muscarella et al. (1990); 
Gompers et al. (2006); Loos 
(2006); Metrick and Yasuda 
(2010); Zarutskie (2010) 
Limiting Amount of Funds and 
Portfolio Firms 
Lopez–de–Silanes et al. (2008); 
Cumming and Walz (2010) 
Internal Characteristics of PE 
Firms 
Lopez–de–Silanes et al. (2008) 
Syndication of Buyouts 
Brander et al. (2002); Gompers 
and Lerner (2006); Cumming and 
Walz (2010) 
Incentive Realignment 
Kreuter et al. (2005); Renneboog 
et al. (2005) 
The Carrot and Stick –
Mechanism 
Lowenstein (1985); DeAngelo 
and DeAngelo (1987); Bull 
(1989); Jensen (1989b); 
Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990); 
Frankfurter and Gunay (1992); 
Gregory (2000); Cotter and Peck 
(2001); Jensen et al. (2006); 
Barber and Goold (2007); Leslie 
and Oyer (2009) 
Substantial Positive Incentives 
Morck et al. (1988); Easterwood 
et al. (1989); McConnell and 
Servaes (1990); Palepu (1990); 
Phan and Hill (1995); Weir and 
Laing (1998); Heel and Kehoe 
(2005); Leslie and Oyer (2009) 
Limitation of Negative 
Incentives 
Demsetz (1983); Fama and 
Jensen (1985); Morck et al. 
(1988); Lei and Hitt (1995); 
Holthausen and Larcker (1996) 
Supervisory Function 
Jensen (1993); Gabrielsson and 
Huse (2002); Gompers and 
Lerner (2006); Bottazzi et al. 
(2008) 
Strategic Guidance 
Rosenstein et al. (1993); 
Sapienza et al. (1996); Kaplan 
and Strömberg (2004) 
Limitation of Board Size 
Jensen (1993); Yermack (1996); 
Eisenberg et al. (1998); Dalton et 
al. (1999); Jensen et al. (2006); 
Acharya et al. (2008); Guest 
(2009); Cornelli et al. (2012) 
Board Composition 
Rogers et al. (2002b); Millson 
and Ward (2005); Jensen et al. 
(2006); Cornelli and Karakas 
(2008) 
 
Active and Participating 
Boards 
Lowenstein (1985); Jensen 
(1989a, 1989b); Smith (1990a); 
Gertner and Kaplan (1996); 
Vafeas (1999); Jensen et al. 
(2006); Acharya et al. (2008); 
Cornelli and Karakas (2008); 
Acharya et al. (2011); Guo et al. 
(2011) 
Critical Board Tasks 
Fama (1980); Demsetz (1983); 
Jensen (1988); Baker and Wruck 
(1989); Jensen (1989a); 
Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990); 
Baker and Montgomery (1994); 
Acharya et al. (2008) Reduced Agency Costs and 
Interest Realignment 2(2) 
Negative Incentives 
Jensen and Meckling (1976); 
DeAngelo et al. (1984); Jensen 
(1986b); Baker and Wruck 
(1989); Easterwood et al. (1989); 
Kitching (1989); Muscarella and 
Vetsuypens (1990); Smith 
(1990a, 1990b); Anders (1992); 
Fox and Marcus (1992); 
Thompson et al. (1992); Weir and 
Laing (1998); Beaver (2001); 
Butler (2001); Jensen et al. 
(2006); Leslie and Oyer (2009) 
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Govern. Drivers 2(2) 5. Cultural Drivers 
Reinforced Management Team The Parenting Advantage: 
Monitoring and Mentoring 
Corporate Culture: Revived 
Entrepreneurial Spirit 1(2) 
Corporate Culture: Revived 
Entrepreneurial Spirit 2(2) 
Performance Management: 
Stretch Budgets and Goals 
Pre–buyout Managerial 
Underperformance 
Jensen and Ruback (1983); 
Gilson (1989); Bertrand and 
Schoar (2003) 
Post–buyout Replacement of 
Management  
Palepu (1990); Anders (1992); 
Khurana and Nohria (2000); 
Cotter and Peck (2001); Rogers 
et al. (2002b); Heel and Kehoe 
(2005); Helfat and Bailey (2005); 
Zong (2005); Jensen et al. 
(2006); Kaplan et al. (2008); 
Bloom et al. (2009); Acharya et 
al. (2011); Cornelli et al. (2012) 
 
Parenting Advantage 
Campbell et al. (1995); Goold 
and Campbell (1998); Goold et 
al. (1998) 
Active Ownership and 
Constructive Interaction 
Bull (1989); Hite and Vetsuypens 
(1989); Anders (1992); Kester 
and Luehrman (1995); Heel and 
Kehoe (2005) 
Monitoring, Control and 
Accelerated Decision–Making 
Lowenstein (1985); Sahlman 
(1990); Singh (1990); Thompson 
and Wright (1991); Admati et al. 
(1994); Maug (1998); Kaplan and 
Strömberg (2003); Bottazzi et al. 
(2008) 
Free–Rider Problem 
Grossman and Hart (1980) 
 
Revived Corporate Culture 
Lowenstein (1985); Bull (1989); 
Jensen (1989a); Hoskisson and 
Turk (1990); Houlden (1990); 
Singh (1990); Anders (1992); 
Taylor (1992); Kester and 
Luehrman (1995); Weir (1996); 
Wright et al. (1996); Butler 
(2001); Wright et al. (2001a); 
Wright, Hoskisson, Busenitz, and 
Dial (2001b); Bruining and Wright 
(2002); Bruining et al. (2004) 
Increased Managerial 
Independence 
Lowenstein (1985); Jensen 
(1989a); Hoskisson and Turk 
(1990); Houlden (1990); Weir 
(1996); Beaver (2001); Butler 
(2001); Wright et al. (2001a) 
 
Pre–buyout Agency Problems 
In Corporate Divisions 
Fama and Jensen (1983b); Hill 
(1988); Thompson and Wright 
(1995) 
Pre–buyout Management 
Issues in Family Firms 
Schulze et al. (2001); Chrisman 
et al. (2004); Howorth et al. 
(2004); Bloom and Reenen 
(2007); Meuleman et al. (2009) 
Stretch Budgets And Business 
Objectives 
Baker and Wruck (1989); 
Easterwood et al. (1989); Jensen 
(1989a); Magowan (1989); Smith 
(1990b); Anders (1992); Baker 
and Montgomery (1994); Butler 
(2001) 
 
Revising the Firm KPIs: Novel 
Yardsticks 
Key Performance Indicators 
Butler (2001); Rogers et al. 
(2002b); Zong (2005); Acharya et 
al. (2008) 
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6. Temporal Drivers 7. Commercial Drivers 1(3) 
High Tempo and Inchoate 
Change 
The Holding Period Time 
Horizon 
General Proprietary Deal Flow Deal Making Expertise 
Allocated Time by GPs After 
Buyout 
Heel and Kehoe (2005); 
Matthews et al. (2009) 
Short Holding Periods 
Associated with High Returns 
Phalippou and Zollo (2005b); 
Lopez–de–Silanes et al. (2011) 
Short Holding Periods Not 
Associated with High Returns 
Siming (2010) 
Long–Term Strategic Focus in 
Buyout Firms 
Rogers et al. (2002b); Jensen et 
al. (2006); Mills (2006) 
Wealth Expropriation –
Hypothesis Supported 
Baker and Wruck (1989); Harlow 
and Howe (1993); Kaestner and 
Liu (1996) 
Wealth Expropriation –
Hypothesis Unsupported 
Kaplan (1989a, 1989b); Kaplan 
and Stein (1993); Renneboog 
and Simons (2005) 
Legitimate Information 
Asymmetries 
Anders (1992); Fox and Marcus 
(1992) 
Proprietary Deal Flow 
Wright et al. (1996); Kaplan and 
Schoar (2005); Loos (2006) 
Restricting Access to 
Auctions 
Wright et al. (1996); Baker and 
Smith (1998); Butler (2001) 
 
 
Commercial Drivers 2(3) 
Target Firm Identification and 
Investment Criteria 
Uncovering the Business 
Potential 
Detecting Nascent Market 
Trends: Multiple Expansion 
Timing the Business Cycles The Entry Transaction: Firm 
Valuation 
Buyout Criteria and Target 
Firms 
Baker and Wruck (1989); Kaplan 
(1989b); Lichtenberg and Siegel 
(1990); Singh (1990); Smith 
(1990b); Opler and Titman 
(1993); Olsen (2002); Malak 
(2005); Masulis and Thomas 
(2009); Arundale (2010) 
The Underperformance 
Hypothesis 
Holthausen and Larcker (1996); 
Renneboog and Simons (2005); 
Nikoskelainen (2006) 
Management Practices Inferior 
in Family–Managed Target 
Firms 
Bloom and Reenen (2007); 
Bloom et al. (2009) 
Industry Growth and Buyout 
Returns 
Phalippou and Zollo (2005a); 
Bergström et al. (2007); 
Valkama et al. (2010) 
Industry Cycles and Vintage 
Years 
Kaplan and Schoar (2005); 
Chew (2009); Cornelius et al. 
(2009); Kaplan and Strömberg 
(2009) 
Timing Ability of VC Fund GPs 
Muscarella et al. (1990); Lerner 
(1994); Schmidt et al. (2004) 
Macroeconomic Conditions 
and Buyout Performance 
Valuation Methods 
Damodaran (2006); Hoffmann 
(2008) 
PE Firms Pay Less Than 
Competitors 
Kaplan (1989b); Butler (2001); 
Wright et al. (2006); Kaplan and 
Strömberg (2009) 
Competitive Auctions, Price 
Levels and Returns 
– 151 – 
Phalippou and Zollo (2005b); 
Valkama et al. (2010) 
Counter–Cyclicality Between 
M&As and Buyouts 
Thomsen and Vinten (2007) 
Loos (2006) 
 
 
Commer. Drivers 3(3) 8. Organizational Drivers 
Divesting the Firm: The Mode 
of Exit 
Mitigated Legislative and 
Regulatory Constraints 
The Corporate Tax Shield: 
Debt and Taxes 
Carried Interest and Capital 
Income 
 
The Prevalent Exit Routes 
Schwienbacher (2002); Povaly 
(2006); Chapman and Klein 
(2009); Schmidt et al. (2009); 
Achleitner et al. (2012) 
Financial Regulatory Regimes 
European Commission (2006); 
EVCA (2009); Appelbaum and 
Batt (2012); Braun et al. (2013a) 
Tax Reductions from Debt 
Bull (1989); Hayn (1989); Leland 
(1989); Marais, Schipper, and 
Smith (1989); Kaplan (1989a, 
1989b); Rappaport (1990); Singh 
(1990); Smith (1990b, 1990a); 
Frankfurter and Gunay (1992); 
Newbould et al. (1992); Long 
and Ravenscraft (1993b); Baker 
and Smith (1998); Kaplan and 
Strömberg (2009); Guo et al. 
(2011); Jenkinson and Stucke 
(2011) 
Gradually Diminished Tax 
Benefits 
Newbould et al. (1992) 
The Effect Of Carried Interest 
Morris and Phalippou (2011) 
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Appendix B. Thematic Analysis of the Case Study Firms 
The purpose of Appendix B is to illustrate the thematic analysis process and to demonstrate that each case was analyzed meticuously and approached 
by congruous means. The intention is not to outline the themes in detail (e.g. key events and actions) in each case firm, as these are delienated in Chapter 
6 during the Cross–Case Study Analysis. Due to this reason the mindmaps have been condensed for each case to fit a single page. The diagrams 
depicting the key events during the pre– and post–buyout holding period are legible by zooming the pdf –version of the thesis. 
All the attached visualizations of the business case firms have been anonymized in accordance with confidentiality agreements. 
Due to the poor quality of the source data, case study F differed substantially from all other cases. The rudimentary mind map was therefore deemed 
unnucessary and excluded, albeit the case (“Upsilon”) is still presented in narrative form and analyzed. 
The graphics for the thematic analysis were created by using CreativeDraw Mindmap® application. 
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 Figure 8. Thematic analysis of a case firm “A” 
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 Figure 9. Thematic analysis of a case firm “B” 
– 155 – 
 
 Figure 10. Thematic analysis of a case firm “C” 
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 Figure 11. Thematic analysis of a case firm “D” 
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 Figure 12. Thematic analysis of a case firm “E”  
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Appendix C. Comparison to a Prior Taxonomy of Value Generation 
Figure 13. Comparison of value generation mechanisms to Berg & Gottschalg taxonomy 
In Figure 13 the red colored squares indicate corresponding mechanisms noted by Berg and Gottschalg (2003), while the green 
colored designate novel mechanisms. Diagonally marked squares indicate partial similarity. The table does not include the fourth 
layer of methods, since it is lacking in the taxonomy by Berg and Gottschalg.  
Value Capture Indirect Value Creation Direct Value Creation 
   
Strategic 
driver 
Operational 
driver 
Financial 
driver 
Governance 
driver 
Cultural 
driver 
Temporal 
driver 
Commercial 
driver 
Organizational 
driver 
High Tempo 
and Inchoate 
Change 
Functional 
Experience and 
Operational 
Expertise 
Capital 
Management 
and Asset 
Utilization 
Cost Structure 
Improvements 
Mitigated 
Legislative and 
Regulatory 
Constraints 
Carried 
Interest and 
Capital Income 
The Corporate 
Tax Shield: Debt 
and Taxes 
The GP Effect: 
Experience and 
Expertise 
Matters 
Agency Costs: 
Incentivation 
and Interest 
Realignment 
PE Firm 
Constraints: 
Industry Focus; 
Fund Size 
Restructuring 
the Board of 
Directors 
Reinforcing the 
Management 
Team 
The Holding 
Period Time 
Horizon 
Focusing on 
the Core: 
Complexity 
Reduction 
Focusing on 
Growth: Market 
Expansion 
Focusing on 
Consolidation: 
Buy and Build 
Strategies 
Financial 
Expertise and 
Contact 
Networks 
Alleviating 
Capital Market 
Constraints 
Debt Market 
Cycles: 
Mispricing and 
Overheating 
Leverage: 
Inflating Gains 
and Inducing 
Efforts 
Creative 
Finance 
Capital 
Structure 
Optimization in 
Buyouts 
Asset 
Conversion and 
Securitization 
The Business 
Potential:    
Underperform. 
Firms 
Timing the 
Business 
Cycles 
Nascent 
Market Trends: 
Multiple 
Expansion 
Divesting the 
Firm: The Mode 
of Exit 
The Entry 
Transaction: 
Firm Valuation 
Proprietary 
Deal Flow 
Target Firm 
Identification 
and Investment 
Criteria 
Deal Making 
Expertise 
The Parenting 
Advantage: 
Monitoring and 
Mentoring 
Performance 
Management: 
Stretch 
Budgets; Goals 
Corporate 
Culture: 
Reviving the 
Entrepreneurial 
Spirit 
Revising the 
Firm KPIs: 
Novel 
Yardsticks 
The Principal Sources of Value Generation in Buyouts 
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Glossary 
The principal terminology and concepts of the private equity industry59 
 
Acquisition: The process of gaining control, possession, or ownership of a private portfolio company by an 
operating company or conglomerate. 
Asset: Anything owned by an individual, a business or financial institution that has a present or future value, i.e. 
can be turned into cash. In accounting terms, an asset is something of a future economic benefit obtained as a 
result of previous transactions. Tangible assets can be land and buildings, fixtures and fittings; examples of 
intangible assets are goodwill, patents, and copyrights. 
Asset–backed loan: Loan, typically from a commercial bank, which is backed by asset collateral, often belonging 
to the portfolio company, i.e. firm acquired in a buyout. 
Average IRR: The arithmetic mean of the Internal Rate of Return (IRR). 
Buyout: This is the purchase of a company or a controlling interest of a corporation's shares mainly by a private 
equity investment firm. 
CAGR: Compound Annual Growth Rate. The year–over–year growth rate applied to an investment or other 
aspect of a firm using a base amount. 
Capital (or Assets) Under Management: This is the amount of capital that the fund has at its disposal, and is 
managing for investment purposes. 
Capital Gain: When an asset is sold for more than the initial purchase cost, the profit is known as the capital 
gain. This is the opposite of capital loss. Long–term capital gains (on assets held for a year or longer) are taxed 
at a lower rate than ordinary income. 
Carried Interest: The portion of any gains realized by the fund to which the private equity fund managers are 
entitled, generally without having to contribute capital to the fund. Carried interest is normally expressed as a 
percentage of the total profits of the fund. The industry norm is 20 percent, which the fund manager would 
normally receive, while the remaining 80 percent would be distributed to the fund investors. 
Consolidation (or Roll–Up Acquisitions): An investment strategy in which a buyout firm acquires a series of 
companies in the same or complementary fields, with the goal of becoming a dominant regional or nationwide 
player in that industry. In some cases, a holding company will be created to acquire the new companies. In other 
cases, an initial acquisition may serve as the platform through which the other acquisitions will be made. 
Deal Flow: The measure of the number of potential investments that a fund reviews in any given period. 
Deal Structure: An agreement made between the investor and the company defining the rights and obligations 
of the parties involved. The process by which one arrives at the final term and conditions of the investment. 
Depreciation: An expense recorded to reduce the value of a long–term tangible asset. Since it is a non–cash 
expense, it increases free cash flow while decreasing the amount of a company's reported earnings. 
Debt financing: This is raising money for working capital or capital expenditure through some form of loan. This 
could be by arranging a bank loan or by selling bonds, bills or notes (forms of debt) to individuals or institutional 
investors. In return for lending the money, the individuals or institutions become creditors and receive a promise 
to repay principal plus interest on the debt. 
Distressed debt: This is a form of finance used to purchase the corporate bonds of companies that have either 
filed for bankruptcy or appear likely to do so. Private equity firms and other corporate financiers who buy 
distressed debt don't asset–strip and liquidate the companies they purchase. Instead, they can make good 
returns by restoring them to health and then prosperity. These buyers first become a major creditor of the target 
company. This gives them leverage to play a prominent role in the reorganization or liquidation stage. In the 
event of a liquidation, distressed debt firms, by standing ahead of the equity holders in the line to be repaid, 
often recover all of their money, if not a healthy return on their investment. Otherwise known as vulture capital. 
                                                                                       
59 The glossary is an abridged and augmented replication of two primary sources: (A) European Private Equity and Venture 
Capital Association at http://www.evca.eu/toolbox/glossary.aspx?id=982, and, (B) Private Equity Demystified: An 
Explanatory Guide, 2nd ed., 2010 at https://workspace.imperial.ac.uk/entrepreneurship/Public/Privateequity2[1].pdf. 
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Due Diligence: A process undertaken by potential investors, individuals, or institutions to analyze and assess 
the desirability, value, and potential of an investment opportunity. 
EBITDA (Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization): A measure of cash flow calculated as: 
Revenue Expenses, but excluding tax, interest, depreciation and amortization. EBITDA looks at the cash flow of 
a company. By not including interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization, we can clearly see the amount of 
money a company brings in. This is especially useful when one company is considering a takeover of another 
because the EBITDA would cover any loan payments needed to finance the takeover. 
Economies of Scale: The economic principle that states that as the volume (of similar goods) of production 
increases, the cost of producing each unit decreases. 
Economies of Scope: Efficiencies wrought by a limitation of the variety (of produced goods), but not the volume. 
Equity: Ownership interest in a company, usually in the form of stock or stock options. 
Equity Carve–out: A clause present in deal documentation that reserves a percentage or fixed amount of 
preferred proceeds for a particular holder. The carve–out can be assigned any seniority and thus any position 
within the preference distribution stack. 
Equity Kicker: Option for private equity investors to purchase shares at a discount. Typically associated with 
mezzanine financings where a small number of shares or warrants are added to what is primarily a debt financing. 
Exit Strategy: A fund's intended method for liquidating its holdings while achieving the maximum possible 
return. These strategies depend on the exit climates including market conditions and industry trends. Exit 
strategies can include selling or distributing the portfolio company's shares after an initial public offering (IPO), 
a sale of the portfolio company, or a recapitalization. 
Exits (AKA divestments or realizations): The means by which a private equity firm realizes a return on its 
investment. Private equity investors generally receive their principal returns via a capital gain on the sale or 
flotation of investments. Exit methods include a trade sale (most common), flotation on a stock exchange 
(common), a share repurchase by the company or its management, or a refinancing of the business (least 
common). Secondary buyouts, i.e. the exit of one private equity firm in a buyout firm to another private equity 
firm, are becoming an increasingly common. 
Flipping: The act of buying shares in an IPO and selling them immediately for a profit. Brokerage firms 
underwriting new stock issues tend to discourage flipping, and will often try to allocate shares to investors who 
intend to hold on to the shares for some time. However, the temptation to flip a new issue once it has risen in 
price sharply is too irresistible for many investors who have been allocated shares in a hot issue. A quick flip is 
often defined as meaning 12 or 18 months within the private equity industry. 
Fund age: The age of a fund (in years) from its first takedown to the time an IRR is calculated. 
Fund Size: The total amount of capital committed by the investors of a venture capital fund. 
General Partners (GP): The partner in a limited partnership responsible for all management decisions of the 
partnership. The GP has a fiduciary responsibility to act for the benefit of the limited partners (LPs), and is fully 
liable for its actions. By the term is commonly referred to the partners of the private equity firm that operate the 
buyout funds and invest in portfolio firms. 
Holding Period: The amount of time an investor has held an investment. The period begins on the date of 
purchase and ends on the date of sale, and determines whether a gain or loss is considered short–term or long–
term, for capital gains tax purposes. 
Initial Public Offering (IPO): The sale or distribution of a stock of a portfolio company to the public for the first 
time. IPOs are often an opportunity for the existing investors (often venture capitalists) to receive significant 
returns on their original investment. During periods of market downturns or corrections the opposite is true. 
Institutional Investors: Organizations that professionally invest, including insurance companies, depository 
institutions, pension funds, investment companies, mutual funds, and endowment funds. Typically the 
institutional investors (Limited Partners or LPs) invest in the funds or the private equity firm.  
IRR (Internal Rate of Return): A typical measure of how VC Funds measure performance. IRR is a technically a 
discount rate: the rate at which the present value of a series of investments is equal to the present value of the 
returns on those investments. 
J–Curve Effect: The curve realized by plotting the returns generated by a private equity fund against time (from 
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inception to termination). The common practice of paying the management fee and start–up costs out of the 
first draw–down does not produce an equivalent book value. As a result, a private equity fund will initially show 
a negative return. When the first realizations are made, the fund returns start to rise quite steeply. After about 
three to five years, the interim IRR will give a reasonable indication of the definitive IRR. This period is generally 
shorter for buyout funds than for early–stage and expansion funds. 
Junior Securities: A security that ranks lower than other securities in regards to the owner's claims on assets and 
income in the event the issuer becomes insolvent. 
Lemon: An investment that has a poor or negative rate of return. An old venture capital adage claims "lemons 
ripen before plums." 
Leveraged Buyouts (LBO): A takeover of a company, using a combination of equity and borrowed funds. 
Generally, the target company's assets act as the collateral for the loans taken out by the acquiring group. The 
acquiring group then repays the loan from the cash flow of the acquired company. For example, a group of 
investors may borrow funds, using the assets of the company as collateral, in order to take over a company. Or 
the management of the company may use this vehicle as a means to regain control of the company by 
converting a company from public to private. In most LBOs, public shareholders receive a premium to the 
market price of the shares. 
Limited Partners (LP): An investor in a limited partnership who has no voice in the management of the 
partnership. LP's have limited liability and usually have priority over GP's upon liquidation of the partnership. By 
the term is commonly referred the capital investors of private equity funds (e.g. pension fund investors). 
Limited Partnerships: An organization comprised of a general partner, who manages a fund, and limited 
partners, who invest money but have limited liability and are not involved with the day–to–day management of 
the fund. In the typical venture capital fund, the general partner receives a management fee and a% of the 
profits (or carried interest). The limited partners receive income, capital gains, and tax benefits. 
Liquidation: (a) The process of converting securities into cash or (b) The sale of the assets of a company to one 
or more acquirers in order to pay off debts. In the event that a corporation is liquidated, the claims of secured 
and unsecured creditors and owners of bonds and preferred stock take precedence over the claims of those 
who own common stock. 
Liquidation Preference: The amount per share that a holder of a given series of Preferred Stock will receive prior 
to distribution of amounts to holders of other series of Preferred Stock or Common Stock. This is usually 
designated as a multiple of the Issue Price, for example 2X or 3X, and there may be multiple layers of liquidation 
Management Buy–in (MBI): When a team of managers buys into a company from outside, taking a majority 
stake, it is likely to need private equity financing. An MBI is likely to happen if the internal management lacks 
expertise or the funding needed to 'buyout' the company from within. It can also happen if there are succession 
issues in family businesses; for example, there may be nobody available to take over the management of the 
company. An MBI can be slightly riskier than an MBO because the new management will not be as familiar with 
the way the company works. 
Management Buyout (MBO): A private equity firm will often provide financing to enable current operating 
management to acquire or buy at least 50 percent of the business they manage. In return, the private equity 
firm usually receives a stake in the business. This is one of the least risky types of private equity investments 
because the company is already established and the managers running it know the business and the market it 
operates in extremely well. 
Market Capitalization: The total dollar value of all outstanding shares. Computed as shares multiplied by current 
price per share. Prior to an IPO, market capitalization is arrived at by estimating a company's future growth and 
by comparing a company with similar public or private corporations. 
Mergers (Mergers and Acquisitions): The combination of two or more corporations. By which often greater 
efficiency is supposed to be achieved by the elimination of duplicate plant, equipment, and staff, and the 
reallocation of capital assets to increase sales and profits in the enlarged company. 
Mezzanine financing: This is the term associated with the middle layer of financing in leveraged buyouts. In its 
simplest form, this is a type of loan finance that sits between equity and secured debt. Because the risk with 
mezzanine financing is higher than with senior debt, the interest charged by the provider will be higher than 
that charged by traditional lenders, such as banks. However, equity provision – through warrants or options – is 
sometimes incorporated into the deal. 
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Net Asset Value (NAV): Calculated by adding the value of all of the investments in the fund and dividing by the 
number of shares of the fund that are outstanding. NAV calculations are required for all mutual funds (or open–
end funds) and closed–end funds. The price per share of a closed–end fund will trade at either a premium or a 
discount to the NAV of that fund, based on market demand. Closed–end funds generally trade at a discount to 
NAV. 
Net IRR: The IRR of a fund taking into account the effect of management fees and carried interest. 
Net Present Value (NPV): An approach used in capital budgeting where the present value of cash inflow is 
subtracted from the present value of cash outflows. NPV is the present value of current and future income 
streams, minus initial investment. 
Positive Abnormal Performance: A financial measure of the positive return of a security that exceeds the risk–
adjusted norm. A common measure of an abnormal return is Jensen's alpha. 
Portfolio company: A private equity firm will invest in several companies, each of which is known as a portfolio 
company. The spread of investments into the various target companies is referred to as the portfolio of the 
private equity firm. 
Preferred return (or Hurdle Rate): The minimum return to investors to be achieved before the general partner 
(GP) is eligible to deduct carried interest. A hurdle rate of 10% means that the private equity fund needs to 
achieve a return of at least 10% per annum before the profits are shared according to the carried interest 
arrangement. 
Private Equity: This refers to the holding of stock in unlisted companies, i.e. companies not quoted on a stock 
exchange. It sometimes includes venture capital and buyout financing, but often is used to denote only buyout 
financing.  
Private Equity Firm: Mainly an investment company that raises capital into funds and from these invests in private 
enterprises. Investments are made in the form of buyouts, whereby the fund acquires the majority stake in the 
private enterprise.  
Public–to–private (PTP or P2P): When a quoted company is taken into private ownership, often after it has been 
subject to a buyout by a private equity firm. 
Public Market Equivalent (PME): A set of analyses used in the private equity industry to evaluate the performance 
of a PE fund against a public benchmark or index (composed of similar public companies). 
Ratchets: This is a structure that determines the eventual equity allocation between groups of shareholders. A 
ratchet enables a management team to increase its share of equity in a company if the company is performing 
well. The equity allocation in a company varies, depending on the performance of the company and the rate of 
return that the private equity firm achieves. 
Recapitalization: The result of an injection of capital, either through raising debt or equity. A company may seek 
to save on taxes by replacing preferred stock with bonds in order to gain interest deductibility. Recapitalization 
can be an alternative exit strategy for venture capitalists and leveraged buyout sponsors. 
Reversed Leveraged Buyout (R–LBO or RBO): When a company that was subject to a buyout and delisted from 
a stock exchange is relisted during an exit. 
Secondary Buyout: A common exit strategy. This type of buyout typically happens when a private equity firm's 
holding in a private company is sold to another private equity investor. 
Senior Securities: Securities that have a preferential claim over common stock on a company's earnings and in 
the case of liquidation. Generally, preferred stocks and bonds are considered senior securities. 
Spin–Out: A division or subsidiary of a company that becomes an independent business. Typically private equity 
investors provide the necessary capital to allow the division to perform a spin–out on its own, while the parent 
company may retain a minority stake. Similarly, a carve–out is when an investor acquires a division or business 
unit of a corporation. 
Subordinated Debt (or Junior Debt): Debt with inferior liquidation privileges to senior debt in case of a 
bankruptcy; sub debt will carry higher interest rates than senior debt, to which it is subordinated, to compensate 
for the added risk, and will typically have attached warrants or equity conversion features. 
Syndication: A number of investors offering funds together as a group on a particular deal. A lead investor often 
coordinates such deals and represents the group's members. Within the last few years, syndication among angel 
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investors (an angel alliance) has become more common, enabling them to fund larger deals closer to those 
typifying a small venture capital fund. 
Turn–around: Turn–around finance is provided to a company that is experiencing severe financial difficulties. 
The aim is to provide enough capital to bring a company back from the brink of collapse. Turn–around 
investments can offer spectacular returns to investors but there are drawbacks: the uncertainty involved means 
that they are high risk and they take time to implement. 
Venture capital: Principally the term given to early–stage investments (often within the high–tech or biotech 
industries). 
Vintage Year: The year in which the venture firm began making investments. Often funds with vintage years at 
the top of a market cycle will display below average market returns. 
 

